It is fair to say that the arguments for the existence of God fail to prove the existence of God. The ontological argument is the only one that sets out to deliver an a priori proof and as Immanuel Kant argued in his “Critique of Pure Reason” (1781) it is “so much labour and effort lost“. It is equally fair to say that the inductive arguments for God’s existence, both Cosmological and Teleological, fail to demonstrate the existence of God conclusively. Criticisms leveled at the arguments by David Hume, amongst many others, point out their several flaws and fallacies. Nevertheless, to say that the arguments do nothing to support the God people worship is a big overstatement. [THESIS]
The ontological argument, for all it seems to rely on bad grammar by treating existence as a perfection and a predicate, remains a powerful thought-exercise for those who already believe. For one example, Karl Barth – who utterly rejected Natural Theology – appreciated the spiritual depth of Anselm’s argument. In “Faith Seeking Understanding” (1931), he suggested that Anselm was not trying to prove that God exists, but was rather meditating on how God exists. For Barth “that than which nothing greater can be conceived of” is a revealed name of God which contains something of God’s nature. Reflecting on it and seeking deeper and deeper understanding is an essential faith-activity, which supports and enriches peoples’ relationship with the divine. For another example, the mystic Thomas Merton was inspired by Anselm’s “faith seeking understanding” and exploration of how God necessarily exists as his starting point in opening his mind to insights about God from all religions [Faith Seeking Understanding: Theological Method in Thomas Merton’s inter-religious Dialogue by Ryan Scruggs, Journal of Ecumenical Studies 46:3 2011]. Both Barth and Merton used Anselm’s ontological argument to support their understanding of and enrich their faith in God, in their different ways. It is wrong to say then that this argument for God’s existence does nothing to support the God that people worship. [REASON]
Cosmological arguments point to God as the Prime Mover, uncaused cause and Necessary sustainer of the universe. For St. Thomas Aquinas, these arguments show a posteriori how God must be eternal in the sense of being outside time and space, which in turn distances God from creation and limits how He can be understood to know and intervene in what happens. On one level, this suggests that the statement “the arguments for the existence of God do nothing to support the God people actually worship” is reasonable. Omnipotence – in the sense of being able to work miracles – omniscience – in the sense of being able to respond to prayer – and benevolence – in the sense of understanding and having a personal relationship with worshipers – are all crucial to the Christian concept of God. Aquinas’ God, although well-supported by the cosmological argument – is not obviously the God most Christians worship. Nevertheless, Aquinas’ ways to God only serve as a preamble to the substance of his argument in the Summa Theologica, which seeks to show why the necessary being supported by observational evidence must be the God Christians worship. It is true that for Aquinas, the meaning of divine attributes like omnipotence, omniscience and omni-benevolence has to be understood analogically and cannot be understood literally, univocally. Yet he also maintains that there is real and positive meaning in claims such as “God is good”, which are central to Christian worship. It is clear that Aquinas’ cosmological arguments establish the necessary existence of the God Christians worship, even if they do not by themselves explain how or why God must be as Christians worship Him. Therefore it is an overstatement to say that the arguments do nothing to support the God people worship. [REASON]
Teleological arguments suggest a God who is more obviously involved in His creation than either ontological or cosmological arguments. William Paley used the analogy of watch and watchmaker to describe the close relationship between creation and creator. Even Aquinas’ fifth way suggests that God is the intelligence that directs inanimate things towards their ends (telos) “as an arrow is given flight by the archer.” In “Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion” David Hume’s character Philo is right to point out that the observable evidence of creation includes things that seem poorly designed or even cruel and might more properly suggest an imperfect deity, or multiple deities, than the perfect God of Christian worship because in practice, most Christians are resigned to worshipping a God who at least allows evil and suffering, albeit for a morally sufficient reason. For example, John Hick argued that God created human beings in His own image, with only the potential to grow into His likeness after passing through the “vale of soul-making” that is human life. In “Evil and the God of Love” (1966) he argued that belief in a God who allows people to suffer for the spiritual benefit that they (or other people) may gain from that experience is compatible with Christian faith and worship. After all, in the Garden of Gethsemane Jesus called out to “Abba, Father…” asking that “this cup of suffering” be taken away by God’s will. God did not act to prevent his suffering, even when Jesus called out “Eloi, Eloi, lama sabachthani, which means “my God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” (Mark 15:34) Christians do not worship a God who doesn’t know about or understand suffering and nor do they worship a God who even tried to create a world with no potential for horror… he placed the tree in the garden after all. It follows that teleological arguments support the God Christians actually worship, “the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob” far more than they support the perfect “God of the philosophers”, to use Blaise Pascal’s distinction. [REASON]
