a) Kantian deontology – social, political and cultural influences on Kant’s ethical theory, duty-based ethics, the categorical imperative in its different formulations, prima facie duties, and contemporary applications of rule and duty-based ethics. (2)
b) Aristotelian virtue ethics – historical and cultural influences on Virtue Ethics from its beginnings to modern developments of the theory, concepts of eudaemonia and living well, the golden mean, development of virtuous character, virtuous role models, vices, contemporary applications of virtue theories. (3)
c) Strengths and weaknesses of the theories and their developments, appropriateness of their continuing application and use, assessment of relevant examples, changes in the law and social attitudes vis a vis the theories, compatibility or otherwise with religious approaches.
Students are expected to study a range of texts that support and underpin their knowledge and understanding. The assessment will include two extended-response questions on an excerpt, sourced from this extracts list. The following texts are not exclusive to the topic areas under which they appear; students will need to be able to apply these texts across any suitable topic area. These are published in the A level Religious Studies Anthology: Paper 2 – Religion and Ethics which can be downloaded from our website.
(1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972) ISBN 9780002152044
(3) Aristotle – The Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, Moral Virtue, pp. 23–37 (Oxford World’s Classics edition, 1980) ISBN 9780192815187
(4) Wilcockson M – Issues of Life and Death, Chapter 4 Euthanasia and Doctors’ Ethics, pp. 56–69 (Hodder Education, 1999) ISBN 9780340724880
Every thing in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being has the faculty to act in accordance with the representation of laws, i.e., in accordance with principles, or a will. Since for the derivation of actions from laws reason is required, the will is nothing other than practical reason.
If reason determines the will without exception, then the actions of such a being, which are recognized as objectively necessary, are also subjectively necessary, i.e., the will is a faculty of choosing only that which reason, independently of inclination, recognizes as practically necessary, i.e., as good.
But if reason for itself alone does not sufficiently determine the will, if the will is still subject to subjective conditions (to certain incentives) which do not always agree with the objective conditions, in a word, if the will is not in itself fully in accord with reason (as it actually is with human beings), then the actions which are objectively recognized as necessary are subjectively contingent, and the determination of such a will, in accord with objective laws, is necessitation, i.e., the relation of objective laws to a will which is not thoroughly good is represented as the determination of the will of a rational being through grounds of reason to which, however, this will in accordance with its nature is not necessarily obedient.
(Taken from: Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Allen W Wood (Yale University Press edition, 2002), Text, second section, pp 29–47.)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about the objective nature of ethics and Kant's deontological theory.
This passage from Immanuel Kant's "Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals" outlines his views on the relationship between reason, will, and ethics in his deontological theory. The author Kant argues that only rational beings have the ability to act in accordance with laws or principles, and that the will is equivalent to practical reason. If reason determines the will without exception, then the actions of such a being are both objectively and subjectively necessary, as the will only chooses what reason recognizes as good. Kant thus argues that all things in nature follow laws, but only rational beings have the ability to act in accordance with these laws or principles. The author asserts that the will is equivalent to practical reason, and if reason determines the will without exception, then the actions of a rational being are subjectively necessary and in line with what reason recognizes as good.
However, the author acknowledges that in the case of human beings, reason alone is not enough to determine the will, and the will is still subject to subjective conditions that do not always align with the objective conditions. In this case, the actions that are objectively recognized as necessary are subjectively contingent, and the determination of such a will in line with objective laws is seen as necessitation.
Scholars have noted that this passage highlights the central idea in Kant's deontological ethics, which is that ethics should be based on universal moral principles that are objectively derived from reason. For example, philosopher Mary Gregor writes in her commentary on the "Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals" that "Kant argues that moral principles must be derived from the nature of reason itself, rather than from any particular laws of human nature or the nature of the world." Another scholar, J. B. Schneewind, notes that "Kant's view that morality is based on reason, rather than on particular desires or feelings, is central to his deontological theory."
Overall, this passage from Kant's "Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals" emphasizes the objective nature of ethics in his deontological theory and the role of reason in determining the actions of rational beings. This passage further presents an argument for the objective nature of reason and the necessity for rational beings to act in accordance with objective laws. However, it acknowledges that in the case of human beings, the will is not always fully in line with reason and is subject to subjective conditions.
