4. Evaluate the meaning and significance of inductive reasoning for the success of the Cosmological argument. (30)
Introduction:
The Cosmological Argument is a classical argument for the existence of God that has been developed by many philosophers throughout history. One of the key features of this argument is its reliance on inductive reasoning, which involves drawing general conclusions from specific observations. This essay aims to evaluate the meaning and significance of inductive reasoning for the success of the Cosmological Argument, with reference to the ideas of philosophers such as Aquinas, Hume, and Kant.
Thesis:
Inductive reasoning plays a significant role in the success of the Cosmological Argument by allowing philosophers to draw general conclusions about the existence of God from specific observations about the universe.
Argument:
The Cosmological Argument is based on the premise that everything that exists has a cause. From this premise, philosophers have argued that there must be a First Cause that is responsible for the existence of the universe. One of the key ways in which this argument is supported is through inductive reasoning.
According to Aquinas, the Cosmological Argument relies on inductive reasoning to draw general conclusions about the existence of God from specific observations about the world. As he states in his Summa Theologica, "We observe in nature things that are caused to exist by other things. Therefore, there must be a First Cause that is not caused by anything else, and this we call God" (Aquinas, Summa Theologica).
Hume, on the other hand, offers a critique of inductive reasoning and its application to the Cosmological Argument. He argues that we cannot infer the existence of a First Cause from the mere fact that everything in the universe has a cause. As he writes in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, "The inference of a First Cause from the works of nature is not supported by reasoning, but by imagination" (Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion).
Despite Hume's critique, Kant argues that inductive reasoning plays an important role in supporting the Cosmological Argument. According to Kant, the concept of a First Cause is necessary to make sense of our experience of the world. As he writes in his Critique of Pure Reason, "The idea of a First Cause is not a mere subjective fancy, but a necessary condition for the possibility of our experience of the world" (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason).
Counter Argument:
However, some philosophers have argued that inductive reasoning is not sufficient to support the Cosmological Argument. For example, philosopher Bertrand Russell argues that the argument relies on a flawed premise, namely that everything that exists has a cause. He writes in his book Why I Am Not a Christian, "The argument for a First Cause is based on a false premise, namely that everything that exists has a cause" (Russell, Why I Am Not a Christian).
Counter Counter Argument:
Despite these criticisms, proponents of the Cosmological Argument have argued that inductive reasoning remains an important tool for supporting the argument. As philosopher William Lane Craig argues, "The Cosmological Argument is not based on the premise that everything has a cause, but rather that everything that begins to exist has a cause. This is a well-supported empirical observation, and it allows us to infer the existence of a First Cause" (Craig, The Kalam Cosmological Argument).
Synoptic Links to the Study of Buddhism
While inductive reasoning may not be directly relevant to the Buddhist worldview and metaphysics, it is still important to consider the role of reasoning and argumentation in Buddhist philosophy of religion. Buddhism has a rich tradition of debate and logical analysis, particularly within the Mahayana school of thought. The use of logical arguments, such as the famous tetralemma, was seen as a way to overcome conceptual hindrances and arrive at a direct understanding of reality. Bhikkhu Bodhi says "The Buddha's path can be characterized as an appeal to reason, rather than to authority, as the basis for deciding what is true or false." - While inductive reasoning may not be directly relevant to the Buddhist worldview, it is still important to consider the role of reasoning and argumentation in Buddhist philosophy. Buddhism has a rich tradition of debate and logical analysis, particularly within the Mahayana school of thought. The use of logical arguments, such as the famous tetralemma, was seen as a way to overcome conceptual hindrances and arrive at a direct understanding of reality. Jay Garfield says "Logical analysis, in the sense of clear thinking and rigorous argument, is considered essential for understanding the Buddha's teachings." - Moreover Mark Siderits argues "The Buddhist tradition has a rich history of logical debate, and logic is considered to be a vital tool for developing insight into the nature of reality." - Furthermore, the concept of dependent origination can be seen as a form of cosmological argument, in which all phenomena are seen as arising in dependence upon other phenomena.
Conclusion
In terms of the cosmological argument itself, inductive reasoning plays a significant role in the form of the argument known as the "argument from contingency". This argument proceeds from the observation that everything in the world is contingent, or dependent upon other things, and argues that there must therefore be a necessary being, or God, that is responsible for the existence of all contingent things. While there are criticisms of this argument, such as David Hume's critique of causation, it remains a powerful argument for the existence of God. Overall, while inductive reasoning may not be directly relevant to the cosmological argument in Buddhism, it remains an important tool for philosophical inquiry and logical analysis, and can help us to better understand the nature of reality and the arguments for the existence of God.
References:
Bodhi, B. (2011). What Does the Buddha Really Teach?: A Secular Perspective on the Buddha's Teaching. Buddhist Publication Society.
Garfield, J. L. (1995). The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika. Oxford University Press.
Siderits, M. (2013). Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction. Ashgate Publishing.Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica. Part I, Question 2, Article 3. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Benziger Bros. edition, 1948.
Hume, David. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Edited by Richard Popkin. Hackett Publishing Company, 1998.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Russell, Bertrand. Why I Am Not a Christian. Routledge Classics, 2004.
Craig, William Lane. The Kalam Cosmological Argument. Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1979.
4. Evaluate the meaning and significance of inductive reasoning for the success of the Cosmological argument. (30)
4 Evaluate the claim that a posteriori types of arguments for Gods existence will never be successful. (30)
4 Evaluate the opinion that Aquinas arguments from movement, as well as cause and effect are still useful in proving Gods existence. (30)
Cosmological Arguments start with the existence of the universe (Greek = Kosmos) and conclude that God is the most logical explanation of it. They are some of the oldest arguments for God’s existence and have an intuitive appeal. As Richard Swinburne observed in “Is There a God?” (1996)
“The human quest for explanation inevitably and rightly seeks for the ultimate explanation of everything observable.”