Pushing this line of reasoning might give more credence to the claim that “the arguments for the existence of God do nothing to support the God people actually worship.” Certainly, ontological and cosmological arguments – if they are sound and cogent respectively – support the existence of a perfect God. Anselm defined God as “that than which nothing greater can be conceived of,” Descartes defined God more straightforwardly as “Supreme Perfection” and Plantinga similarly defined God as a “maximally great being.” Aquinas’ cosmological arguments support a God who is the Prime Mover, uncaused causer and de re necessary being sustaining the universe. By definition, such a God is 100% actual and has no potential, is outside time and space and cannot change. Aquinas successfully showed that this God must be all-good. In the Aristotelian sense defining goodness in terms of fulfilling potential and evil in terms of falling short, a God whose nature is to unchangingly be 100% actual cannot be other than all-good. Further, Aquinas successfully showed that this God must be all-powerful and all knowing in the sense of being the primary cause of everything that exists, what is responsible for things being as they are and no other way. Nevertheless, Christians do not worship a God who is perfect in this abstract way. The Bible casts God as the creator of everything, but a creator who has a defined purpose for each aspect of his creation (Genesis 1:27-31) and who can and does interact with and respond to people both in Eden (Genesis 2-3) and subsequently throughout Biblical History. In Genesis God appears to Abraham – albeit in a mysterious way – then Jacob wrestles with God, mistaking him for a man. In the New Testament God speaks to acknowledge Jesus as His son, Jesus calls God Abba (literally Daddy) and claims “the father and I are one” (John 10:30) before dying horribly on the cross. It is difficult to claim that the God Christians worship is the abstract if all-powerful, all-good God supported by ontological and cosmological arguments. [DISAGREE] Nevertheless, the Nicene Creed affirms that the Christian God is the perfect God of the philosophers as well as being the God of Biblical history. God is the creator both of what is “seen and unseen”, Jesus’ incarnation is part of the original creation, willed from the beginning of time rather than being a response to circumstance. God speaks but through the prophets, acts but through the agency of the Holy Spirit. It is fair to say that the Christian God, the God Christians actually worship, is paradoxical and mysterious but it is not fair to say that the God supported by the arguments is not the God people actually worship. [EVALUATION]
In conclusion, to say that the arguments do nothing to support the God people worship is a big overstatement. [THESIS] While it is true that the ontological argument and the cosmological argument point towards an abstract, perfect God which demands theological explanation to show as the God of Biblical history, it is unfair to say that the arguments do nothing to support the God people actually worship. Certainly, as Karl Barth and Thomas Merton pointed out of the ontological argument, they are useful in enriching and sustaining faith by supporting deeper understanding of God’s nature. Certainly, as Reformed Epistemologists like William Lane Craig have argued, cosmological arguments help believers to “defeat the defeaters” and show that faith – while not based on or dependent on arguments – is not irrational despite that. In addition, as St Thomas Aquinas reasoned, a proper understanding of religious language shows that the attributes of the God supported by the arguments and the attributes of the God actually worshipped by Christians share meaning, even if that meaning is of a specific and limited type. Finally, teleological arguments offer essential support for the God people actually worship, showing His creative care and causing people to reflect on the existence of evil and suffering in a way that is essential to Christian worship. Without appreciating the reality of suffering – and rational reflection on God as designing intelligence encourages this – Christians could not understand the importance of the atonement or stake their lives on the hope for salvation, and in this case there would be little point in worship. [Significance]
4. Evaluate critically by comparison the cosmological and teleological arguments for God’s existence
St Thomas Aquinas presents five ways of demonstrating God’s existence based on observation in his Summa Theologica (1,2,3). The first four of these ways are Cosmological arguments, reasoning from observations of movement, efficient causation, contingency and grades of perfection in the universe a posteriori to the conclusion that God as a Prime Mover, uncaused cause, necessary being and supreme perfection must exist. The fifth way is a teleological argument, reasoning from observation of order and purpose (teleology) in the universe a posteriori to the existence of an intelligent designer “which is what everybody calls God.” Clearly, Aquinas saw both Cosmological and Teleological Arguments as persuasive arguments for God’s existence, however the Teleological Argument offers better support to the God of Christian worship than the Cosmological Argument does.