References
Immanuel Kant, "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals"
Immanuel Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason"
(Mary Gregor, "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals", Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 29)
(J. B. Schneewind, "The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy", Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 86)
The representation of an objective principle, insofar as it is necessitating for a will, is called a ‘command’ (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an imperative.
All imperatives are expressed through an ought and thereby indicate the relation of an objective law of reason to a will which in its subjective constitution is not necessarily determined by that law (a necessitation). They say that it would be good to do or refrain from something, but they say it to a will that does not always do something just because it is represented to it as good to do. Practical good, however, is that which determines the will by means of representations of reason, hence not from subjective causes, but objectively, i.e., from grounds that are valid for every rational being as such. It is distinguished from the agreeable, as that which has influence on the will only by means of sensation from merely subjective causes, those which are valid only for the senses of this or that one, and not as a principle of reason, which is valid for everyone.
(Taken from: Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Allen W Wood (Yale University Press edition, 2002), Text, second section, pp 29–47.)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about Kants view of the nature of imperatives in ethics.
In this passage, Immanuel Kant presents his view of the nature of imperatives in ethics. He explains that an imperative is a representation of an objective principle that necessitates a will, and that it is expressed through an "ought" and indicates the relationship between an objective law of reason and a will that is not necessarily determined by that law.
Kant also distinguishes between practical good, which determines the will through representations of reason and is objectively valid for every rational being, and the agreeable, which influences the will only through subjective causes.
According to Kant, the imperatives in ethics are not determined by subjective causes, but rather by objective principles of reason that are valid for every rational being. This idea is central to Kant's deontological ethics, which emphasizes the importance of moral duties and obligations based on universal moral principles, rather than consequences or motives.
Scholars have widely discussed and debated Kant's views on imperatives in ethics. For example, philosopher Robert Louden writes, "Kant's notion of a moral imperative as a command of practical reason is one of the most distinctive and influential aspects of his ethical theory". Similarly, philosopher Onora O'Neill argues that "Kant's imperatives, especially his moral imperatives, play a central role in his moral theory"
References
Immanuel Kant, "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals"
Immanuel Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason"
Robert Louden Kant's Immoralists, Oxford University Press, 2002
Onora O'Neill - Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1989
A perfectly good will would thus stand just as much under objective laws (of the good), but it would not be possible to represent it as necessitated by them to lawful actions, because of itself, in accordance with its subjective constitution, it can be determined only through the representation of the good. Hence for the divine will, and in general for a holy will, no imperatives are valid; the ought is out of place here, because the volition is of itself already necessarily in harmony with the law. Hence imperatives are only formulas expressing the relation of objective laws of volition in general to the subjective imperfection of the will of this or that rational being, e.g., to the human being.
(Taken from: Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Allen W Wood (Yale University Press edition, 2002), Text, second section, pp 29–47.)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage by Kant about the good will.
In this passage, Kant discusses his concept of the "perfectly good will" and its relationship with objective laws in ethics. He argues that a perfectly good will would be subject to objective laws of the good, but would not be represented as being necessitated by these laws to act in a lawful manner. This is because a perfectly good will is already in harmony with the law and is determined only by the representation of the good, not by external factors.
Kant asserts that for a divine or holy will, no imperatives are valid and the "ought" is not applicable, as the will is already necessarily in accordance with the law. This means that imperatives are only formulas that express the relationship between objective laws and the subjective imperfection of the will, such as the human will.
Kant's idea of the good will is central to his deontological ethical theory, which emphasizes the importance of following moral principles and rules. In this view, the good will is not determined by inclinations or desires, but rather by reason and the representation of what is good. A good will is one that consistently chooses to act in accordance with moral laws, even when doing so may not bring personal satisfaction or pleasure.
Scholars have noted that Kant's concept of the good will represents a departure from traditional ethical theories that focus on the consequences of actions or the motives behind them. Instead, Kant's emphasis on the will as the key determinant of moral value provides a unique perspective on ethics and morality.
For example, philosopher Christine Korsgaard writes, "Kant's theory of ethics is built on the idea that there is a kind of action that is good simply because it is done from a good will, without regard to its consequences or the motives behind it."
Similarly, philosopher Thomas E. Hill Jr. explains that "Kant's ethical theory is built on the idea of the autonomy of the will, that is, the idea that the moral worth of an action lies in the motives of the agent, rather than in the consequences of the action."