Cosmological Arguments can be found in the work of Plato (Laws Book X) and Aristotle (Physics Book II, Metaphysics Book IV) and make up the first four of Aquinas’ five ways to God in the Summa Theologica (1.2.3). While Aquinas’ Cosmological Arguments are all framed as a posteriori arguments – and so could never provide proof – they do provide strong support for the existence of a Prime Mover. Nevertheless, Aquinas goes too far in his claim that this is what everybody calls God.
Aquinas’ first way draws on the Aristotelian concept of movement. In the Physics, Book V, Aristotle wrote, “all things that are in motion must be moved by something.” Motion does not necessarily mean movement in the sense that things are is moving through space from location A to location B, but rather that they are moving from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality in multiple different respects. As Aristotle wrote, movement involves the… “actualizing of some potency. It is because things have real potencies that they are able to change.” Aquinas later wrote, “for motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality.” Whereas Plato’s argument, later refined by Muslim scholars of the 8th Century Kalam School and more recently by William Lane Craig, focuses on a temporal series of causes much like a domino-rally, pointing towards a beginning in time, an uncaused cause, which is what everybody calls God, for Aristotle and for Aquinas, even if the universe is as infinite as it appeared to be, there is still the need for a Prime Mover because everything depends on other things. As Parmenides, Heraclitus and separately the Buddha observed, everything changes or moves and nothing stays the same, but nothing changes or moves without being moved by something else, even if that is just time itself. As Aristotle wrote, “potential, precisely because it is potential, cannot make itself actual”. Aristotle concluded that there must be a Prime Mover outside time and space, but stops short of claiming that this is God. Aquinas went further, claiming that this Prime Mover is “what everybody calls God”, but in doing this he weakened the argument. It is true that the Prime Mover must be outside time and space and thus wholly simple and unchanging, pure actuality and with zero potentiality. As Aquinas wrote,
“nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality… it is impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved…”
It is also true that everything ultimately depends on the Prime Mover for its existence. As Aquinas wrote, “therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other” However, it is a step too far to claim that the Prime Mover could be seen as the “creator”, let alone act in the world, speak to human beings or be crucified and rise again. When Aquinas writes “and this everyone understands to be God” He goes beyond the evidence and possible knowledge. In his book “The Nature of God” Gerard J. Hughes describes the Prime Mover changing potentiality to actuality in terms of a bowl of milk causing a cat to cross a room. The bowl of milk does nothing, in the way that the Prime Mover – being timelessly unchanging and impassive – does nothing, because it has no potential and is pure act. It follows that Aquinas’ first framing of the Cosmological Argument provides strong support for the existence of a Prime Mover, but not for the existence of the God that Christians worship, because the Prime Mover would be unable to say “let there be light”, work miracles or judge individuals on the final day… all of these require in God potential and the ability to act in time, which the Prime Mover cannot have.
Aquinas’ second way draws on the Aristotelian concept of efficient causation. For Aristotle, all things have four causes – material, formal, efficient and final. Efficient causes are agents which bring things into being, in the way that parents bring their children into being or the earth, sun and rain bring the oak tree out of the acorn. If everything depends on efficient causes to bring them into being, again there is a chain of causation which requires explanation. The chain cannot be infinite, because if there was no first efficient cause there would be no subsequent causes and the universe would not exist. Something cannot come out of or be caused by nothing. Similarly, there cannot be a first efficient cause like other things in the universe, as if there were it would need efficient causes of its own and could not, therefore, be the first. Aquinas concludes, “it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.” Again, Aquinas’ second Cosmological Argument provides strong support for the existence of an uncaused efficient cause and again, it is a step too far to claim that this must be the God of Christian worship. This not least because efficient causes do not need to be sustaining causes in esse (as Frederick Copleston later called them) but could be a cause in fieri (again, to use Copleston’s terminology). An uncaused cause which began the universe but has no further role in it is not the God of Christian theism; at most it supports deism. Further, Aquinas admits that
“There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be PRIOR to itself, which is impossible.”
This implies that as efficient cause the uncaused cause must be PRIOR to the universe, something which would be difficult to reconcile with Big Bang Theory as this suggests that as time itself was created at the Big Bang, it makes no sense to speak of anything being PRIOR to it or indeed, as Stephen Hawking observed, causing it. In these ways, Aquinas goes beyond the evidence in claiming that the uncaused cause is that to “everyone gives the name of God”.
Aquinas’ third way develops the idea of the contingency of things in the universe, pointing out that everthing has the potential to be or not to be; “We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be”. In an infinite universe, all potentials not to be might be expected to have been realized; as something can’t come out of nothing, nothing would then exist and I could not be writing this essay. It follows, therefore, that EITHER the universe cannot be infinite – in which case there would have to be a first cause in time which would be what everybody calls God – or the universe is infinite and there exists a “necessary being”, a fully actual “neither something nor nothing” which contains its own explanation and has no potential not to exist. This, Aquinas claims, is what “all men speak of as God.” Aquinas’ third Cosmological Argument is just as problematic as an argument for the existence of the God of Christian worship as the first and second. Not only as an a posteriori argument does it stop short of providing proof, it also goes well beyond the observable evidence in concluding that the necessary being is God as Christians would define Him. Leibniz later recast the third Cosmological Argument as an a priori argument, writing:
“Why is there something rather than nothing? The sufficient reason […] is found in a substance which […] is a necessary being bearing the reason for its existence within itself.”
