Ethical naturalism is empiricist in orientation and argues that ethical propositions are no more than statements of fact that can be justified by appeal to the natural world, therefore ethical statements are not ‘beyond’ non-ethical statements. Although there are different ways to interpret ethical statements they all relate to what is actually real and objective. For instance, Mill sees ethical statements as, really, statements about pleasure or pain.
For Bradley, it is all about realising the concrete universal and through self-realisation finding one’s duty. These different ways at least agree that ethical and nonethical statements are the same. Evolutionary ethics argues that it is all to do with how we assess and adapt biologically, psychologically and socially just like Charles Darwin’s drunken monkey.
If we know that fire is hot then we do not touch the flame; how is this any different from deciding how to live ethically when we know that violence causes pain and so avoid it? We may feel, deeply, that a moral sentiment is ‘real’, absolute and provable like any claim about the ‘objective world’; for example, it is directly related to actions that we can work out a sense of justice in society. Indeed, this viewpoint reflects not only Naturalism but also moral viewpoints based on religion and revelation. For example, the parable of the Good Samaritan in Christianity teaches through clear actions that it is good to help someone in need or who is suffering. There is nothing metaphysical about that, and therefore ethical statements are the same as non-ethical statements. However, there are clear challenges to Naturalism.
Moore argued that contrary to ethical Naturalism, ethical statements are ‘a priori’ matters of truth just as with mathematics and can be identified through use of one’s intuition. In this sense ethical propositions are very different to non-ethical propositions. Firstly, Hume’s ‘is-ought problem’ can be used to show that Naturalism is wrong – you cannot derive a value from a fact. Therefore, ethical statements are not the same as non-ethical statements. Secondly, the ethical
Ethical language is in controversy over whether or not it holds significance. Different ideas to ethical to ethical language have caused a number of problems to arise.
G.E. Moore in Principia Ethica (1903) attacked naturalism- the idea that morality can be understood through observation of nature- with the ‘Problem of Good’. One of the greatest problems with using ethical language is whether or not we are able to define ‘good’. In short, the problem of good is the idea that one cannot accurately define ‘good’ by referring to other non-moral properties. Different theorists have different definitions of the word ‘good’: a utilitarian would say that good is ‘pleasure’; a Divine Command Theorist would say that ‘good’ was what God says is good or right; G.E. Moore would say that ‘good’ was like the word ‘yellow’- indefinable. For Moore ‘good is good, and that’s the end of the matter’. Moore said that people know words like ‘good’ intuitively. He also emphasised that ‘good’ is a non-natural property meaning that is cannot be empirically verified or scientifically tested as it is not within the bounds of ‘natural science’. Moore also said that you couldn’t define ‘good’ with something observed and therefore he concluded that you cannot observe pleasure and then say that pleasure is good. The word ‘good’ becomes a problem for philosophers when it is taken out of the context of morality. G.E. Moore called this the argument against naturalism, the naturalistic fallacy. He believed that morality cannot be observed but instead is intuited. As well as the problem of good, G.E. Moore put forward the open question argument in order to refute the idea that the word ‘good’ has non-moral property.
He argues that it can be shown that good cannot be defined by considering the fact that "whatever definition be offered, it may be always asked, with significance, of the complex so defined, whether it is itself good". For example, it may be argued that good means doing what is pleasurable. And that eating meat is pleasurable and so good. Initially this may seem a plausible definition of good. But it can still be asked "Is it good to do what is pleasurable?" This question is as intelligible as the original question "Is eating meat good?" Thus, it remains an open question whether or not eating meat is good, regardless of whether it is pleasurable (hence the name the open question argument). Similarly, it may be said that what makes something good is that it is rational. But it can always be asked with significance if it is this which makes it good (and the same could be said of any other property one wishes to replace rationality with). Thus good cannot be defined by anything other than itself.
Another problem raised by the use of ethical language is the ‘is-ought gap’. The 18th century philosopher Hume criticised the way most ethical statements are constructed. He established that one could not go from an ‘is’ i.e. fact, to an ‘ought’ i.e. what one ought to do in response to the fact. For example, from “Children are malnourished from starvation”, a fact, to “We should feed the children”, a moral command. For Hume there had to be a principle between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ so that the ‘ought’ could be based upon that. So in the case above, an example of a principle might be, “Where there is suffering that can be prevented, we should prevent it”. This makes the statement logically true. Furthermore, Hume’s Fork is the idea that all assertions of knowledge are either based on logic and definitions or on observation (like synthetic and analytic statements). However, the combination of the is-ought gap and Hume’s Fork is problematic. If Hume’s Fork is true then the idea of ‘ought’ statements cannot justify moral knowledge because ‘ought’ statements do not seem to me known in either of these ways.
Introduction- Ethical statements are not simply expressions of emotion. Although the non-cognitive branch of meta-ethics emotivism claims ethical statements are only expressions of emotion due to no evidence justifying the idea there is an objective ethical standard, this stance is very narrow-minded and so unconvincing as it assumes scientific arrogance. More convincingly, intuitionism takes into account the fact that ethics cannot be proved empirically, but it reaches the conclusion that ethical statements are more than expressions of emotion as everyone seems to have an inward sense of what is right and wrong.
Firstly, the non-cognitivist branch of emotivism argues ethical statements are simply expressions of emotion. New atheist A.J Ayer in ‘language, Truth and Logic’ would support the statement as he contends there is no objective, universal standard for what is considered right and wrong. Due to this, a claim such as murder is wrong has no other meaning than simply being an outlet of emotion as the claim cannot be empirically verified. Barnes’ ‘Boo hurrah’ theory also supports this as ethical statements can only be seen as subjective to the person.
However, although this contention may be convincing from a logical positivist’s point of view, the issue is that scientific arrogance is imposed here as the only important statements are ones which are empirically verifiable. Also, ethical statements seem to be shared amongst human beings as most ethical judgements are materialized through the law such as murder being a crime. Due to this, it seems more convincing to argue ethical statements are more than simply outlets of emotions as people seem to have a common consensus as to what is right and wrong. Therefore, ethical statements are more than simply outlets of emotion.
Furthermore, intuitionism poses the most convincing argument to undermine the idea ethical statements are no more than expressions of emotion. As H.A Prichard contends, although ethical statements cannot be proven to be valid through empirical validating means, it seems that people have a shared idea about what is right and wrong. Just like one is unable to describe the colour yellow, everyone recognizes it through intuition. Although Bertrand Russell tries to undermine this as he argues the mind is unable to recognize non-physical qualities, this does not explain why most people intuitively see when something is right or wrong and act on gut reaction. Thus, ethical statements are more than simply expressions of emotion.