David Hume criticised cosmological arguments in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779). His character Philo pointed out that it is based on limited observations of the universe. For all we know there might be uncaused things out there… as indeed Quantum Physics and Particle Physics has since shown to be the case. Further, the argument is based on the fallacy of composition, the assumption that just because the parts of the universe have a cause that the whole universe must have a cause. As Bertrand Russell later pointed out; just because all men have mothers doesn’t mean that the human race has a mother, it could be that the universe is a “brute fact”. Hume’s criticisms of the cosmological argument are difficult to overcome. While it is fair to say that Hume’s claims about the limitations of human observations as the basis for knowledge about natural laws are just as much of a problem for science as they are for religion, his other criticisms hit hard. In truth, the universe might, for all we know, be uncaused or be its own cause. It is fair to ask why what is true of the part should also have to be true of the whole. Although William Lane Craig argues that the cosmological argument – at least in his own Kalam version, which stops short of concluding that the Prime Mover is “what everybody calls God” – is the best support for the reasonableness of faith, his claims about the impossibility of an actual infinite and about the Big Bang theory needing a cause have been shown to be mistaken by critics such as Erik Sotnak and Stephen Hawking. While the cosmological argument might superficially seem to be supported by Big Bang theory, in reality Cosmology shows that the idea of causation cannot apply outside the space-time matrix of our universe. While it seems incredible, as Terry Pratchett quipped, science proposes that “in the beginning there was nothing, which exploded.” It is clear, therefore, that the cosmological argument is not persuasive.
Hume’s character Philo also attacked the teleological argument in the Dialogues, criticising the tendency to make the argument using inappropriate analogies and pointing out apparent imperfections in the design of the universe, which might undermine the idea that the designer would be perfect. Later, both Charles Darwin and JS Mill pointed out the brutality in nature and reasoning that an Ichneumon wasp could not have been designed by the God of Christianity.
“Nearly all the things which men are hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another are nature’s everyday performances.” Mill: Three Essays on Religion
Nevertheless, these critics all failed to exclude the possibility that the universe could be designed to contain evil for some morally sufficient reason. As St. Augustine argued, it could be that natural evil in the world is a just punishment for sin. Moral evil could be the necessary bi-product of human freedom. Evil does not necessarily undermine the claim that the universe was designed by God. Alternatively, as John Hick argued, suffering could be positively created by God to afford the opportunity for “soul-making” with any injustices being accounted for through an afterlife. Further, there are versions of the teleological argument which do not rely on spurious analogies – such as FR Tennant’s aesthetic argument and anthropic principle. These are more persuasive than the cosmological argument. Hume’s criticisms fall short of undermining Tennant’s claim that God is needed to explain beauty and human consciousness in the universe and evolution through natural selection fails to explain these aspects of the universe adequately either. Modern Intelligent Design arguments – such as those proposed by Michael Behe from irreducible complexity and by William Dembski from specified complexity – show that evolution cannot provide the complete explanation that atheists like Richard Dawkins claim it can. While Paley’s argument in Natural Theology can be rightly criticised for its use of the famous watchmaker analogy, its appeal to our incredulity at the scientific claim that all this could have arisen by chance is powerful. To accept that evolution through natural selection can provide a complete explanation of the universe and that there is no intelligence guiding it is difficult to accept. Take the Japanese puffer-fish… can evolution really account for the extent of the intricacy and beauty of its designs? It is clear, therefore, that the teleological argument is more persuasive than the cosmological argument.
In addition, even if the cosmological argument was persuasive, it would only serve to demonstrate the existence of a Prime Mover, an uncaused cause, a necessary being outside time and space. It is not easy to see how this being could be the God of Christian worship. Aristotle stopped short of claiming that the Prime Mover could be a God in any normal sense, its power being limited to supporting the existence of all contingent things and its goodness being limited to being fully actualised and containing no potential. How could a God who is outside time and space act to create the universe when there could be no time before during or after his action and when there would be no space to differentiate the creation from the creator? Both human understanding and the language which tries to communicate it struggles to cope with objects outside the space-time matrix which bounds our experience. It might, of course, be fair to say that human understanding and language cannot expect to be able to comprehend or describe God. Yet, without the ability to claim that God exists, that God is the all-powerful creator and that God is good with some content, it is difficult to see how Religion could prosper. St. Thomas Aquinas attempted to show how human language could be used to describe God in positive terms as analogies, but even he admitted that he content of attributes such as goodness must needs be limited and cannot be understood in the same way as human goodness. The teleological argument, by contrast, does not rely on locating God outside time and space. As the intelligent designer, it seems likely that God would have defined the purpose of the universe from within the same logical framework which governs its operation today. In this way, God’s power and goodness have real content, as they relate to how He created the complex order and purposiveness we can observe. It follows that the teleological argument offers better support for the God of Christian worship than the cosmological argument does.