For Leibniz, anything that exists has a cause for its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. If the universe has an external cause for its existence, this cause must be God. As the universe exists, it must have a cause for its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause. Because the universe exists contingently, not necessarily, the universe must have an external cause and this must be God. Nevertheless, like Aquinas, Leibniz argument fails to prove the existence of the God of Christian worship. Causing the universe is not enough to be called God; the Christian God does rather more than an abstract singularity or the Higgs Boson does. Further, it doesn’t make sense to predicate much of what the Christian God does to the necessary cause of the universe supported by Aquinas and by Leibniz in his supposed improvement of Aquinas’ third cosmological argument. Both the God of Aquinas and the God of Leibniz are timelessly impassive and it is inconceivable how such a being could act even once to create the world, given that this would involve a change in its being incompatible with being timeless and fully actual with no potential. Further, as Immanuel Kant observed, we have no experience of necessary beings so it makes little sense to speculate about their possible existence. Also, it is inconsistent to start an argument by claiming that all things are contingent and conclude by hypothesizing something that is not contingent. Again, while Aquinas’ third Cosmological Argument strongly points towards the existence of a necessary being or beings in the universe, it is far from being conclusive proof of such, even when recast as an a priori argument and cannot in any case justifiably claim that the necessary being is what Christians worship as God.
While it is true that most of the classical criticisms of Aquinas presented by David Hume and Bertrand Russell fail to undermine his Cosmological Arguments, the point (which they all make) about the Cosmological Argument failing to support the God of Christian worship stands.
Firstly, Hume criticized a version of the Cosmological Argument presented by his character Demea in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779) Book IX. Cleanthes points out that there is no support for the claim that everything in the universe is moves and is moved, caused and is caused or is contingent. We have a limited view of the universe and no sensible reason to believe that the universe is homogenous or that we see things the way they actually are, a principle known in science as isotropy. For all we know, argues Cleanthes, there could be unmoved movers, uncaused causes or necessary beings within the universe which could explain its continued existence. Nevertheless, accepting these criticisms of the Cosmological Argument entails abandoning Natural Science altogether. Leibniz coined the term “Cosmological Principle” to refer to the principles of homogeneity and isotropy which all scientists must assume in order to reason inductively towards natural laws. Without the Cosmological Principle, we could not make many scientific knowledge claims; Cosmology and Quantum Science, Medicine and Biochemistry would all be a waste of time. In practice, laws of nature supported by inductive reasoning enable mobile phones and space shuttles to work, so it doesn’t make sense to doubt the authority of our observations as Hume, through Cleanthes, does. These criticisms of Hume’s fail to undermine Aquinas’ Cosmological Arguments insofar as they point to a necessary cause for the universe.
Secondly, Cleanthes continues by criticizing the claim that just because the parts of the universe have causes, so must the universe as a whole. Demea (and Aquinas) rely on the so-called fallacy of composition. Further, Cleanthes asks why the universe cannot be the explanation of itself, why there must be an external cause for the universe. Later, Bertrand Russell asked why the universe cannot be a “brute fact”. Yet neither of these criticisms is conclusive. As Leibniz points out, it is difficult to see how a universe of contingencies can itself exist necessarily. Contingencies involve potential which cannot, by definition, exist within a necessary being. Further, while characteristics of the parts do not necessarily have to be characteristics of the whole and while (as Russell argued) just because all men have mothers it doesn’t mean that the human race has a mother, it can sometimes follow. Each strand of spaghetti has two ends, something which also applies to the whole packet of spaghetti. In a sense and because it is made up of material in the way that things in the universe are, the universe is a thing. Things exist contingently and need to be moved and caused by things other than themselves. These criticisms of Hume’s fail to undermine Aquinas’ Cosmological Arguments insofar as they point to a necessary cause for the universe as well.
Nevertheless, Cleanthes’ criticism that the cause of the universe could not be said to have the attributes of the Christian God is, for reasons previously explored, is persuasive. Again it is clear that while Aquinas’ Cosmological Arguments do offer support to the hypothesis that there is an uncaused, necessary cause for the universe, they are far from proving that the God of Christian worship exists.
In conclusion, Aquinas’ Cosmological fail to prove that God exists, both because as a posteriori arguments they stop short of proving their conclusions and because even if they are reframed into a format which could provide proof, as Leibniz attempted, they demonstrate only the existence of an abstract necessary being far short of having the attributes of the God Christians worship.
Bibliography
Class notes on the Cosmological Argument
Aristotle, Physics Book V
Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1, 2, 3
Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Book IX
Vardy & Vardy “God Matters” Chapters 4 & 5
4 Evaluate the claim that the universe requires a cause and that God is the best explanation. (30)
Aquinas’ first cause argument is the second of his three versions of the Cosmological Argument, which form the first of his three ways to God in the first part of the Summa Theologica. As a Cosmological Argument, Aquinas’ first cause argument starts from the observation of order, in this case causation, in the universe. The word “Cosmological” derives from the Greek “Kosmos” which means both “order” and “universe”. As Anthony Kenny[CV1] explains, Aquinas relies on Aristotle’s theory of causation, as outlined in the Metaphysics Book IV. Aristotle argued that all things in the universe have four causes, which can by understood in terms of the material, efficient, formal and final. Material causes are the physical ingredients of things, efficient causes the agents that cause them to exist as they do, formal causes the definitions of things which make them what they are and the final cause to which things aim is their goal or telos and ultimately flourishing. Focusing on efficient causation, Aquinas’ second way to God argues that everything in the universe is caused by one or more agents outside itself and nothing causes itself to exist. If this is so then there is a problem – what was the first efficient cause. An infinite chain of efficient causes makes no sense, because without a first cause nothing would exist. Something cannot come out of nothing. There must be a first efficient cause, but this must itself be uncaused, which makes it unlike any other thing. The uncaused cause of the universe could then be said to be “neither something nor nothing” and, Aquinas concludes, this is what everybody calls God. As an inductive argument the conclusion of the Cosmological Argument, that God exists, is supported by observed premises which are falsifiable. Because of this, Aquinas’ first cause argument cannot be said to prove God’s existence. The problem of induction ensures that the most that the argument can be said to achieve is a very high degree of probability that its conclusions are, in fact, true[CV2] . Leaving the problem of induction and the issue of proof to one side: Aquinas’ first cause argument is still a convincing argument for the existence of God and, as William Lane Craig continues to argue, it is a useful means of defending the rationality of faith [CV3] .