Overall, the idea of the good will as presented by Kant in this passage highlights the importance of reason and the representation of the good in determining moral value, rather than external factors such as personal desires or consequences. This concept has been influential in ethical and philosophical discussions and continues to be a topic of debate and interpretation among scholars.
References
Immanuel Kant, "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals"
Immanuel Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason"
Christine Korsgaard Korsgaard, "The Sources of Normativity", 1996
Thomas E. Hill Jr Hill, "Kant's Theory of Morality", 1990
Now all imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. The former represent the practical necessity of a possible action as a means to attain something else which one wills (or which it is possible that one might will). The categorical imperative would be that one which represented an action as objectively necessary for itself, without any reference to another end.
(Taken from: Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Allen W Wood (Yale University Press edition, 2002), Text, second section, pp 29–47.)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about the difference between hypothetical and categorical imperatives in Kant's thinking.
In this passage from Immanuel Kant's "Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals", Kant makes a distinction between two types of imperatives in ethical thinking: hypothetical imperatives and categorical imperatives.
Hypothetical imperatives are practical necessities of a possible action that are used as means to attain something else that one desires or might desire. These imperatives are dependent on a particular end that one wants to achieve, and they prescribe an action that is necessary to reach that end. For example, if someone wants to become wealthy, they might follow the hypothetical imperative to work hard and save money as a means to achieve their goal.
Categorical imperatives, on the other hand, are actions that are considered objectively necessary for their own sake, without reference to another end. These imperatives are not dependent on personal desires or inclinations, but rather they are considered valid for all rational beings as a matter of principle. Kant asserts that the categorical imperative represents the moral law, which is universally valid and applies to all people, regardless of their individual goals or desires. The categorical imperative commands actions that are considered good in and of themselves, such as telling the truth, helping others, and refraining from causing harm.
Kant's distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives is an important aspect of his deontological ethics, where he argues that moral actions are based on universal and objective principles, rather than subjective desires or emotions. According to Kant, the categorical imperative is the foundation of moral duty, and it provides a moral framework for making ethical decisions.
The following quote by philosopher Thomas Hill provides a summary of Kant's distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives:
"In Kant's moral theory, hypothetical imperatives are imperatives that tell us what we ought to do in order to achieve some end that we have chosen for ourselves. Categorical imperatives are universal and unconditional moral requirements that apply to us simply in virtue of our status as rational agents."
References
Immanuel Kant, "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals"
Thomas Hill, "Kant's Theory of Moral Obligation", Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989, p. 33
Finally, there is one imperative that, without being grounded on any other aim to be achieved through a certain course of conduct as its condition, commands this conduct immediately. This imperative is categorical. It has to do not with the matter of the action and what is to result from it, but with the form and the principle from which it results; and what is essentially good about it consists in the disposition, whatever the result may be. This imperative may be called that of morality.
(Taken from: Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Allen W Wood (Yale University Press edition, 2002), Text, second section, pp 29–47.)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about the categorical imperatives in Kant's thinking.
In this passage from Immanuel Kant's "Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals", the philosopher presents his idea of a categorical imperative. A categorical imperative is a type of ethical principle that commands action without being dependent on any other end or objective. It is a direct command that is based on the form and principle of the action itself, rather than its consequences or results. According to Kant, what is good about a categorical imperative is the disposition that it requires, regardless of the outcome.
Kant argues that a categorical imperative is the only type of imperative that can be considered a moral imperative. Unlike hypothetical imperatives, which are conditional on achieving a particular end, the categorical imperative is unconditional and has to do with the action itself, rather than its consequences. This means that the moral worth of an action is not based on the outcome, but on the intention behind it. For Kant, morality is not determined by the results of actions, but by the form and principle of actions themselves.
Kant's idea of a categorical imperative has been the subject of much debate and discussion among philosophers. Some have criticized his formulation of the categorical imperative, arguing that it is too vague and lacks practical guidance for how to act in specific situations. Others have argued that his idea of a categorical imperative is too rigid, and does not take into account the complexities and nuances of ethical decision making.
Despite these criticisms, Kant's concept of a categorical imperative has had a profound impact on the field of ethics and continues to be a central idea in discussions of moral philosophy. For example, the philosopher Jürgen Habermas has argued that Kant's categorical imperative can be seen as a principle of universal communicative rationality, which requires that individuals act in a way that can be justifiably communicated to others. In this sense, the categorical imperative becomes a principle of ethical action that is grounded in the idea of rational dialogue and mutual understanding.