In conclusion, the teleological argument offers better support for the God of Christian worship than the cosmological argument does. Clearly, the teleological argument relies on the possibility of defending God’s goodness and power against charges of creating or allowing evil and suffering, but it is still more persuasive than the cosmological argument. Even Immanuel Kant, who rejected all the classical arguments for God’s existence in his Critique of Pure Reason, saw the age and persistence of the teleological argument as pointers to its status as the most powerful of the arguments for God’s existence.
Copleston: Well, perhaps I might say a word about religious experience. I don’t regard religious experience as a strict proof of the existence of God, so the character of the discussion changes somewhat, but I think it’s true to say that the best explanation of it is the existence of God. By religious experience I don’t mean simply feeling good. I mean a loving, but unclear, awareness of some object which irresistibly seems to the experiencer as something transcending the self, something transcending all the normal objects of experience, something which cannot be pictured or conceptualized, but of the reality of which doubt is impossible – at least during the experience. I should claim that cannot be explained adequately and without residue, simply subjectively. The actual basic experience at any rate is most easily explained on the hypotheses that there is actually some objective cause of that experience.
(Source: Extract adapted from ‘A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick’, Copleston, F. C., BBC Radio, 1948, Edexcel Anthology)
3a Clarify the ideas illustrated in this passage about the nature of religious experience (10 marks)
3b Analyse the view that the argument for the existence of God based on religious experience fails to prove the existence of God. (10 marks)
The traditional arguments for the existence of God have been fairly thoroughly criticized by philosophers. But the theologian can, if he wishes, accept this criticism. He can admit that no rational proof of God’s existence is possible. And he can still retain all that is essential to his position, by holding that God’s existence is known in some other non-rational way. I think, however, that a more telling criticism can be made by way of the traditional problem of evil. Here it can be shown, not that religious beliefs lack rational support, but that they are positively irrational, that the several parts of the essential theological doctrine are inconsistent with one another, so that the theologian can maintain his position as a whole only by a much more extreme rejection of reason than in the former case. He must now be prepared to believe, not merely what cannot be proved, but what can be disproved from other beliefs that he also holds.
(Source: extract from J.L. Mackie ‘Evil and Omnipotence’ (1977) in The Philosophy of Religion, edited by B Mitchell (Oxford, OUP, 1977)).
3 (a) Clarify the views of Mackie for an understanding of the problem of suffering. (10)
You must refer to the passage in your response.
3 (b) Analyse two possible solutions to the problem of suffering. (20)
A fine brash hypothesis may be killed by inches, the death by a thousand qualifications...
It seems to people who are not religious as if there was no conceivable event the occurrence of which would be admitted by religious people to be a reason for conceding ‘There wasn’t a God after all.’ Someone tells us that God loves us as a father loves his children. But then we see a child dying of inoperable cancer of the throat. His earthly father is driven frantic in his efforts to help, but his heavenly Father reveals no signs of concern. Some qualification is made – God’s love is ‘not merely human love’. But then we ask: Just what would have to happen to entitle us to say ‘God does not exist’?
A believer’s statement has been so eroded that it is no longer an assertion at all.
(Source: Quote from ‘The Philosophy of Religion’, Flew, A, Editor: Mitchell B, By permission of Oxford University Press)
3 (a) Clarify the ideas illustrated in this passage about falsification in religious language. (10)
You must refer to the passage in your response.
3 (b) Analyse the implications for religious language from this passage. (20)
The partisan of the parable does not allow anything to count decisively against the proposition ‘The Stranger is on our side.’ This is because he has committed himself to trust the Stranger. But he of course recognizes that the Stranger’s ambiguous behaviour does count against what he believes about him. It is precisely this situation which constitutes the trial of his faith.Hare’s lunatic who has a blik about dons doesn’t admit that anything counts against his blik. Nothing can count against bliks. Also the partisan has a reason for having in the first instance committed himself, viz. the character of the Stranger; whereas the lunatic has no reason for his blik about dons – because, of course, you can’t have reasons for bliks. This means that I agree with Flew that theological utterances must be assertions. The partisan is making an assertion when he says, ‘The Stranger is on our side.’
(Source: Extract adapted from ‘The Philosophy of Religion’ - Chapter I, ‘Theology and Falsification: A Symposium’, edited by Mitchell, B., Oxford University Press, 1977, Edexcel Anthology)
3a Clarify Mitchell’s ideas in this passage that religious claims are assertions because they do allow things to count against them. (10 marks)
3b Analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the challenge to religious language from the verification debate. (20 marks)