An immediate criticism of Aquinas’ argument is that it assumes that EVERYTHING in the universe is caused. Although this claim is supported by Aristotle, it may be fair to suggest – as indeed JL Mackie did in “The Miracle of Theism” (1982[CV4] ) – that there may be things in the universe that are uncaused. Indeed, Quantum Physics has concluded that there are sub-atomic particles that are in a sense uncaused. It could be that Aquinas’ first premise – that everything in the universe is caused – is untrue and if that is the case then the argument would fail. Nevertheless, it would be going too far to suggest that Physics has proven the existence of uncaused things in the universe. Quantum particles could well be caused, for all we know, even though they appear not to be. The most that Mackie’s criticism achieves is to show that Aquinas’ first premise must remain uncertain. Although it seems likely on the basis of present experience that all things are caused, as Hume observed it is always possible that there are things in the universe that are uncaused and that these could explain the universe without recourse to God[CV5] . In this way, although Aquinas’ first cause argument is not entirely successful as an argument for God’s existence from observation, it is able to survive an obvious line of criticism.
In Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779) Hume went on to suggest that the universe itself could be the uncaused cause of itself. Russell made a similar point in his debate with Frederick Copleston[CV6] , suggesting that the universe should be seen as a “brute fact”. This is certainly possible; Aquinas’ might be guilty of committing the fallacy of composition in reasoning that just because things within the universe need causes that the universe as a whole needs a cause. Russell gave the analogy of mothers – just because all men have mothers doesn’t mean that the human race has a mother. While Hume and Russell could well be right and the universe might be the cause of itself, this goes well beyond our experience. It is just as difficult to theorise about the universe being self-causing as it is to theorise that it has an uncaused cause. Neither conclusion can be drawn with any degree of confidence. What does seem certain is that Aquinas is correct to reason that the universe must be explained in terms of something that is uncaused, whether that is within the universe, the universe itself – or God. William Lane Craig[CV7] , in adapting the Cosmological Argument for modern Christian Apologetics, chooses to leave the argument at its first conclusion – that there must exist an uncaused causer. He leaves it to Theologians to convince people that the uncaused cause is in fact “what everybody calls God” and it seems that his caution is sensible. Neither Aquinas’ first cause argument nor any other version of the Cosmological Argument can conclusively prove the existence of God, but the argument can point to the rationality of faith given the necessity for a cause for the universe which is unlike anything within our normal experience[CV8] .
Immanuel Kant advised such caution when in the Critique of Pure Reason he argued that the Cosmological Argument, like other inductive arguments for God’s existence, goes beyond the boundaries of what we can claim to know. It is reasonable to observe that all things are caused and that there is a tension implicit in this which demands explanation – but it is not reasonable to draw conclusions about that explanation when they go beyond possible experience. Perhaps this is where faith comes in; the first cause argument cannot successfully PROVE the existence of God, but it can point towards a mystery which is evident in the observed universe, a mystery which is suggestive of the existence of something supernatural if not of the God of Classical Theism. As Hume pointed out, the first cause argument cannot claim to lead to the God of Christianity – even to a single God in fact – but limited as it is, the argument provides a useful defence for the believer[CV9] .
References
[CV1]Precise relevant detail and range of scholarly views
[CV2]Acknowledging & engaging with the precise wording of the title – This also works to show the LIMITATIONS of the argument.
[CV3]THESIS
[CV4]Using a range of scholarly views. This paragraph also serves as the COUNTERCLAIM, as it does cede some of the point that Mackie makes.
[CV5]Evaluating the “maybe not everything has a cause” criticism, linking to the THESIS, justified, developed…
[CV6]Range of scholarly views – again a bit of counterargument (balance) here, allowing that Hume and Russell have a point.
[CV7]Range of scholarly views
[CV8]Evaluating the fallacy of composition criticism and linking to the THESIS – justified, developed, sustained…
[CV9]Drawing in Kant’s criticism & another of Hume’s in drawing the final CONCLUSION, which restates the THESIS – successful argument. Builds step by step and is therefore convincing.
4 Evaluate the opinion that contingency and necessity existence in cosmological arguments that show God exists. . (30)
4 Evaluate the relative importance of the issues around the interpretation of experience in cosmological arguments. (30)
4 Evaluate the view that the cosmological argument fails given the issues around the interpretation of experience.’ (30)
4 Evaluate the significance of the the problem of infinite regression in the cosmological argument . (30)
4 Evaluate the extent to which he principle of sufficient reason provides an explanation for G-d’s existence. (30)
4 Evaluate the relevance of the Principle of sufficient reason as an approach to successfully showing that God exists. . (30)
4 Evaluate the opinion the strenghts and weaknesss of the claim that the Kalam version of the cosmological argument for G-d’s existence is successful. (30)
The Kalam Argument for the existence of God was put forward by Islamic mutakallimimiin in the early middle ages. Responding to the work of Aristotle, gathered and translated by the first Caliphs into the Bayt al Hikmah in Baghdad, Muslim scholars were divided between accepting Aristotle’s persuasive world-view along with his arguments and modifying Aristotle to fit in with the revealed truth that the Universe was created by Allah and so had a beginning in time. Those who accepted Aristotle’s idea of an infinite universe, albeit one sustained by a Prime Mover, were known as “Falsafa” (the Arabic transliteration of “Philosopher” and those who modified Aristotle were known as “Kalam” (which literally means word or speech of God). The Kalam argument built on 6th century Christian writer John Philoponus’ argument that the idea of an infinite universe was self-contradictory. Philoponus observed that “The eternity of the universe would imply an infinite number of past motions that is continually being increased. But an infinite cannot be added to…” Scholars of the Kalam school argued that
P1: Everything that begins to exist has a cause
P2: The Universe began to exist
IC: The universe has a cause to its existence.