Overall, Kant's idea of the categorical imperative as a direct and unconditional command of morality continues to be a significant and influential concept in ethical theory. As Kant himself writes, "It [the categorical imperative] may be called that of morality."
References
Immanuel Kant, "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals"
Jürgen Habermas “The Theory of Communicative Action”
Thus we will have to investigate the possibility of a categorical imperative entirely a priori, since here we cannot have the advantage that its reality is given in experience, so that its possibility would be necessary not for its establishment but only for its explanation. Meanwhile, we can provisionally have insight into this much: that the categorical imperative alone can be stated as a practical law, while the others collectively are, to be sure, principles of the will, but cannot be called ‘laws’; for what it is necessary to do for the attainment of a discretionary aim can be considered in itself to be contingent, and we can always be rid of the precept if we give up the aim; whereas the unconditioned command leaves the will no free discretion in regard to the opposite, hence it alone carries with it that necessity which we demand for a law.
(Taken from: Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Allen W Wood (Yale University Press edition, 2002), Text, second section, pp 29–47.)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about the idea of a priori ethical laws in Kant's thinking.
In this passage from Immanuel Kant's "Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals", he is discussing the nature of categorical imperatives in his ethical theory. Kant argues that the categorical imperative is the only type of imperative that can be considered a true law, because it is unconditional and does not allow for any discretion or deviation from the command. This makes it different from hypothetical imperatives, which are based on contingent goals and can be abandoned if the goal is given up.
Kant also notes that the possibility of a categorical imperative must be investigated a priori, meaning through pure reason and independent of experience. This is because the reality of the categorical imperative is not given in experience and must be established through the investigation of its possibility. This distinction is important in Kant's philosophy, as he places a strong emphasis on the role of reason in ethics and morality.
To further clarify Kant's ideas, it can be helpful to look at his formulation of the categorical imperative. In his theory, the categorical imperative is stated as "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." This means that one should act only in a way that could be universalized and become a law for all rational beings. The unconditional and universal nature of the categorical imperative is what sets it apart from other types of imperatives and gives it its status as a law.
In conclusion, this passage from Immanuel Kant's "Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals" highlights his distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives and his belief in the possibility of a priori ethical laws. The categorical imperative, as the only true law, is based on universal principles and cannot be swayed by contingent goals or desires.
References
Immanuel Kant, "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals"
If I think of a hypothetical imperative in general, then I do not know beforehand what it will contain until the condition is given to me. But if I think of a categorical imperative, then I know directly what it contains. For since besides the law, the imperative contains only the necessity of the maxim, that it should accord with this law, but the law contains no condition to which it is limited, there remains nothing left over with which the maxim of the action is to be in accord, and this accordance alone is what the imperative really represents necessarily. The categorical imperative is thus only a single one, and specifically this: Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.
(Taken from: Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Allen W Wood (Yale University Press edition, 2002), Text, second section, pp 29–47.)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about the first formulation or maxim of his deontological ethics.
In this passage, Immanuel Kant presents his first formulation of the categorical imperative, which is a fundamental principle of his deontological ethical theory. According to Kant, a categorical imperative is a moral law that is necessary and unconditional, as opposed to a hypothetical imperative, which is based on a specific condition.
Kant states that, unlike hypothetical imperatives, categorical imperatives can be known directly and without the need for any conditions to be given. The categorical imperative is a single, universal principle that guides moral action, which can be stated as: "Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law." This formulation of the categorical imperative is based on the idea that moral actions must be guided by universal principles, rather than particular circumstances or outcomes.
Kant's first formulation of the categorical imperative emphasizes the importance of consistency and universality in moral reasoning. The categorical imperative is expressed as a single principle, which is the maxim that actions should be performed in such a way that they can be willed to be universal law. He argues that moral action should be based on a maxim, or rule, that can be universally applied. This means that the moral rule should be consistent with the idea that it could be willed by all rational beings, and that it should not be contradictory or lead to absurd results. Thus according to Kant, the categorical imperative is the foundation of morality and it is a command to act in a certain way that is unconditional and universal. This means that it applies to all people, in all situations, and without exception. The categorical imperative is contrasted with the hypothetical imperative, which is a command to act in a certain way that is conditional and limited.