P3: That cause is what everybody calls God
C: God exists
In this way, scholars such as Al Kindi and later Al Ghazali proposed that Aristotle’s principle of causation suggests a necessary Uncaused Causer at the beginning of time rather than just a Prime Mover sustaining an infinite universe.
The work of Al Ghazali in particular inspired American scholar William Lane Craig to develop and defend a new version of the Kalam Argument in the 1970s and 1980s as part of a battery of arguments which he employs for the purposes of Christian apologetics. He focussed on the first part of the argument above, namely
P1: Everything that begins to exist has a cause
P2: The Universe began to exist
C: The universe has a cause to its existence.
Craig chose to leave it to Theologians to argue separately that the (uncaused) cause of the universe could indeed be said to be God. Nevertheless, Craig’s argument was subject to immediate criticism. Scientists took issue with the proposition “everything that begins to exist has a cause”, citing quantum particles as examples of entities within the universe that are not subject to the Aristotelian principle of causation. Atheists took issue with the conclusion “that cause is what everybody calls God”, noting that little can be known about the Uncaused Cause of the universe and there is little point of worshipping something as abstract as the Higgs Boson. This essay will conclude that while the argument fails to demonstrate God’s existence it has significant value in other ways.
The Atheist philosopher JL Mackie rejected Craig’s first statement of his Kalam argument in his “The Miracle of Theism”, which was published posthumously in 1983. In Chapter 5 Mackie attacks the idea that the universe could have a first cause in time, suggesting that Craig had misunderstood the concept of infinity. He doubts that there is any good reason to believe that the first proposition of the Kalam argument, that “everything that begins to exist has a cause”, is true but focusses his attention on proposition two, that the universe must have begun to exist. Mackie showed that there are a series of steps or sub-arguments involved in proposition 2, the first relying on the impossibility of an actual infinite and the second relying on the impossibility of an infinity by successive addition. He argued that neither of the sub-arguments could be said to be sound and therefore that proposition 2, on which Craig’s conclusion relies, cannot be upheld. Finally, Mackie pointed to the inconsistency in an argument which starts by upholding causality and then proposes an uncaused solution; like Al Ghazali and later Bertrand Russell, he asks “why could not the universe be its own cause?” Mackie’s critique of Craig’s argument is persuasive and echoes generations of critics of the Cosmological Argument as a whole. Nevertheless, in “Professor Mackie and the Kalam Cosmological Argument“[2] Craig labelled Mackie’s criticism as “superficial”, suggesting that Mackie’s theoretical demolition of his claim that an actual infinite or an infinity by successive addition is impossible did not address the real-world difficulty of supposing the universe has no beginning. It is one thing to theorise about Hilbert’s Hotel or Gabriel’s Trumpet, but it is a different matter to suggest that either approximates to reality. Craig appeals to experience; how can we suppose that a series of causes and effects in time has no beginning? Something just can’t come out of nothing! It seems that Craig really has a point; the concept of infinity stretches the bounds of comprehension and the idea of the universe we can see and otherwise sense and that we can observe (using radio-telescopes at least) expanding, having no beginning and no end seems much less plausible than the alternative.
Nevertheless, Craig’s reluctance to make the move from claiming that the universe has a first cause in time to claiming that this cause is God is a potential weakness. Perhaps, as James Still observes, “Craig’s admirable effort to prove the finitude of the universe leaves him in the position of the runner at Marathon. While he has expended all of his energy to bring the news of the universe’s beginning to us, he has little strength left to argue convincingly for its cause.” Or perhaps Craig’s reluctance is more strategic. Given research into sub-atomic particles and the evidenced suggestion that on the quantum level things happen without a cause right now, let alone when the conditions of the universe were markedly different (as in the singularity), it is a logical stretch to identify the un-caused cause of the universe with God with any speed and without a great deal of justification. Although the qualities that Craig ascribes to the cause of the universe – uncaused, necessary, timeless, space-less, eternal, unchanging, infinitely powerful – are the traditional qualities of God, arguably they became so as a result of the work of philosophers in attempting to co-opt Aristotle’s philosophy into the Philosophy of Religion. It is difficult to see how the cause of the universe could be understood to be the father of Jesus, the author of miracles or the active recipient of prayers, even allowing for the use of metaphorical language. Yet of course Craig understands this difficulty; as a Reformed Epistemologist following Hick and Pannenberg, he leaves it to Theologians to make that case, seeing that his role as an apologist is limited to showing that a faith sourced elsewhere is potentially reasonable. Craig’s theistic purpose in advancing and defending his argument is obvious; Craig’s version of the Kalam argument was first advanced at the end of a survey and analysis of cosmological arguments for God’s existence and is repeatedly referenced through Craig’s apologetic articles and videos. It seems that his evasion in relation to the final step in the Islamic Kalam argument is deliberate and strategic, sidestepping the damaging criticism that would inevitably have followed on from his completing the Kalam argument as Al Ghazali did. Craig does not need to complete the argument for his purposes and to do so would be costly, so he chooses to focus on the part of the argument that is more defensible and which raises difficult questions about his opponents’ world-view. While the criticism that Craig is a hypocrite is rightly rejected as being ad hominem,[4] it is fair to suggest that Craig’s strategic approach to the argument undermines its plausibility to some extent.
In later articles and popular presentations[5] Craig has recruited the work of scientists in support of his reasoning, pointing to the Big Bang Theory and associated evidence such as Red Shift, the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics etc. as evidence for the necessity of a beginning for all time and all space. Given the weight of scientific opinion behind the existence of the universe having a beginning it seems reasonable to conclude, as Craig does, that the universe must have a cause and that this must be outside space and time and thus, single, simple, unchanging, necessary and the origin of everything. Yet the Philosopher of Science Adolf Grunbaum rejected Craig’s reasoning, arguing that Big Bang theory leads back to a singularity, an infinitely small and dense point of matter at t0.[6] If time starts with the singularity, it makes no sense to speak of a cause prior to the singularity so the ultimate cause of the universe IS the singularity. To put it another way, the singularity is the cause of the universe and, because there is no space or time prior to the singularity, the cause of the universe can only be the singularity. Grunbaum’s reasoning seems flawless; if space and time are connected, as Einstein demonstrated, a universe expanding in space is also expanding in time and both space and time start together. How then could there be a cause prior to or outside the universe, whether that cause is God or otherwise? Perhaps the conclusion that the universe is, at least so far as human understanding is concerned, “a brute fact” is inescapable.
In conclusion, it seems that the Kalam argument is subject to several significant criticisms. While its simple and elegant form seems to be valid, as JL Mackie observed it conceals chains of reasoning which might not bear scrutiny and makes universal claims about causation which cannot be fully supported. It is not, therefore, a good argument even in terms of establishing the limited conclusion which William Lane Craig restricts it to, that the universe has an unspecified cause. Nevertheless, it does seem that the argument has the merit of drawing attention to the inadequacy of alternative, non-theistic explanations of the universe. It may be that we cannot establish the necessity of a cause for the universe, let alone that that cause is God in any meaningful sense, and yet the idea that the universe has no cause is difficult to accept on any level. In the end the Kalam Argument shines a light on the bizarre state of relations between Science and Theology today… with the Scientists arguing against the principle of causation and against the implications of their own conclusion that the universe started to exist and the Theologians arguing that the scientists have been right all along, that the principle of causation must stand and that the Big Bang Theory and its implications must be accepted in full. Perhaps at some point both will have to accept that establishing the cause of the universe is beyond the limits of human knowledge.
Footnotes
[1] Quoted in William Lane Craig “The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz” (1979) p53.
[2] Religious Studies, 1984, Vol.20, pp.367-375
[3] James T Sill “Eternity and Time in William Lane Craig’s Kalam Cosmological Argument” www.infidels.org
[4] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OSK3F3sjVNk
[5] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6CulBuMCLg0
[6] Vardy and Vardy “God Matters” (SCM Press, 2014) page 74
4 Evaluate to what extent to which Aquinas’ Cosmological Argument successfully reach the conclusion that there is a transcendent creator?’ (30)
Aquinas’ Cosmological Argument fails to demonstrate the existence of the Christian God. While the first, second and third ways offer some support to the belief that there must be a Prime Mover, Uncaused Cause and Necessary Being, In the Summa Theologica 1,2,3 Aquinas only asserts that “this is what all men speak of as God.” Indeed, taking the Prime Mover as an example, it could share only some of the characteristics of God as He is normally understood. While the Prime Mover is certainly transcendent and immutable, the extent to which it could be omnipotent or omniscient, let alone omnibenevolent or immanent, is slight and unconvincing. Nevertheless, putting this criticism aside, Aquinas’ Cosmological Argument successfully demonstrates the existence of a transcendent explanation for the Kosmos.
Firstly, in Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Hume’s character Philo criticised the Cosmological Argument, asking how anybody can be certain that everything has a cause. While it is true that the observed laws of nature which form the premises of Aquinas’ argument depend on observations which are necessarily limited within time and space, questioning whether such observations can be taken to be fair and representative attacks the Cosmological Principle on which all science depends. Newton was the first to express the Cosmological Principle, the assumption that “viewed on a sufficiently large scale, the properties of the universe are the same for all observers” or in other words that the universe is homogenous and isotropic and more fundamentally, that the way we observe the universe is the way it really is and that this is a fair and representative sample of the whole. In asking whether there might not be uncaused things in the universe despite the fact that these have never been observed, Hume’s criticism of the Cosmological Argument constitutes a sceptical attack on the human ability to use observations as a basis for understanding the Natural Laws which govern the universe, so by accepting this criticism we lose far more than one approach to demonstrating the existence of God. It follows that Aquinas’ argument survives Hume’s first criticism and demonstrates the existence of a transcendent “creator”.
Secondly, Hume’s character Philo goes on to ask why the cause of the universe, if such there is, would have to be intelligible. This criticism is no more effective than the first. The whole point of Aquinas argument is to show that whatever caused the universe must be transcendent and beyond human understanding, impervious to the laws of motion, causation and contingency that govern everything else. For Aquinas, the cause of the universe is “neither something nor nothing,” a necessary being that does not exist as things exist, contingently, but rather eternally and immutably outside the framework of spatio-temporal reality. While Kant argued that necessary existence is so far beyond our experience to be beyond possible knowledge, Aquinas does not claim to be able to know or understand God, only to deduce that He exists, albeit mysteriously. It follows that Aquinas’ Cosmological Argument survives Hume’s second criticism and Kant’s criticism as well, demonstrating the existence of a transcendent “creator”.
Thirdly, Hume’s character Philo argues that Aquinas’ argument relies on the Fallacy of Composition, and indeed Aquinas does move from observations of movement, causation and contingency in the universe to claiming that the universe as a whole must be moved, caused and have something to depend on. Russell used the powerful example of all men having mothers but the human race not having a mother to explain Hume’s point. However, while it is fallacious to assume that characteristics of the part MUST be true of the whole, it is not impossible that they are true of the whole. Aquinas (and more recently Craig) appeal to common sense as well as fallacious reasoning when they argue that given that everything in the universe is caused, the universe must also have a cause. The alternative, that the universe is uncaused or, as Russell put it, a “brute fact” seems unacceptable to most people today, not least because the Aristotelian infinite-universe paradigm has been replaced by Big Bang Theory which shows that the universe had an absolute beginning. Masses of Scientific evidence now supports the claim that the universe had a cause, even if that cause outside of the normal laws of nature and so transcendent, even if this was not a “creator” as this would normally be understood. It follows that Aquinas’ Cosmological Argument survives Hume’s third criticism and Russell’s criticisms as well, demonstrating that the universe has a transcendent cause, if not a “creator” precisely.