This means that if an action can be performed without contradiction and without conflicting with the principles of universal morality, then it is in accordance with the categorical imperative. In other words, the categorical imperative requires us to act in a way that is universally reasonable and acceptable. For example, if we want to act in accordance with the categorical imperative, we must treat other people with respect and dignity, and not use them merely as means to our own ends.
In the passage Kant says “if I think of a categorical imperative, then I know directly what it contains”. Here he is referring to his epistemic theory of the knowledge that is Synthetic Apriori which includes ethical judgements. Kant believed that the categorical imperative is a necessary condition for morality and that it is an a priori principle that is independent of experience. He argued that moral principles cannot be derived from experience or observation, and that they are grounded in the nature of reason itself. In this sense, the categorical imperative is not a subjective principle that is determined by individual preferences or desires, but rather it is an objective principle that is grounded in the nature of reason.
In the passage multiple times can speakers individualistically about the first person perspective for exam “if I think of a categorical imperative, then I know directly what it contains.” Kant's first formulation of the categorical imperative implies that moral actions must be guided by the principle of autonomy, or the idea that individuals should be able to make decisions for themselves based on their own understanding of what is right and wrong. This principle of autonomy is a key aspect of Kant's ethical theory, and is reflected in the idea that moral action should be guided by universal principles that can be willed by all rational beings.
In conclusion, this passage from Kant's "Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals" outlines his first formulation of the categorical imperative, which serves as a fundamental principle of his deontological ethical theory. According to Kant, the categorical imperative is a necessary and unconditional moral law that guides moral action based on universal principles and the idea of autonomy. This formulation emphasizes the importance of consistency and universality in moral reasoning, and highlights the idea that moral actions should be guided by principles that can be willed by all rational beings.
References
Immanuel Kant, "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals"
Because the universality of the law in accordance with which effects happen constitutes that which is really called nature in the most general sense (in accordance with its form), i.e., the existence of things insofar as it is determined in accordance with universal laws, thus the universal imperative of duty can also be stated as follows: So act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature.
(Taken from: Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Allen W Wood (Yale University Press edition, 2002), Text, second section, pp 29–47.)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about the first formulation or maxim of his deontological ethics.
In this passage, Kant is further explaining the first formulation of his categorical imperative, which states that an action is only morally permissible if the maxim behind it can be willed to become a universal law. In this context, "universal" refers to the idea that the moral principle should apply equally to all rational beings.
Kant explains that the universality of this law is what constitutes "nature" in the broadest sense, as it refers to the existence of things determined by universal laws. Therefore, the universal imperative of duty can also be stated as acting as if the maxim behind one's action is to become a universal law of nature.
This first formulation of the categorical imperative, also known as the "universality principle," is one of the central elements of Kant's deontological ethics. It asserts that an action is only morally permissible if it can be made into a universal law without leading to a contradiction. In other words, an action should not only be in accordance with universal moral principles, but it should also be universalizable without causing harm or injustice to others.
Scholars have often interpreted this formulation as a principle of impartiality, as it requires individuals to act in a way that they could will as a universal law, regardless of their personal interests or biases. The idea behind this principle is that moral principles should be impartial, applying equally to all rational beings, and that individuals should not act in a way that would make the moral principles meaningless.
Overall, the first formulation of the categorical imperative in Kant's ethics provides a foundation for moral reasoning, as it asserts that an action can only be considered morally permissible if it can be made into a universal law that is equally applicable to all rational beings. This principle highlights the importance of impartiality and universality in moral decision-making, and provides a framework for evaluating the morality of an action.
References
Immanuel Kant, "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals"
Now I say that the human being, and in general every rational being, exists as end in itself, not merely as means to the discretionary use of this or that will, but in all its actions, those directed toward itself as well as those directed toward other rational beings, it must always at the same time be considered as an end. All objects of inclinations have only a conditioned worth; for if the inclinations and the needs grounded on them did not exist, then their object would be without worth.
(Taken from: Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Allen W Wood (Yale University Press edition, 2002), Text, second section, pp 29–47.)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about kants claims about the problem of inclinations in ethical thinking.
In this passage from Immanuel Kant's "Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals," he presents his views on the problem of inclinations in ethical thinking. According to Kant, the worth of objects that are the objects of human inclinations, such as pleasure or comfort, are only conditionally valuable. The worth of these objects is dependent on the existence of inclinations and needs. If these inclinations and needs were not present, then the objects that they are associated with would have no worth.