On the other hand, Aquinas’ Cosmological Argument falls short of providing rational support for faith in the transcendent creator-God of Christianity. As Hume rightly pointed out, there is no way to show that there could not be multiple uncaused causes of the universe, let alone that the cause would be omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent or in any sense personal or capable of becoming incarnate in Jesus Christ. Nevertheless, the question did not ask whether Aquinas’ argument successfully reached the conclusion that God exists, but rather asked whether the argument successfully reached the conclusion that there is a transcendent creator. A transcendent creator may, but also may not be, the same as the God of Christianity. In this case, Aquinas’ argument demonstrates the existence of a transcendent entity that is responsible for initiating and sustaining the universe but no more.
In conclusion, Aquinas’ Cosmological Argument successfully reaches the conclusion that there is a transcendent “creator” but does not demonstrate the existence of God. As William Lane Craig has argued, it is for theologians to determine whether the attributes of the transcendent cause of the universe can be reconciled with those of the object of religious faith. This is why his Kalam argument stops with the conclusion “the universe must have a cause” rather than making the leap to saying “and this is what all men speak of as God” as Aquinas boldly does.
4 Evaluate the claim that the Csomological Argument is undermined by its weaknesses. .’ (30)
4 Evaluate the claim that 'Science, not God, tells us all we need to know about the beginning of the universe (30)
4 Evaluate the importance of the Cosmological Argument as a proof for the existence of God. (30)
4 Evaluate the view that the Cosmological Argument is a successful proof for the existence of God. (30)
4 Evaluate the view that the Russell's idea of the universe as a brute fact in debates about infinite regress sucessfully undermines the Cosmologiacl argument.. (30)
4 Evaluate the view that the Kantian claim of the impossibility of metaphysical knowledge of Gods existence drawn from observation of contingency is sucessful. (30)
4. Evaluate the meaning and significance of Hume's claim if we can explain the parts of the universe we do not have to explain the whole . (30)
4. Evaluate the extent to which Hume successfully argues that observation does NOT prove the existence of God . (30)
David Hume criticized all the classical arguments for God’s existence through his book “Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion“, which was published after his death in 1776. The Dialogues take place between four characters, with the interaction between Demea, a deist, Cleanthes, a theist and Philo, a sceptic, being the focus. Most scholars see Philo as a vehicle for Hume’s own views and arguments and because of this, A Level textbooks list simplified versions of Philo’s criticisms of the classical Cosmological and Teleological arguments from the Dialogues and credit them to Hume. It is probably fair to say that if the textbook was the sum total of one’s reading it would be easy to conclude that Hume was unsuccessful in arguing that observation does not prove the existence of God, in every case other than the criticism that the arguments do not support belief in all the attributes of the Christian God, which Christians accept in any case. Few believers suggest that arguments for God’s existence are sufficient support for Christian faith in themselves. For example, when the textbook suggests that Hume asks “and what caused God” in response to Aquinas’ Cosmological Argument, it would be natural to criticize Hume for missing the more subtle point that Aquinas is making about God’s necessary existence. Nevertheless, if one reads “Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion” it becomes clear that the criticisms Hume places in the mouth of Philo are subtle and support the conclusion that Hume was indeed successful in arguing that observation does not prove the existence of God.
In Part VIII of the Dialogues, against a very basic form of the Cosmological Argument for a “voluntary agent or first mover” Philo points out that nobody can know whether all things in the universe have a cause, that it is fallacious to make the leap from all things in the universe being caused to proposing that the universe itself has a cause. He points out that for all we know some things in the universe could exist or happen without a cause… why not some natural process rather than a supernatural, divine agent deciding to create. He argues in favour of the Epicurean Hypothesis, the idea that the universe could be actually infinite, which was the commonly accepted scientific world-view at the time, rooted in Aristotle.
“But this presupposes, said Demea, that matter can come to move without any voluntary agent or first mover. And where’s the difficulty in that? replied Philo“
Superficially, Philo’s criticisms appear ill-founded. William Lane Craig and other Christian apologists argue that an actual infinity of causes is impossible and suggest that Big Bang theory supports them in the need for an absolute beginning for the universe as a whole and so in the need for an uncaused cause. However in fact, modern Physics supports Philo’s reasoning. Although it is true that the standard model suggests that time and space had a beginning – the Big Bang – no Cosmologist today sees the Big Bang as the absolute beginning in the sense of needing a divine cause to explain it. Stephen Hawking responded to a question about whether the universe needed a cause by saying that the question makes no sense to ask. True, causation applies within time and space, but within the singularity there is no sense in which it could apply. Cause and effect imply time and space; without either it makes no sense to think in terms of causation. Further, research confirms the hypothesis that (at least at the Planck scale) things in the universe exist and happen without a cause and it is possible that the natural action of sub-atomic particles could account for the Big Bang. Whatever the apologists claim, it seems that modern science supports Hume’s criticism of the attempt to prove God from observation and does not support the existence of God as the necessary uncaused cause.
In addition, through parts 8 and 9 of the Dialogues Philo makes the important point that…
“I won’t even allow any one part to justify conclusions about another part”
This is a point that builds on one he made in relation to the teleological argument in Part II
“can it be proper to argue from parts to the whole? Doesn’t the great disproportion between part and whole bar all comparison and inference?”
While superficially flippant, Philo’s point is actually subtle and far-reaching and extends beyond the point that the arguments from observation depend on the Fallacy of Composition. Although it what is true of parts is not necessarily true of the whole, it still could be so the most damage that the classic textbook criticism of the Cosmological Argument could do is to point out that the conclusion needs more support, not that the argument has no merit. In fact, Philo’s criticism of the Cosmological Argument is more damaging than the technical point about relying on the Fallacy of Composition. He points out that the argument makes the massive assumption that the part of the universe we can observe is a fair sample, that the whole universe behaves as this part behaves, and that the way we see the universe is the way it really is. The Cosmological Principle was first spelt out by Isaac Newton and Astronomer William Keel states that it…
“amounts to the strongly philosophical statement that the part of the universe which we can see is a fair sample, and that the same physical laws apply throughout. In essence, this in a sense says that the universe is knowable and is playing fair with scientists” [The Road to Galaxy Formation, 2006]
Following the discovery of Quantum Physics, science has had to abandon the Newtonian paradigm to the extent that today, the “Cosmological Principle”, the very principles of homogeneity and isotropy, are being questioned – even though that leads to the unwelcome conclusion that science is extremely limited in what it can claim to know about the universe. Philosopher Karl Popper criticized the Cosmological Principle on the grounds that it makes
“our lack of knowledge a principle of knowing something”
concluding that
“the “cosmological principles” were, I fear, dogmas that should not have been proposed”
and since then some Physicists have come to similar conclusions, including Steven Weinberg. Scientists might be as reluctant to accept the force of Philo’s argument as believers, but that doesn’t take away from the fact that there is no way to know that the way we perceive causation is actually what is happening or that the principle of causation that appears to apply here also applies everywhere in the universe, let alone to the universe as a whole. Certainly, what is true of parts of the universe is not necessarily true of the whole of the universe – but further, it is not possible to say what is true of parts of the universe and let alone what might be true of the whole. This argument of Philo’s alone shows that attempting to prove God from observation is impossible.
Further, also in Part 9 of the Dialogues, Philo attacks a version of the Cosmological Argument presented by Demea that echoes Jeremiah Clarke’s a priori argument. While not strictly an argument from observation, this version of the cosmological argument deduces God’s necessary existence and attributes from the contingent nature of other existences. Nevertheless, unless one is an idealist, understanding what it means for other things to exist must depend on observation, so it is worth considering Hume’s refutation of this version of the argument here. Although in 1996 Joseph K Campbell successfully argued that Philo fails to defeat this version of the Cosmological Argument – leaving open the possibility that God could be the necessary sustaining-cause of the universe – Philo’s point in asking why the cause of the universe would have to be intelligible renders Campbell’s argument in support of proving God from observation only a technical victory. While it is true that there might be the necessary sustaining-cause of the universe, it is also true (as Philo contends) that it is not meaningful to claim that this sustaining cause has the attributes of the Christian God. Jeremiah Clarke faced the same difficulties as Aquinas in trying to marry the attributes of a necessary being with those of the object of Christian faith. Neither thinker manages to do more than imply that Christian faith is misplaced, because there is no way that the being indicated by contingent existence could create or act in the way that the God of Abraham and Isaac creates and acts, let alone provide hope for salvation and/or personal survival beyond death. Nobody seriously claims that the Higgs Boson is omnipotent, let alone omniscient or omnibenevolent. Nobody worships quarks. Even if God might be whatever sustains the universe in being, there is no way to support religion on that basis. Further, there is now a sensible natural explanation for the universe which obviates the need to call the necessary sustaining cause of the universe “God” and so muddy the waters of Cosmology with Theological assumptions and associations. On this point also, despite Campbell’s work, Hume’s argument against proving God from observation has been vindicated.
Philo provides numerous other criticisms of the arguments from observation. For example, through Parts II-V of the Dialogues, Philo criticizes versions of the Teleological Argument presented by Cleanthes, pointing out that the analogies Cleanthes employs are weak, that there is no way to establish that everything in the universe which appears to have order and purpose really has, and that (because like effects prove like causes) the universe suggests a cause or designer who is far from perfect, not necessarily single and either way a long way from being the God of the Christian religion.
“what shadow of an argument, continued Philo, can you produce, from your hypothesis, to prove that God is one being? A great many men join together to build a house or ship, to found and develop a city, to create a commonwealth” … “For all he knows, the world is very faulty and imperfect by certain higher standards… only the first rough attempt of some infant god, who afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his poor performance… the work of some dependent, inferior god, whose superiors hold it up for ridicule… produced by some god in his old age and near-senility, and ever since his death the world has continued without further guidance, activated by the first shove he gave to it and the active force that he built into it.” (Part V)
As JCA Gaskin has argued, Philo’s individual criticisms are compelling, highlighting one by one the flaws and leaps in reasoning in two distinct versions of the teleological argument. They are far more serious than Philo’s flippant tone might suggest, as they demonstrate how far short of proving the existence of the Christian God classical arguments fall and how much believers must depend on revelations and authority.
In addition, the broader criticism implicit in Philo’s line of argument is conclusive; despite the multi-layered theodicies of St Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas, and the less complete but more pastorally satisfying Irenaean theodicy proposed by John Hick, there has as yet been no satisfactory explanation of why a perfect creator would create an imperfect world. As JL Mackie observed in his essay “Evil and Omnipotence” (1955), St Augustine’s Free Will Defence fails to explain why an omnipotent God could not create free beings who always choose to do what is right. Further, St Thomas Aquinas’ approach to redefining evil as a lack of good and God’s attributes as meaning that He can do only what is actually possible and compatible with His wholly simple nature fails to do justice to the reality of peoples’ faith. The problem of evil and suffering remains the most persuasive objection to attempts to argue to the God of Christianity from observation.
In conclusion, Hume’s arguments – as proposed through the character Philo – successfully show that attempts to prove God from observation all fail. The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion present a persuasive case against belief in any sort of God which goes well beyond the petty point-scoring that the genre and style of the piece suggests. Nevertheless, while extremely persuasive, Philo’s line of argument is a skeptical one and there significant implications flow from accepting it. Philo casts doubt not just on belief in God, but also on the human ability to know that what we observe is really what we observe and on the human ability to deduce natural laws of any kind on the basis of observation. By this argument, people wouldn’t just have to drop their belief in God but also their belief in science, something which few people are willing to do. This, perhaps, is the best objection to Philo’s arguments against the attempt to prove God from observation, that they surely and persuasively lead people into a pit of despair. However, it is not reasonable to conclude from this that the arguments from observation prove God or that Hume’s criticisms, as presented through Philo, are less than successful.