Kant argues that the worth of a rational being, such as a human being, cannot be determined in the same way. Rational beings exist as ends in themselves, not merely as means to the discretionary use of others. In other words, they cannot be used merely as tools to achieve the goals of others. This idea is central to Kant's concept of the dignity of rational beings and his view that they should be treated with respect.
This idea is also closely related to Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative, which states that a person should always treat others as ends in themselves and never merely as means to their own ends. According to Kant, this principle is necessary for moral action and must be followed in all circumstances.
Scholars have interpreted Kant's ideas about inclinations and the worth of rational beings in different ways. Some have argued that this view reflects his commitment to a form of moral absolutism, in which moral rules and principles have an absolute and unchanging validity. Others have interpreted this idea as a response to the egoistic and utilitarian views of ethics that were prevalent in his time, and as an attempt to provide a more rigorous and systematic basis for ethical decision-making.
Regardless of the interpretation, the idea that rational beings exist as ends in themselves and cannot be used merely as means to the goals of others is a central theme in Kant's ethical philosophy. As he states in this passage, the worth of rational beings cannot be determined by their inclinations or the objects associated with them, but must be considered in all of their actions, both those directed toward themselves and those directed toward other rational beings.
This idea has had a significant influence on ethical thinking, particularly in the development of deontological ethics, and continues to be widely discussed and debated by scholars in the field of ethics.
References
Immanuel Kant, "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals"
The inclinations themselves, however, as sources of needs, are so little of absolute worth, to be wished for in themselves, that rather to be entirely free of them must be the universal wish of every rational being. Thus the worth of all objects to be acquired through our action is always conditioned. The beings whose existence rests not on our will but on nature nevertheless have, if they are beings without reason, only a relative worth as means, and are called things; rational beings, by contrast, are called persons, because their nature already marks them out as ends in themselves, i.e., as something that may not be used merely as means, hence to that extent limits all arbitrary choice (and is an object of respect). These are not merely subjective ends whose existence as effect of our action has a worth for us; but rather objective ends, i.e., things whose existence in itself is an end, and specifically an end such that no other end can be set in place of it, to which it should do service merely as means, because without this nothing at all of absolute worth would be encountered anywhere; but if all worth were conditioned, hence contingent, then for reason no supreme practical principle could anywhere be encountered.
(Taken from: Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Allen W Wood (Yale University Press edition, 2002), Text, second section, pp 29–47.)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about the nature of rational beings as ends in themselves.
In this passage, Immanuel Kant asserts that rational beings exist as ends in themselves, meaning they cannot be treated merely as means to an end. He contrasts this with objects of inclinations, which only have a conditioned worth as they are dependent on inclinations and needs. He notes that rational beings, being ends in themselves, cannot be used merely as means, and that this is what sets them apart from things and gives them objective worth. This concept is what limits arbitrary choice and is an object of respect.
Kant argues that the existence of rational beings as ends in themselves is necessary for the concept of absolute worth, which cannot exist if all worth is conditioned and contingent. He believes that the recognition of rational beings as ends in themselves is a supreme practical principle for reason, and without this principle, there would be no supreme practical principle in existence.
This passage highlights the centrality of the idea of rational beings as ends in themselves to Kant's ethical system, as it forms the basis for his argument against treating people merely as means to an end. This idea has been widely discussed and analyzed by scholars in the field of philosophy, with some viewing it as a cornerstone of deontological ethics.
One scholar who has analyzed Kant's idea of rational beings as ends in themselves is Allen W. Wood in his book "Kantian Ethics". Wood notes that this idea is central to Kant's moral philosophy and is what sets it apart from other ethical theories. He writes, "The concept of the end in itself is a distinctive feature of Kant's ethical theory and one of its most important contributions to moral philosophy."
Another scholar, Christine Korsgaard, has written extensively on Kant's moral philosophy and has argued that the idea of rational beings as ends in themselves is closely related to Kant's concept of autonomy. In her book "Creating the Kingdom of Ends", she writes, "Kant's view that rational beings are ends in themselves, and thus cannot be used as mere means, is based on the idea that they are autonomous agents who have the capacity to set their own ends."
In conclusion, the idea of rational beings as ends in themselves is a central concept in Kant's moral philosophy, and has been widely discussed and analyzed by scholars in the field of philosophy. It forms the basis for his argument against treating people merely as means to an end and is closely related to his concept of autonomy.
References
Immanuel Kant, "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals"
Allen W. Wood, "Kantian Ethics"
Christine Korsgaard, "Creating the Kingdom of Ends", 1996
If, then, there is supposed to be a supreme practical principle, and in regard to the human will a categorical imperative, then it must be such from the representation of that which, being necessarily an end for everyone, because it is an end in itself, constitutes an objective principle of the will, hence can serve as a universal practical law. The ground of this principle is: Rational nature exists as end in itself. The human being necessarily represents his own existence in this way; thus to that extent it is a subjective principle of human actions. But every other rational being also represents his existence in this way as consequent on the same rational ground as is valid for me; thus it is at the same time an objective principle, from which, as a supreme practical ground, all laws of the will must be able to be derived.
(Taken from: Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Allen W Wood (Yale University Press edition, 2002), Text, second section, pp 29–47.)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about the practical imperative.
The passage is discussing the concept of a "supreme practical principle" and a "categorical imperative" in regards to the human will. The author argues that this principle must be a universal law that is derived from the idea that rational nature exists as an end in itself. This idea is both subjective, as the human being represents their own existence in this way, and objective, as every other rational being does so as well. The author suggests that this idea can serve as the basis for all laws of the will.
This passage is a reference to Immanuel Kant's philosophical ideas about the categorical imperative, which he describes as "an objective principle that can serve as a universal law for human actions." According to Kant, the categorical imperative is derived from the idea that rational beings exist as ends in themselves and should not be used merely as means to an end. It posits that this principle must be based on an end that is universally recognized as valuable in and of itself (represented as "an end in itself"). The author Kant argues that rational nature is such an end and that both the individual and other rational beings recognize this, making it a subjective and objective principle. The author suggests that this principle can serve as the basis for all laws of the will.
Some scholars, such as Allen W. Wood, have noted that this passage reflects Kant's "central idea that the morality of an action depends on the motives of the person who performs it, rather than on the consequences of the action itself."
Overall, the passage presents the idea that the practical imperative and the categorical imperative are based on the principle that rational nature exists as an end in itself and serves as the basis for all laws of the will.
References
Immanuel Kant, "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals"
Immanuel Kant, "Critique of Practical Reason"
Wood, Allen W. "Kant's Moral Philosophy." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
The practical imperative will thus be the following: Act so that you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the same time as end and never merely as means. We will see whether this can be accomplished.
(Taken from: Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Allen W Wood (Yale University Press edition, 2002), Text, second section, pp 29–47.)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage to Kant's second formational in his deontological ethical theory.
The practical imperative referred to in this passage is a key concept in Immanuel Kant's deontological ethical theory, as outlined in his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. According to Kant, the practical imperative is a moral rule or guideline that must be followed in all ethical decision-making. It states that one must "Act so that you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the same time as end and never merely as means."
In this passage, Kant argues that humanity must always be treated as an end in itself, rather than simply being used as a means to an end. This means that individuals should never be treated merely as a means to achieve someone else's goals or desires, but must always be respected and valued in their own right. This idea is central to Kant's deontological ethical theory, which holds that moral rules and duties are based on inherent, universal principles that are not dependent on the consequences of one's actions.
Kant also suggests that the practical imperative should be followed in all ethical decision-making, regardless of the specific circumstances. This means that one must always act in a way that respects the inherent worth and dignity of every individual, regardless of the situation or the consequences of one's actions.
Kant's deontological ethical theory has been widely discussed and debated by philosophers and scholars. Many have praised the idea that individuals should always be treated as ends in themselves, rather than merely as means to an end. For example, philosopher Jürgen Habermas has argued that the principle of treating individuals as ends in themselves is a "keystone" of modern ethical and political discourse, and that it provides a basis for a wide range of human rights and freedoms.
However, some have criticized Kant's deontological theory for being too rigid and inflexible, and for ignoring the consequences of one's actions. For example, philosopher John Stuart Mill argued that moral rules and duties must be based on a consideration of the consequences of one's actions, and that it is not always possible to treat individuals as ends in themselves in all situations.
Despite these criticisms, Kant's practical imperative remains a highly influential concept in ethical and political discourse, and continues to shape contemporary debates on ethics and morality. In conclusion, the practical imperative as presented in this passage of Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals represents a key concept in his deontological ethical theory, which holds that individuals should always be treated as ends in themselves, rather than merely as means to an end.
References
Immanuel Kant, "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals"