INTRODUCTION The question of whether moral truths can be discovered through the observation of the world is a fundamental inquiry in the field of meta-ethics. Meta-ethics delves into the study of morality and moral language, attempting to decipher the meaning and logical features of moral language. This discipline is concerned not with the truth or falsity of moral judgments, as philosopher J.L. Mackie aptly pointed out, but rather with understanding the essence of morality itself.
THESIS In this essay I will defend the view that it is indeed the case that Moral truths are discoverable by observation of the world.
ARGUMENT
The notion that moral truths are discernible through observations aligns most closely with the cognitivist and realist meta-ethical theory of naturalism, which posits that the goodness or badness of actions can be determined by examining their real-world consequences. John Stuart Mill in "Utilitarianism" argues "The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness." Here he is arguing that utilitarianism reduces 'good' to 'pleasure' and 'bad' to 'pain,' both of which are considered natural properties. Thus naturalistic meta-ethics holds that moral properties can be grounded in natural properties, allowing for an objective understanding of morality based on empirical observations of the world
COUNTER ARGUMENT
However, the question arises: can we truly equate moral judgments, such as 'drinking alcohol is good,' solely with natural properties like 'pleasure'? This oversimplification ignores the complexities of moral reasoning, as evidenced by scenarios like alcohol poisoning or drunk driving, where pleasure and goodness diverge. This dilemma echoes G.E. Moore's naturalistic fallacy, which warns against the unwarranted leap from natural properties to moral judgments. G.E. Moore in "Principia Ethica" argues "The naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy not because it says that goodness is a simple quality of anything that can be good, but because it tries to define what is meant by 'good' by means of something else that is supposed to be simpler and more 'real.'" Additionally, David Hume's 'is/ought' gap, although not directly critiquing naturalism, underscores the challenge of deriving moral imperatives from empirical observations. David Hume argues in "A Treatise of Human Nature" "In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible, but is however of the last consequence." Meaning the gap between facts and values is evident when transitioning from a factual statement like 'Smith murdered Jones' (cognitivist) to the evaluative statement 'Smith shouldn't have murdered Jones,' which involves emotions and values. A.J. Ayer argrees with Hume and in "Language, Truth, and Logic" argues "The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content. Thus if I say to someone, 'You acted wrongly in stealing that money,' I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, 'You stole that money.' In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any further statement about it." Morover, invoking God will not help as J.L. Mackie in "Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong" argues that "Moral properties constitute so odd a cluster of properties and relations that they are most unlikely to have arisen in the ordinary course of events, without an all-powerful god to create them."
COUNTER COUNTER ARGUMENT
Having said this, just because emotional expressions cannot be proven true or false doesn’t mean that they are void of value. Emotivist A.J. Ayer said that “ethical concepts are essentially concerned with the application of evaluations to the objects of our feelings”, this rules out a need for empirical fact when making ethical judgments as ethics are essentially aesthetics. This echoes in teleological theories such as utilitarianism (which is a naturalist theory) - the right action is the “greatest good for the greatest number” (Bentham) which allows for morally subjective. Morover it can be arued that Ethical statements are cognitivist, and as a result, morality can be defined in factual terms. F.H. Bradley in "Ethical Studies" argues "The sentences of ethics, therefore, do not merely express emotion like a cry of pain or a burst of enthusiasm. They express propositions, and the validity of these propositions does not depend on our emotion being what it is." This would mean that ethical statements have an absolute nature that can be applied to all moral agents equally. The idea is supported by F.H. Bradley, he stated that ethical sentences express moral propositions. It is the objective features of the world around us that can be used to decide if these propositions are true or false. Objective moral realists such as Bradely thus argue that there are objective moral facts that exist independently of our beliefs or feelings. These facts can be discovered through rational inquiry and empirical observation of the world. Russ Shafer-Landau in "Moral Realism" argues that "Moral objectivity entails that ethical statements have an absolute nature, and they can be applied universally to all moral agents, regardless of individual beliefs or cultural variations."
SYNOPTIC LINKS
Religions such as Buddhism (especially Theravada) reject this type of moral subjectivity. Buddhist teachings, particularly the Vinaya Pitaka teach that
the Five Precepts are moral guidelines that Buddhists follow to create peace and harmony in the world. The Buddha said in Digha Nikaya 1.5 (Sutta Pitaka): "All beings tremble at violence. They fear death, just like you do. So do not kill, or cause to kill, any being." According to Venerable Bhikkhu Bodhi, American Theravada Buddhist monk and scholar (source: The Noble Eightfold Path: Way to the End of Suffering). "The first precept is the most important, because it protects the life of all beings. It is the foundation of the other precepts." - The Buddha in Di said gha Nikaya 1.5 (Sutta Pitaka): "All beings want what is theirs to be theirs. So do not steal, or cause to steal, what belongs to others." Dr. Paul Williams, British Buddhist scholar and author (source: Mahayana Buddhism The Essential Teachings).comments "The second precept protects the property of others. It is important to respect the possessions of others, and not to take what is not yours." The Buddha said in Digha Nikaya 1.5 (Sutta Pitaka): "All beings want to be free from sexual misconduct. So do not engage in sexual misconduct, or cause others to engage in sexual misconduct." Dr. Rita Gross, American Buddhist scholar and author (source: Buddhism: The Path to Liberation) argues this means "The third precept protects the sexual integrity of others. It is important to respect the boundaries of others, and to engage in sexual activity only with the consent of all involved.". The Buddha said in Digha Nikaya 1.5 (Sutta Pitaka): "All beings want to be free from false speech. So do not speak falsely, or cause others to speak falsely." Dr. B. Alan Wallace, American Buddhist scholar and author (source: The Attention Revolution: Unlocking the Power of the Focused Mind). comments "The fourth precept protects the truthfulness of communication. It is important to be honest and truthful with others, and to avoid speaking falsehoods." The Buddha said in The Buddha said in Digha Nikaya 1.5 (Sutta Pitaka): "All beings want to be free from intoxicants that cloud the mind. So do not consume intoxicants that cloud the mind, or cause others to consume intoxicants that cloud the mind." Dr. Donald S. Lopez Jr., American Buddhist scholar and author (source: Buddhism: Introducing the Buddhist Experience). explains "The fifth precept protects the clarity of mind. It is important to avoid substances that impair the ability to think clearly and make wise decisions." - In Summary The Buddha is reported to have said in Digha Nikaya 1.5 (Sutta Pitaka): "All beings want what is theirs to be theirs. So do not steal, or cause to steal, what belongs to others." i.e. they include "refraining from taking life, stealing, engaging in sexual misconduct, lying, and consuming intoxicants." These guidlneness are naturalist ic for Buddhists in that they are guidelines for good Karma and part of the rules for sucessful monastic and lay life and much like Aquinas’ natural moral law, these are a set of deontological precepts to guide morality. For example, do not take life, do not steal and do not engage in sexual misconduct.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, the statement that “Moral truths are discoverable by observation of the world” cannot be true unless a degree of moral subjectivity is allowed, like the emotivists. However this is juxtaposed by naturalists who claim that if moral properties can be described in natural properties it must be an objective moral fact. As mentioned before, both Hume and G.E. Moore found faults in not only naturalism but cognitive realist theories too, therefore you cannot discover moral truths through observations of the natural world.
Whether or not ethical terms hold objective factual meaning is based on whether one assumes a cognitive or non-cognitive understanding of such terms, indeed there are such who would contend that ethical terms are cognitive such as ethical naturalists who believe moral sentences can be expressed as natural properties such as desires, causing them to hold truth value. In this essay I will argue that they are meaningful and they do have a truth, it is't cognitive, objective or empirical but is still truth
Argument - Ethical naturalism is a meta-ethical doctrine which maintains that moral truths can be empirically discovered via observation of the world, it is a moral realist theory (insofar as it believes moral facts exist) and thus cognitive ( as moral statements can be judged to be true/false)
Such suggestion that moral truths are objectively meaningful/the y have a truth etc can be detected in Aquinas's natural law, which offers a form of theological naturalism whereby it is proposed that one can understand the moral standard ( as set by God's eternal law) through observation of the natural world/order ( natural world)
NL and empercisicisms seems to suggest however that when we look at what the world, that which surrounds us this is how things 'should be' however Hume criticises this thought eh isouth problem, fundemtnally, it is logically impossibel to go from a descriptive premise of what ''is'' to a prescriptive conclusion ''ought'' statement, philosphically this is problematic. However it is also offers a pragmatic challenge - no matter how closely you empericaly examine a situation, the rightness or wrongness will never become objectively clear, it is imposssible to draw such conclusions from the emperical
.
If morality and moral statemetns//ethical terms, cannot be discovered//comprehended through objective, then not true'fase, they only exist in the mind/ they are meaningless ?
Hume's challenge, however, cannot be automatically accepted as a viable and accurate problem, the empirical also entails the human experience and for utilitarians like Bentham and Mill, morality can be empirically observed and therefore deduced by observing what brought about the most pleasure and least pain. Morality in this way is empirical, can be detected/observed - must have an objective basis.
The challenge however made by utilitarian's is that moral properties have been directly correlated with natural properties, this is a challenge for GE Moore who argues that moral properties are not identical to natural properties.
For example, a moral act such as giving to charity might make me happy but the morality of the act merely gives way to the happiness and is not the happiness in itself, ore more explicitly inflicting pain for a sadist is pleasurable but is it good? Fundamentally, this is a wholly open question argument - if goodness and pleasure were the same things it would not make sense to ask '' is pleasure good?'' because it would be like asking '' Is pleasure pleasure ?'' yet as the former question does make sense, clearly good is distinct from pleasure ( or any other natural property) moral properties cannot be reduced to anything simpler, such as pain or pleasure because moral properties are simple. It cannot be defined in such a crude way, they cannot be comprehended in a way that is objective.
Equally, instutionists claim that ethical terms such as ''good'' hold objective factual basis, however they only offer an explanation of what gives them their truth value, it is contended that we simply just know when something is good or bad.
Whilst maintaining that morality is cognitive, intuitionism asserts that moral facts are not to be discovered, but rather are self evident and they are known intuitively. '' If I am to be asked 'how is good to be defined?' my answer is that it cannot be defined and that is all I have to say about it ( GE Moore in Principa Ethica) Moore likened good to the colour yellow, we only demonstrate our knowledge by pointing to the colour yellow; it can be shown and known yet not defined, it seems true that people have an intuitive sense of morality. Bertrand Russell, in ' The Problems of Philosophy' argues that perception is a priori, '' the truth of such knowledge can neither be proved no disproved by experience.'' Surely this indicates the fact that there is a certain meaningful truth to moral statements, however they cannot be discovered in a way of empirical objectivity.
There are however conflicting intuitive understandings in this, how can morality be cognitive and intuitive, if many have different intuitive understandings of good and bad, then how could this possibly point to something that is cognitive, objectively and meaningfully true.
Nietzsche raised the issue of ethical color blindness to highlight how different intuitions may point to different ideas of right and wrong, what one may see as yellow another may see as green.
If knowledge of good and bad is a priori and unable to be proved by outside Criterion then there is no way to prove whose interpretation of moral dilemmas is correct, if murder was right and killed someone who thought it was wrong there would be no way to discern who had knowledge of moral truth. If we have no knowledge of moral truth then there can be no objective, meaningful ethical terms.
H Pritchard responds to the Nietzschean criticism by arguing that some have better intuition than others, people disagree on what is good, not because goodness isn't meaningful or objective but because their minds are not ordered correctly. Conflicting ideas does not undermine the objectivity of goodness, rather some just have a better understanding than others. Moral statements/terns/arguments are not meaningless or non-cognitive.
Still, the fact that there are such conflicting claims regarding intuinism, illustrates the issue of intuition The phenomena of intuition doesn't seem to be sufficiently explained and the idea of knowledge detached from experience or the sense may be puzzling to some, like Plato's concept of the forms, GJ Warnock used the similar criticism against intuitionism, it is simply a sense of bewilderment that is disguised to look like a theory. If intuinism and naturalism cannot provide the basis for the argument that there is meaningful objective meaning behind ethical terms/statements etc, then there is very little ground for the argument that there is objective truth in moral terms and statements.
Therefore, the most convincing response to teh question is to argue that ultimately ethical statements are merely subjective expressions of feelings and unlike analytic or synthetic statements, they lack objective meaning. Nonetheless, to claim ethical statements are non-cognitive is not to claim that they lack significant meaning to cultures or social groups. Whilst the premise of emotivism seems sound, the conclusion is flawed, (that ethical discussion is nonsensical) as ethical statements are provide through human experience, not science or logic.
The emotivist view essentially goes to suggest that moral statements are non-cognitive evinces of preference and attitudes. This is a view that is expanded on by AJ Ayer in 'language, truth and logic' in which he explains that putative propositions can only be literally meaningful once they have been analytically or emperically verified (or falsified) Ayer developed the principle of weak verification which claimed that statements could be verified if one is able to state what evidence would make the statement probable.
He claimed that moral statements were neither analytic or provable by the senses and were therefore factually meaningless and non-cognitive. In turn implying:
a) ethical terms do not have an objective factual basis making them true or false in describing something
b) Only reflect what is in the mind of the person
c) cannot be meaningful
In conslusion Although Ayer's emotivism sets the bar too high by arguing that because I cannot prove something it becomes meaningless, one can argue that whilst moral statements clearly express preferences they can be validated through reasoning and experience as opposed to scientific or factual proof. For example, although I cannot prove paedophilia is wrong I can give reasons why it is wrong eg damaging psychological effects, abuse, violation of human rights. Karol Wojtyla in ' the acting person' highlights that ethical demands and stances grow out of human encounter -it is through encountering good, bad needs desires that we uncover a sense or morality and the need to be moral, ethical statements do not require logical or scientific justification but instead experience of being human and living. Therefore implying that they are meaningful and they do have a truth, it is't cognitive, objective or empirical but is still truth
Ethical naturalists are one group of thinkers who argue that ethical language does indeed have meaning, as moral truths are objective and can be absolutely known - this is cognitivist. F. H. Bradley for example, came to the conclusion that doing ‘good’ can be defined as doing one’s ‘duty’ in life, which in turn can be discovered from looking at what society does. Bradley came to this conclusion on the basis of Hegel’s theory of the geist, is some kind of ‘force’ that ‘moves’ society ‘forwards,’ or at least is the cause of social change. The zeitgeist is whatever the current generally accepted worldview of society is, and within this is found the volksgeist, which is the spirit, or some kind of collective conscience of the people that make up society; the volksgeist defines morality. Therefore, what society considers (according to the volksgeist) to be ‘good’ – for itself and for the individuals that make it up – is ‘good.’ One flaw that could be pointed out in this argument is that it goes against Hume’s principle of the ‘Naturalistic Fallacy,’ which declares the necessity of separation of fact and value; that which ‘is’ is not the same as that which ‘ought’ to be, and therefore one’s societally-defined duty and what is morally ‘good’ are not automatically the same thing. However, the naturalistic approach to metaethics is still a valid one despite this, as it seems that where ‘good’ comes from as described here fulfils any and all purpose that it can or should in that it leads to a stable and safe society, and one in which individuals are happy to follow such a moral code, as they are themselves component parts of what has come to be defined as ‘good.’ Although it contravenes Hume’s ‘fork,’ it is not clear that there is any other purpose that ‘good’ can or should serve, and thus the blurring of the lines between fact and value in this particular context does not seem destructive to the argument. Furthermore, it could well be argued that such a state of affairs is the one found in civilisation now and throughout history: social attitudes change with the law and therefore what the state describes as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ tends to be in line with what the majority of the populace would also describe as ‘right’ or ‘wrong.’ From either an atheist or a theist standpoint, the naturalist argument for the origins of morality seems to fit perfectly with what we actually experience, generally-speaking, morality to be: punishment or reward given by others, or guilt or happiness induced by what we feel others think of our actions. We can therefore know ‘moral truths,’ as they are defined by society and are objective in their truth (until the geist moves things around). Ethical language does have meaning in that it defines the (albeit contemporary) moral truth.
Another approach to pinpointing the origin of what ‘good’ is, that results in ethical language indeed having meaning is intuitionism. G. E. Moore is an example of such a thinker, who postulated that ‘good’ is undefinable because “good is good,” and there is no more to it. Moore came to the conclusion that moral truths are known innately and by intuition alone, and this is because all attempts to define ‘good’ or ‘bad’ are subject to the Open Question Argument, which asks whether a ‘good’ something is necessarily ‘good.’ For example, one might suggest that pleasure is morally ‘good,’ but clearly this is not necessarily the case when most humans intuitively feel that some pleasure is inherently not ‘good;’ the act of rape would be a good example of this. Moreover, acts such of kindness and generosity seem to feel ‘good’ for no particular reason other than that they just are ‘good.’ This argument fits in with the fact that certain acts are seen universally across cultures and times as intrinsically immoral. If murder is seen as morally ‘bad’ throughout human civilisation, then such a conclusion must come from inside humans themselves, either purely naturally or through some divine action or voice in our conscience. For an intuitionist, ethical language has meaning in that it translates man’s common innate senses into something communicable, which allows for the creation of a safe and moral society.
However, some argue that ethical language cannot have meaning, such as the emotivist and logical positivist A. J. Ayer. Ayer wrote that a statement cannot be meaningful unless it is verifiable, and that knowledge can only be found through either synthetic or analytic reasoning; this approach to epistemology is known as logical positivism. This means therefore that moral truths are intrinsically unknowable, because by their nature they are unverifiable in that they cannot be empirically studied or deconstructed to pure logic given their inherent ties to either that which is beyond the rational (should one believe morality comes from God), or to emotion. Therefore, all ethical language can only be ways of depicting human emotion, and nothing more – it cannot be objective in truth and is not meaningful as a result. There are several flaws in this line of argument however. Most importantly, Ayer postulates that statements are not meaningful if they are not verifiable; this statement is itself entirely unverifiable, and therefore by is hoisted by its own petard in that it must be meaningless. Fundamentally, this argument is entirely self-defeating.
To conclude, the given statement is wrong in its assertion that ethical language is meaningless. Cognitivist views of the origin of morality seem to be far more compatible with the real experience that humanity has of how moral ‘truths’ are manifested in society, and were the opposite view that morality is subjective and therefore that the language that surrounds it is meaningless true, it seems that total social breakdown is inevitable; why should one follow ethical rules if what is ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in terms of outcome from one’s actions are based purely on the emotions of others? Ethical language must have meaning, because of the existence of widely-agreed, universal moral ‘truths,’ and because arguments that come to this conclusion are compatible with the genuine experience of morality in their postulations of where it originates from.
Cognitivists would disagree they would point towards natural knowledge of morality and even the notion of intuitive knowledge to suggest that moral statements must be more than expressions of emotions. This cognitive understanding is certainly flawed however the non-cognitive doesn't mean meaningless and certianly not reductionist Direction. This essay will argue that moral statements are non cognitive expressions of emotion over natural cognitive statements.
There are those like AJ Ayer in 'language truth and logic; who would suggest that moral statements are non-cognitive evinces of preference and attitudes, This essentially follows along the lines that putative propositions can only be literally meaningful once they have been analytically or empirically verified or falsified; Ayer developed the principle of weak verification which claimed that statements could be verified if one is able to state what evidence would make this sentence probable.
Moral statements, however, are neither analytical or provable by the senses, as a result of this, they are factually meaningless in turn pointing towards the argument that moral statements are non-cognitive and real nothing more than expressions of emotions. The challenge in Ayer's dismissal, however, is the assumption that moral truths cannot be empirically proved, there are certainly those belonging towards the sort of ethical naturalism, a meta-ethical doctrine, which maintains that moral truths can be empirically discovered via Observation of the world, it is a moral realist theory ( insofar as it believes moral facts exist) and is therefore cognitive (as moral statements can be judged to be true or false) if this is the case then surely this would refute the suggestion that moral statements are no more than expressions of emotion
The cognitive, empirical quality of moral statements that can be detected further when considering the theological naturalism offered by Aquinas' natural law, which suggests that we can only understand the moral standard (set by God's eternal law) through observations of the natural world/order, without a moral standard society would collapse as there could be no justified laws - we cannot reduce the value and need for moral statements down to the confine of emotion, they must hold objective, empirical truth rather than being expressions of emotion
By bringing forth cognitive nature of moral statements through prism of natural law raises the is-ought problem illustrated by Hume, who contends that absolute wrongness or rightness cannot be deduced from experience or from observation, there are fundamentally NO metaphysical truths or supernatural truths, it seems evident that when people are describing something as good, bad, right or wrong they are expressing an attitude towards something, by viewing moral statements in this ay there is not unexplainable metaphysical phenomena such as ''intuition'' or a '' divine law'' - but preference, attitude, and emotion, in effect proving the notion that moral statements are not cognitive statements, they must only function as expressions of emotion, have to reject the rigidity and restrictions of natural law's attempt to prove the empirical cognitive nature of moral statements
Still, the notion that moral statements aren't just expressions of emotion isn't necessarily a reflection of rigid legality, (the criticism easily directed to Natural law)
Human experience itself may confirm truth, utilitarians such as Mill and Bentham believed that morality could be deduced from observations as to what brought the most pleasure and the least pain, ultimately this represents the use of human experience to confirm truth and certainty of moral statements, it refutes the implication that moral statements must be meaningless as they are only emotive, human experience tells us that they are not meaningless.
In effect suggesting that • Emotivism sets the bar too high by arguing that because I cannot prove something it becomes meaningless. For example, although I cannot prove paedophilia is wrong, I can give reasons for why it is wrong e.g. damaging psychological effects, abuse, violation of human rights, so moral statements might t be cognitive they cannot be proved through empirical ethical naturalism - they are not meaningless and perhaps can't be reduced down to only the position of expressions of emotion
Perhaps the best response to the challenging paradigm of accepting cognitivism but rejecting ethical naturalism and rejecting emotivism is to accept the notion that moral statements might be a form of cognitive intuitive knowledge
Whilst maintaining morality is cognitive intuitionism asserts that moral facts are not to be discovered in an empirical way as asserted by say Aquinas or Philippa Foot but rather they are self-evident and known intuitively. The thinking behind intuitionism is profoundly embodied By GE Moore who in principa Ethica raised the suggestion that '' I am to be asked '' how is good to be defined'?'' my answer is that it cannot be defined and that is all I have to say about it.. Moore likened good to the colour yellow - we only demonstrate our knowledge by pointing to the colour yellow it can be shown and known yet not defined, thereby suggesting that people have an intuitive sense of morality over an emotive reaction and certainly not one that can be proved in an empirical way.
There still remains and issue with intuition, how can morality be cognitive and intuitive, if many have different intuitive understandings of good and bad Nietzsche raised the issue of ethical colour blindness to highlight how different institutions may point to different ideas of right and wrong, what one may see as yellow another might see as green, colour isn't so simple, it isn't universal, why accept that moral statements would produce a universally similar intuitive effect.
this suggests that good has no more meaning if it is reduced down to the position of perception and different understandings, there is no universal, objective, infallible truth in moral statements, this points towards the emotivists understanding that good is an expression of preference, thus arguably factually meaningless, only an expression of emotion
The Nietzschean criticism however prevents any form of meaningful discussion, if no terms can be proved or disproved as they are merely a matter of expression there could be no meaningful debate about ethics, in exactly the same way that atheism, theism and agnosticism were meaningless to logical positivists the meta-ethical debate or relativity to absoluteness is nonsensical, furthermore this contradicts our own understanding of use of ethical terminology, ethical terms of beliefs are clearly not beyond reason as we have reasons for our beliefs based on experience., the grounds used to condemn intuitionism as poting towards emotivism is flawed, in effect meaning that this cannot be considered as a valid way of discrediting the value of intuitionism in suggesting that moral statements are not just expressions of emotions
Emotion, however, cannot be completely separated from moral statements, fundamentally emotion does have a place in moral statements, however, such statements are not meaningless on account of such relationship
The centrality of emotion, comes from the very fact that ethics are born out of human encounter, Karol Wojtyla in 'the acting person' highlights that ethical demands and stances grow out of human encounter, it is through encountering good, bad, needs, desires that we uncover a sense or morality and the need to be moral, ethical statements do not require logical or scientific justification but instead the experience of being human and living - surely this points towards a conception of moral statements that do not necessarily pertain a cognitive, empirical truth, but one that arises out of the subjective and therefore emotional experience ?
The challenge of Wojtlya in this is that morality is reduced down to human interactions, the trivial and in trivializing ethics Mel Thompson raised the point that '' you cannot reduce morality down to a set of Cheers and boos'' if morality is not more than personal opinion then laws such as "do no murder" seem to be no more important than someone claiming "I don't like red sweets". MacIntrye argues emotivism places child carers and paedophiles as equals, this is surely wrong, emotion cannot be considered as central to the process of making moral statements, in effect meaning that moral statements cannot be considered to be any more than expressions of emotion, EMOTIVISM creates impression of moral statements and therefore the inversion of the 'moral' to be meaningless - a suggestion that is challenging to be accepted
In conclusion Stephen Jay Gould, Non-overlapping magisteria says "ethical statements are merely subjective expressions of feelings and unlike analytic or synthetic statements; they lack objective meaning. Nonetheless, to claim ethical statements are non-cognitive is not to claim they lack significant meaning to cultures or social groups" While the premise of emotivism seems sound, the conclusion is flawed (that ethical discussion is non-sensical), as ethical statements are proved through human experience, not science or logic, thereby moral statements are no only expressions of emotion, they have a cognitive root underpinning them that emerges from experience
Many scholars such as AJ Ayer would suggest that ‘good’ is meaningless, because it cannot be verified analytically or synthetically, placing it in the category of subjective opinion, based solely on emotion.
In this essay I will show that while I would agree with Ayer that moral statements are just expressions of emotion, I would be inclined to suggest that these statements still have meaning, as they are part of our daily lives, through law and basic human rights.
There's no way for a person to distinguish between something actually being right and it merely seeming right to that person. This reflects the is-ought fallacy i.e. that We cannot go from what is to what we ought to be. The idea that value statements are different from facts means that they do not have meaning. David Hume shows this when he says that there are matters of fact and relations of ideas. Hume would ask if morality were objective why are there so many arguments about morality? The differences between moral various moral systems and the varied positions that take on medical and social ethics, war and the environment could be cited as examples. Naturalism entails scientific testing of degrees of morality (i.e. Utilitarianism). This reflects a modern world view and our need to test statements
Counter Argument How ever against the view that moral statements are just expressions of emotion Bradley in his book “Ethical Naturalism’ would suggest that good is an absolute, observable fact of the world, which has direct relevance to our position and role in society. This would imply that good has a resolute meaning as it influences how we should behave, given our place in the world. Naturalism makes morality objective and this has the strength of raising morality above personal opinion. Through Naturalism you can arrive at absolutes (such as murder is wrong) and this matches a common sense view of ethics. Further, there are common elements of morality that cross gender, culture, language and geography – this is proof not only that a particular Naturalistic ethical theory is founded in objectivity, but that morality - in general - is as well.
Counter Counter Argument - Many thinkers would criticise this viewpoint, such as Kai Neilson who would correctly note that society is ever -changing, and ‘good’ varies within different cultures, which would adequately explain or changing attitudes to homosexuality, pre-marital sex and race and diversity. ‘Absolute’ is rather an ambiguous term in ethics. It can mean universal – applying to the whole of humanity, objective, meaning measurable in some way, or non-consequentialist.
This would suggest that other naturalists, such as Philippa Foot, are incorrect to say that good has a fixed meaning, even if it is culturally observable as to what societies mean by ‘good’. Foot uses the insightful example from Memoirs of a Revolutionist to try and illustrate how ‘good’ is something fixed and intrinsically meaningful. The example sates how a geographer , observing a tribe of indigenous people, upholds his promise not to photograph them even when he is presented with the opportunity of doing so without their knowledge of it, whilst they are asleep. This, Foot would argue, illustrates how ‘good’ is a fixed duty and not relative to the people concerned, but concrete.
Perhaps Kant’s maxim of ‘universalisation’ could suggest a reason for this apparently ‘fixed’ sense of duty from the geographer. This could be suggested as perhaps the geographer would not want this action to be universalised, and if he was in the situation would not want someone to take a picture of him, hence suggesting that self-preference and compassion for others decides goodness; it is not fixed but relative and therefore has meaning only in a subjective sense.
Mackie makes an interesting addition to this debate in his book “Does morality rest on a mistake’ as he suggests that we know what good is and it has meaning; but that this ‘meaning’ is completely made up by society and tradition. He gives the example of the rules in a game of chess, which are only valid due to the being created and accepted by those who play, and have no meaning to someone who did not know how to play the game. This suggestion that good has meaning is actually human created would provide a much more satisfactory explanation of that of an intuitionist such as GE Moore, who in Principia Ethica would argue that “when I am asked ‘what is good?’ my answer is ‘good is just good’ and that is the end of the matter”.
This suggests that good is indefinable but still has intrinsic meaning as just as we recognise the colour yellow, we intrinsically recognise good, suggesting that it has significant meaning, even if some would argue this definition of it lacks clarity.
In conclusion, ethical naturalists and intuitionists alike, although disagreeing how to define good, or whether it can indeed be defined, would both suggest that good does indeed have meaning. Personally I would suggest that Kai Neilson’s principle of cultural relativism sheds the most light on this issue, although he states that good is essentially made up it still has different meaning in different cultures, even although it cannot be empirically or analytically proven.
Essay Process
Your first step will be to simply BUG the question – this is a technique which will help you with any question on the exam. This simply means
B – Box the command word. There is one word in the question which tells you what you are to do: put a box around it.
U – Underline any word that you think is especially critical to address in your reponse. In a way, all of the words are critical to address! But which words would you really need to focus upon – underline these
G – Glance back at the question.
You won’t be doing this now, but on an exam, you will always be glancing back at the question as you write your response to ensure you are still responding to the question. Now do your “B” and “U” to this question – and then look at the small print below to check your work:
Guide: • You will have put a box around the word ‘Evaluate’ - that is the command word for all AO2 questions. It is good to do this because it reminds you that your job is not merely to describe different points of view; it is to weigh them up – to point to strengths and weaknesses and come to a conclusion. • You will want to underline the phrase word “not intuitive” because it represents a one-sided statement! You will direct all of your arguments to this phrase. It does not matter which side you argue (i.e. that moral terms are / are not intuitive); what matters is that you engage with that word throughout your response. • You will have underlined ‘moral terms’ – for, this reminds you that you will need to focus on these terms – and keep bringing the conversation back to the key ethical terms that intuitionists use (and ‘obligation’ or ‘duty’ for Prichard or ‘good’ for Moore). • You might put a double underline under ‘intuitive’ – for you will need to have a definition of this term in mind in order to answer the question. • You may, then, have underlined every word in the question – good. This ensures that you are paying attention to the words used and will formulate a response that relates to these words.
You do not need an introduction to score the highest mark on your essay response. In fact a long and meandering introduction can mean that you lose marks – since you are using up time that should be spent engaging with the issues. However, a short and focused introduction can help to focus your mind and your essay. In just 3-4 sentences try to do these three things:
• Restate the question in different words – this shows the examiner that you understand the question and are aware of specialist language. You might even want to “interrogate” a word in the question
• Give an indication of the issues that need to be covered in order to evaluate the question.
• (optional) you can take a position in the first paragraph (alternatively you can skip this – just make sure you take a position at the end of the paper – and support it)
Guide:
• Did you state the question/issue in a fresh way? For instance, you could have said: ‘Some moral philosophers have thought that words such as ‘good’, ‘duty’ , ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ are indefinable but known intuitively; in other words, that these terms are selfevident to us. Yet, this is a highly debatable position.’ This shows that you clearly understand the question and have a grasp of specialist language (‘moral philosophers’, ‘good’, ‘duty’ , ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘indefinable’, ‘self-evident’).
• You could have interrogated the term ‘Intuitive’ saying something such as, ‘What does ‘intuitive’ mean? In common use the word ‘intuitive’ speaks to the idea of having an immediate grasp of the truth, apart from a process of reasoning. But Prichard and other intuitionists never used this word. Still, this ‘common’ use of the term will be used in this essay as it corresponds well to Prichard and Moore’s belief that we have direct knowledge of morality.
• You could have stated a position such as, ‘I [or, this response] will show that there is no ground at all for maintaining that ethical terms are known intuitively’ Or, you could have stated an opposite position (Prichard and Moore are quite right to insist that we have intuitive knowledge of what is meant by the moral terms we use). You could see the rest of your response (all of the paragraphs that follow) as ‘unpacking’ this position, explaining it and evaluating challenges to it. • You might have referred to some specific claims you are going to deal with such as: ‘In order to evaluate this issue effectively it will be important the claim that no proof of moral intuition exists, the fact that intuitive ‘truths’ to which moral terms refer can differ widely and, finally that there is no obvious way to resolve conflicting intuitions.’
4. Write Your 1st Body Paragraph
The body of your essay will be composed of three, long paragraphs. Each paragraph will have three elements:
1. You will make a point in direct response to the question. You will support or deepen this point with any of these: scholarly knowledge, an example, quotation etc. See page 9 for ideas.
2. You will challenge (1) by presenting a counterargument or point that could be made against it. You will support or deepen this point with any of these: scholarly knowledge, an example, quotation etc.
3. You will come to a mini-conclusion based on just (1) and (2). You might simply say that (1) is stronger because – or it is weaker because... These three elements, together, form one long paragraph of the body of your essay Now, give this a try: 1. Make a point in relation to the question and support it. 2. Make a counter point or raise a challenge to (1) and support it. 3. Come to a mini conclusion. This means pointing out why (1) and/or (2) above is strong or weak based on how they were supported
5. Write Your 2nd Body Paragraph
Now you are going to do the same thing again – with a different point! 1. Make a point in relation to the question and support it. 2. Make a counter point or raise a challenge to (1) and support it. 3. Come to a mini conclusion. This means pointing out why (1) and/or (2) above is strong or weak based on how they were supported
Guide:
• (1) Make sure you look at the question and ensure that your point is related to the question. For instance you might say ‘It may seem that moral terms are intuitively known, but there is a perfect explanation behind this: our culture and families have already defined these words for us. We inherit the definition not from intuition but from society.’ See also page 9 below for ideas.
• (2) Your counterpoint needs to be a direct challenge to (1) – and different from what you have said in your first paragraph. You will always support each point and counterpoint – again, not merely repeating material you have already used in other paragraphs
• (3) If you are stuck on your ‘Mini-conclusion’, simply begin by saying, ‘This point [1 or 2 above] is strong (or weak) because... and make sure you justify your assertion with some evidence.
5. Write Your 3rd Body Paragraph
Now you are going to do the same thing a final time – with a different point! 1. Make a point in relation to the question and support it. 2. Make a counter point or raise a challenge to (1) and support it. 3. Come to a mini conclusion. This means pointing out why (1) and/or (2) above is strong or weak based on how they were supported
Guide:
• Make sure your paragraphs use specialist terms. For example, have you used any of these: the names of scholars, ‘self-evident’, ‘immediate’, ‘consequentialism’, ‘obligation’, ‘duty’, ‘utilitarianism’, ‘motive’, ‘desire’, ‘conflicting obligations’, ‘the tradesman [Prichard]’, ‘word game’ etc.? You don’t need to use all of these words, but your discussion should reflect words you find in the textbook for this area
• The mini conclusions you reach of the body paragraphs do not need all agree with each other – your mini-conclusions can disagree with one another – as long as they respond directly to the question.
• Some students like to use a quotation to support a key point or make an argument. This is fine, as long as you explain why that quote has been used or why it is so effective. However, you can also paraphrase key scholarly ideas in your own words.
6. Write Your Conclusion
You need to do two main things in your conclusion • State a firm point of view either for or against the question statement.
• Support this point of view by restating points you said earlier in a fresh way. In other words, you do not need to bring in brand-new material here. You can use material you used earlier but rework this. You might find it easy to restate one or more of your ‘Mini conclusions’ earlier in the paper – noting why it/they are particularly relevant to reaching an overall conclusion
Guide:
Here is an example of a short conclusion which displays the qualities above. This conclusion does not need to be long because it emerges from/builds upon the three mini-conclusions earlier in the essay it comes from. Also, it is only one possible conclusion – you may wish to conclude that Ethical Egoism does indeed lead to moral evil. Finally, take note that the conclusion works directly with the question, referring several times to ‘moral evil’. ‘It is clear, then, that moral terms are not known intuitively. As we’ve seen, we may have an experience of knowledge that feels ‘intuitive’ in that we are not conscious of having gone through a long process of reasoning. Yet we have that knowledge, in fact, because it was taught to us at a young age. Another way of putting this is that our dispositions to moral terms ‘came with our mother’s milk.’ So, when someone feels an obligation to give to the poor or to pay a ‘tradesman’ what is due, this is because we were socialised to do so. This view has the advantage of explaining why different obligations occur in different cultures - a fact that intuitionism cannot explain.
7. Points You Can Develop in Your Paragraphs
• Moral terms are undefinable yet self-evident – or are they? The intuitionists said that terms such as ‘good’ (Moore) or ‘obligation’ (Prichard) are undefinable, yet we recognize them when we see them. (You can strengthen this with a scholarly quotation or the paraphrase of an idea from one of these scholars). Supporting this idea is that we have all had the sense of something we should do – apart from a process of reasoning (you can give an example of this). Yet if this is true, why do people in different times and places have such different ideas of what constitutes ‘goodness’ or ‘obligation’? (Give an example of how different families, cultures or nations have entirely different senses of ethical obligations. Remember to close this paragraph with a mini-conclusion in which you weigh up the ideas and come to your own view).
• It’s possible to have immediate and direct knowledge of things (like moral terms) – or is it? The intuitionists believe that we have direct access to moral knowledge. They see this as reflecting the more general fact that we have direct knowledge of all kinds of things. Prichard said that we can look at a mathematical equation or symbol and suddenly understand the answer or what it means (You can give an example of this and/or a quote or paraphrase of a scholarly idea). Yet, this is just an assertion about reality are without any real evidence. For, we only arrive at any knowledge through a process of training, instruction and trial and error (give an example of this). Even when things seem suddenly ‘true’ or ‘right’ this is because of learning and reasoning that has happened in the past. (Close this paragraph with a miniconclusion).
• Moral terms have everything to do with intuition and nothing to do with following desires or outcomes – or do they? The intuitionists say that their approach to ethics is different from other approaches including utilitarianism. In utilitarianism one makes decisions based on their desire for greater pleasure for themselves and/or for others. (You can give an example of this and/or a quote from a utilitarian theorist). This is not the same, says Prichard, of basing ethics on a direct and immediate (or, intuitive) sense of obligation. Utilitarianism can give you a desire to take an action – it cannot ever replace the sense of obligation you had in the first place (you can use a quote or a paraphrase of an idea from Prichard). But isn’t this just a word-game? Why draw a circle around ‘obligation’ and exclude desire from it? Isn’t it true that our desires are a part of everything we do and feel (Give an example of this. Close this paragraph with a mini-conclusion).
9. Sample Paragraph
This paragraph contains all of the qualities that you have been asked to reflect: a clear point which is supported, a challenge (also supported) and a mini conclusion.
Intuitionists maintain that moral terms are intuitively known – aside from all reason and our ability to define the terms. H. A. Prichard said that the term ‘obligation’ is indefinable but, at the same time, our obligations are self-evident – we know what they are. This seems supported by the fact that most human beings would agree that they have an ‘inner’ or ‘intuitive’ sense of what they should do without having arrived at that sense through a process of reasoning. Prichard used the example of having agreed with a ‘tradesman’ on the price for some work to be done. Now, the work has been completed and we have the obligation to pay the tradesman. Acting on this sense of obligation is the essence of morality. Yet, if this is true, why do people in different times and places have such different ideas of what constitutes ‘obligation’? For example, a young person in Taiwan may feel an obligation to participate in military service whereas a young person in Britain may not feel that obligation at all. When we look into reasons for the differences in obligations, it seems clear that these can be explained through the expectations of family, friends, culture and nations – it’s currently the law in Taiwan for all males aged 18- 35 to serve in the military; this is not the case in the U.K. This refutes Prichard’s position. For, as soon as we can explain why we have an obligation it is no longer self-evident and indefinable. We could thus define ‘obligation’ as: ‘the pressure we feel to act in certain ways in order to maintain a positive relationship with our society.’ We could use this definition (and not intuition) to explain and even predict the meaning of moral terms
Guide: • This paragraph responds directly to the question by pointing to one reason it is claimed that moral terms are intuitive and then refuting that reason.
• Notice that the seventh sentence presents a challenge which is also supported. • The paragraph closes with a short ‘mini-conclusion’ that weighs up the points made.
• You can feel free to borrow from the views presented here in one of your own body paragraphs
• Note specialist language H. A. Prichard, obligation, self-evident, reasoning, etc.
• Scholarly ideas and examples have been used.
• Did you notice the evaluative ‘feel’ of this paragraph? By using phrases such as ‘seems supported’, ‘Yet, if this is true, why...’ , ‘It seems clear’ and ‘this refutes’ it is clear that the writer is doing more than describing; this paragraph is weighing up ideas. • The ‘mini-conclusion’ at the end of the paragraph links directly to the question through using the phrase ‘moral terms’.
9. What’s Wrong?
The paragraph below is an attempt to respond to the same question; it is weak in several ways. Read the paragraph and write down some weaknesses in the empty box below it. When you’ve done that, check the guide to see if you are on the right track
‘Moral terms are not intuitive.’ Evaluate this view .
Of course moral terms are intuitive. This is because we all know what ‘good’ is without a long argument being used. If you go to the cinema and you watch any of the Avengers movies, you don’t need to be taught who the good guys and good causes are – you just know. This is intuition at work. Now, if someone comes along and says that they can explain what ‘good’ is, they will get hopelessly lost. Let’s say they try to say, ‘Good is good’ – that is no definition at all and really just proves the point of intuitionism. Let’s say they try to define good differently: ‘Good is pleasure’. Well, that runs into a different problem: changing good into a different concept, something that it isn’t. That is a ‘cheat definition’. That also proves that the intuitionists are right as they say that ‘good is good’ and completely indefinable. So, there is absolutely no way to know what moral terms are apart from our intuition. When you are in life, standing in front of people and situations, you just know and do not need to be told what ‘good’ is.
Write down what you think is weak about this paragraph:
Guide
• This is a one-sided paragraph. No real attempt has been to represent an opposite point of view. If the student had gone on to provide a counterpoint later in the response, then this would make the overall presentation much stronger. • There are no scholars named in this paragraph. Furthermore, there are no scholarly examples and no attempt to represent scholarly ideas with any care. • This student could have mentioned Moore’s ‘Open Question Argument’ as this seems to be behind one of the points they are making.
• There are not many specialist terms used. ‘Cheat arguments’ is not a specialist term.
• Yet this is NOT a terrible paragraph – the points are all relevant! This student would be credited for understanding something of the intuitionist view and presenting three different arguments which support it. The paragraph also does directly engage with the question. So, if the student sustained this level of engagement and was careful to include some counterarguments, it would be possible to achieve a very good result.
• It would have been much better if the student had simply begun their paragraph by saying, ‘One reason to see ethical terms as being intuitive is X. X = one point that can be made in response to the question (i.e. these terms defy definition). Then, the student could go on and provide a brief description of X and back it up with an example, a quote or a scholarly reference. Then X should be criticised! Finally, the paragraph should end with some kind of evaluation. What is the stronger or weaker point made (X or the criticism of it)?
10 Checklist
When you have ticked all of the boxes below, then you have completed this exercise. You can then: (i) write up all that you have written into one continuous paper. You may wish to show this to your teacher for feedback (ii) Move on to a new essay for a different subtheme I have...
Written a short opening paragraph which restates the question using different specialist terms, outlines the direction of the essay, interrogates a key word in the question (optional) and states a point of view (optional)
Written three ‘body paragraphs’ with each paragraph presenting a point that is directly relevant to the question, presenting a counterpoint, and supporting all points made with evidence in the form of examples, insights, quotes, or paraphrases of key ideas
Written three mini-conclusions at the end of each of the body paragraphs.
Written a conclusion which articulates a point of view – and supports that point of view through a fresh restatement of material used earlier in the paper. Looked over my work to check that I have used a variety of specialist language that I see used in the textbook and the notes I have taken for this section
Looked over my work to see that I have made use of issues and arguments referred to by my teacher and by the textbook and other resources we have used for this s section
Introduction. Some would maintain that morality is indeed intuitive as we simply know what is right and wrong without realising precisely what is right or wrong about the situation in question. It could be said that people often just have an intuitive sense of right and wrong and seems part of human nature to use and trust this intuition.
Thesis. In this essay I will argue that moral term are indeed intuitive.
Argument- Intuitionism asserts that moral terms are self evident, whilst maintaining that morality is cognitive, intuitionism asserts that moral facts are not to be discovered but rather are self evident and are known intuitively. If I am to be asked ''how is good to be defined'' my answer is that it cannot be defined, and that is all I have to say about it.'' As suggested by GE Moore, good can be likened to the colour yellow we can only demonstrate our knowledge by pointing to the colour yellow, it can be shown and known yet not defined, any attempt to define neglects the simple nature of morality whereby it seems true that people have an intuitive sense of morality. By pointing toward the ''good' as intuitive then this seems to follow Bertrand Russell's argument in 'the problem of philosophy' argues that the perception of good '' can be proved nor disproved by experience '' this pointing towards the a priori conception of good, that which means that we 'just know' what the good is, therefore it is cognitive and intuitive.
Counter Argument- It seems challenging to suggest that knowledge of the good can be both cognitive and intuitive when it appears that many have different understandings of good and bad Nietzche raised the issue of ethical colour blindness to highlight how different intuitions may point to different ideas of right and wrong; what one may see as yellow another might see as green. If knowledge of good and bad is a priori and unable to be proved by outside criterion then there is no way to prove hose interpretation of moral dilemmas is correct, if a murder thought murder was right and killed sone who thought it was wrong there would be no way to discern who had knowledge of moral truth. How can we all just know what the good is if there is no certain intuitive understanding of good?
Counter Counter Argument-HA Pritchard responds to this criticism however efficiently in his suggesting that fundamentally some just have better intuition than others, people disagree on what is good because their minds are not ordered correctly, conflicting ideas does not undermine the objectivity of goodness rather it highlights that some have fuller understanding than others, in the same way, that some are better than maths at others, the maths still remains an objective, unquestionably a priori truth, in much the same way that good remains, objective, intuitively known knowledge. H. A. Prichard said that the term ‘obligation’ is indefinable but, at the same time, our obligations are self-evident – we know what they are. This seems supported by the fact that most human beings would agree that they have an ‘inner’ or ‘intuitive’ sense of what they should do without having arrived at that sense through a process of reasoning. Prichard used the example of having agreed with a ‘tradesman’ on the price for some work to be done. Now, the work has been completed and we have the obligation to pay the tradesman. Acting on this sense of obligation is the essence of morality.
2nd Counter Argument-There still remains however an issue with intuition, the phenomena of intuition doesn't seem to be sufficiently explained and the idea of knowledge detached from experience or the sense may be puzzling for some. Much like Plato's concept of innate knowledge of the forms, GJ Warnock used to argue intuitionism was simply a sense of bewilderment got up to look like a theory therefore meaning that good isn't just 'known' this fails to explain the meta-ethical question of how we know what good is. Further, if Prichards argument is true, why do people in different times and places have such different ideas of what constitutes ‘obligation’? For example, a young person in Taiwan may feel an obligation to participate in military service whereas a young person in Britain may not feel that obligation at all. When we look into reasons for the differences in obligations, it seems clear that these can be explained through the expectations of family, friends, culture and nations – it’s currently the law in Taiwan for all males aged 18- 35 to serve in the military; this is not the case in the U.K. This refutes Prichard’s position. For, as soon as we can explain why we have an obligation it is no longer self-evident and indefinable. We could thus define ‘obligation’ as: ‘the pressure we feel to act in certain ways in order to maintain a positive relationship with our society.’ We could use this definition (and not intuition) to explain and even predict the meaning of moral terms
2nd Counter Counter Argument-However, others would argue that what we intuitively know as right or wrong can actually be explained through natural properties and observation of the world, thus morality isn't intuitive, but based on experience. This would be the position maintained by naturalists who believe like intuitionists morality is cognitive, yet differ in how morality is uncovered.
Ethical naturalism is a meta-ethical doctrine which maintains that moral truths can be empirically discovered via observation of the world, it is a moral realist theory, (insofar that it believes moral facts exist) and is therefore cognitive ( as moral statements can be judged as true or false)
Aquinas's natural law is a form of theological naturalism as it proposes that one can understand the moral standard (set by God's eternal law) through observation of the natural law/order as set out in natural law, as a result of this our conception of good doesn't come through an intuitive sense but it is born wholly out of observation of the world and can be explained through natural properties.
3rd Counter Counter Argument- One of the arguments for the intuitiveness of moral terms is that moral judgments are automatic and immediate. This argument is supported by Greene, who argues that moral judgments are based on a fast, intuitive process that occurs in the brain. According to Greene, this process is responsible for generating immediate moral judgments without conscious reflection. NL however seems to suggest that in looking at what the world 'is' - how things appear is interpreted to comprehend how they ''should'' be, the issue with this however is raised by Hume's is ought problem, whereby he argued that one cannot go from a descriptive premise of what '' is'' to a prescriptive conclusion ''ought'' statement, no matter how closely you empirically examine a situation, the rightness or wrongness will not be objectively clear. The criticism of experience on the grounds of rejecting the natural order may be responded to when considering that actually human experiences seem to confirm truth. Utilitarians such as Mill and Bentham, believed that morality could be deduced from observing what brought about most pleasure and least pain this is not intuitive but instead experienced. In effect proving that we cannot just know what good is.
3rd Counter Argument-This argument, however, raises the naturalistic fallacy as outlined by GE Moore who has argued that moral properties may be correlated with natural properties but moral properties are not identical to natural properties, for example, a moral act such as giving to charity might make me happy, but the morality of the act merely gives way to the happiness and is not the happiness in itself, or more explicitly inflicting pain for a sadist is pleasurable but is it good ? This is fundamentally an open question argument if goodness and pleasure were the same thing, it would not make sense to ask '' is pleasure good?'' because it would be like asking '' is pleasure pleasure ?'' - yet as the former question does make sense , clearly good is distinct from pleasure ( or any other natural properties) moral properties cannot be reduced to anything simpler, such as pain or pleasure because moral properties are basic, thus Moor's analogy of the color yellow is right.
3rd Counter Counter Argument- Yet the most convincing response would be to argue that people cannot just know know within themselves what is good, bad, right and wrong, ( last bit if relevant) but instead formulate moral understanding through encountering other human beings in life and being subject to the ethical decisions of others. Ultimately, ethical statements (such as what good is) are merely subjective expressions of feelings, and unlike analytic or synthetic statements, they lack objective meaning. Nonetheless, to claim ethical statements ( such as what good is) are non-cognitive is not to claim they lack significant meaning to cultures or social groups. Moreover the argument that morality is evincing preference, rather than objective knowledge can be argued through AJ Ayer's ideas in 'language, truth and logic' in which he explains that putative propositions can only be literally meaningful once they have been analytically or empirically verified ( or falsified) Ayer developed the principle of weak verification which claimed that statements could be verified if one is able to state what evidence would make the statement probable. He claimed that moral statements were neither analytic or provable by the sense and therefore factually meaningless - non cognitive. By suggesting that moral statements/ethical language like good is meaningless however poses a challenge in that that it trivialises ethic, as argued by Mel Thompson, ' you cannot reduce morality to a set of cheers and boos''; if morality is not more than personal opinion than laws such as '' do not murder'' seem to be no more important than someone claiming '' I don't like red sweets'' MacIntyre, argues that emotivism places child carers and paedophiles as equals, this is challenging to us, therefore, suggesting that it is impossible to think that ethical language like the word good could be considered to be meaningless.
There is still the chance however that this argument has distorted the reality of emotivism, it doesn't render ethics as meaningless as moral proof is different from scientific proof. Although, Ayer's emotivism, sets the bar too high by arguing that because I cannot prove something it becomes meaningless, one can argue that whilst moral statements clearly express preference they can be validated through reasoning and experience (as opposed to scientific or factual proof): for example, although I cannot prove paedophilia is wrong, I can give reasons for why it is wrong e.g. damaging psychological effects, abuse, violation of human rights.
Synoptically on the arguments for the intuitiveness of religious language that religious language is meaningful because it refers to a transcendent reality that cannot be described in ordinary language is supported by Tillich, who argues that religious language is "symbolic" and points to the "ultimate concern" of human existence. Similarly, the argument for the intuitiveness of moral terms is based on the idea that moral principles are based on universal truths that are accessible to human reason. This argument is supported by Kant, who argues that moral principles are based on the "categorical imperative," which is a universal principle that applies to all rational beings.
In conclusion Karol Wojtyla, in 'The Acting Person', highlights that ethical demands and stances grow out of human encounter - it is through encountering good, bad, needs, desires that we uncover a sense or morality and the need to be moral ethical statements do not require logical or scientific justification/ intuition, but instead experience of being human and living, therefore suggesting that we cannot just instinctively know what good is. In summary ethical statements are intuitive as there is considerable agreement on moral issues e.g. value of human life. We can discover objective moral laws using our minds in an intuitive way – not through reason or the senses. Intuitive ability is universal and innate – so must mean that moral terms are intuitive
Moore – moral judgements are based on intuitive knowledge of good things – not on duty, pleasure etc. Moral terms such as good can’t be defined as that would reduce or limit them – so is intuitive – simple like yellow not horse. As Pritchard argues we know moral obligation through our intuition
and whilst we may recognise the wrongness of some actions, this is just as it is difficult to specify exactly why they are wrong. Rather we interpret it through a moral sense, not a list of moral definitions – so moral terms are known through our intuition
References:
Ayer, A. J. (1952). Language, truth, and logic. Dover Publications.
Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice: Psychological theory and women's development. Harvard University Press.
Greene, J. D. (2013). Moral tribes: Emotion, reason, and the gap between us and them. Penguin Press.
Hume, D. (1751). An enquiry concerning the principles of morals. Oxford University Press.
Kant, I. (1785). Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals. Cambridge University Press.
Mackie, J. L. (1977). Ethics: Inventing right and wrong. Penguin Books.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (2008). Moral intuitionism meets empirical psychology. In M. P. Lynch (Ed.), The nature of moral responsibility: New essays (pp. 315-330). Oxford University Press.
Shafer-Landau, R. (2007). Moral realism: A defence. Oxford University Press.
Tillich, P. (1952). The courage to be. Yale University Press.
INTRODUCTION The question of whether "ethical terms are meaningless" pertains to the meta-ethical debate between ethical naturalists such as Bentham, Mill,in their Utilitarianism and Aquinas in his Natural Moral Law and advocates of a non-naturalist approach to ethics such as Hume and AJ Ayer. The latter are thought to assert a form of ethical Nihilism. Moreover, Meta Ethics can be divided into Cognitivist meta-ethical theories and non-cognitivist meta-ethical theories - the former suggesting ethical terms are meaningful and the latter not. Ethical cognitivists believe goodness can be known either empirically or by some process of observation. Non-cognitivists do not have this kind of certainty and so believe there is no objective test for goodness.
THESIS In this essay, I will defend the theological naturalistic view of Natural Moral Law, suggesting that ethical terms are meaningful. Within the framework of theological ethical naturalism, we argue that ethical terms are indeed meaningful, grounded in a theological understanding of the world. This perspective asserts that ethical terms derive their significance from a divine source and are intertwined with the very fabric of existence.
ARGUMENT In theological ethical naturalism (TEN), ethical terms are meaningful because they are firmly rooted in a theological framework that provides a transcendent source of moral guidance. Theologians have argued that ethical terms gain their meaning from divine revelation and the inherent moral order of the universe. Thomas Aquinas, a prominent figure in theological ethics, asserted that ethical terms are meaningful precisely because they reflect the divine will and the inherent moral structure of the world. He stated, "The natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation in the eternal law." According to Aquinas, ethical terms find their meaning in the eternal law established by God.
Immanuel Kant, although not a theological naturalist in the traditional sense, argued for the meaningfulness of ethical terms by emphasizing the importance of a moral law that transcends human experience. Kant's categorical imperative, a foundational concept in his moral philosophy, suggests that ethical terms like "duty" and "goodwill" have a transcendent and meaningful basis, independent of empirical observation.
Today, TEN is variously developed. Paul Tillich says, "The meaning of life is to be found in the realization of the highest values, which are love, justice, truth, and peace." Jürgen Moltmann contends that "Ethics is the search for the right way to live in response to the love of God." Rosemary Radford Ruether argues that "Ethical language is a way of expressing our commitment to the values of love, justice, and compassion." Thus, TEN arguably provides a strong argument for the meaningfulness of ethical terms.
TEN holds that ethical values are grounded in the natural world, which is a meaningful realm. Moreover, TEN believes that ethical values can be understood and applied in light of our understanding of God or the divine. This means that ethical terms like "love," "justice," and "compassion" are meaningful because they refer to qualities that we value and that we believe are important in our relationship with God.
COUNTER ARGUMENT Critics of theological ethical naturalism may argue that grounding ethical terms in theology presupposes the existence of a specific religious framework, rendering these terms meaningless for those who do not share that faith. In other words, ethical terms may be meaningful only within the confines of a particular religious tradition.
Ethical nihilism, the perspective that ethical terms lack meaning, poses a significant challenge to the foundations of ethics and moral discourse. At its core, this view contends that when we use terms like "good," "bad," "right," and "wrong," we are engaging in linguistic practices that lack any objective or substantive content.
Arguing from linguistic analysis, ethical nihilists such as Hume argue that ethical terms are empty of descriptive content. They contend that these terms do not refer to any concrete properties or facts in the world. When we say something is "good" or "bad," we are merely expressing our subjective feelings or attitudes, rather than making meaningful claims about the world.
David Hume in "A Treatise of Human Nature" argues, "In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, 'is,' and 'is not,' I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an 'ought,' or an 'ought not.' This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence."
Moreover, they argue moral values are contingent on cultural beliefs and practices. From this perspective, ethical terms are seen as products of social conditioning and do not possess any universal or objective significance. What is considered "good" in one culture may be considered "bad" in another. Mary Midgley in "Can't We Make Moral Judgements?" argues, "Moral discourse [...] is not the endless, fruitless search for something not found in any culture, something buried somewhere else and better than anything people have ever known. It is rather the multi-levelled analysis of those situations which people have already noticed, disliked, praised, deplored, and talked about."
Most significantly, G.E. Moore in his "Principia Ethica" develops the Open Question Argument, which suggests that when we inquire whether something is "good," we are implicitly asking whether it is desirable or ought to be pursued. Moore argued that since these questions remain open and unanswerable by appealing to non-moral properties, ethical terms must be meaningless. He says, "It is always open to us to ask of any action, which is said to be right or wrong, 'Is it right?' and of any action, which is said to be good or bad, 'Is it good?' The meaning of these questions is obvious, and it is quite certain what would have to be the case if the answer to them were 'Yes.' ... It must never be forgotten that what we are asking is solely and simply whether that which we began by calling 'good' is, in point of fact, the same with any quality which we actually find, and can, if we like, continue to find, anywhere in the universe."
A.J. Ayer argues in "Language, Truth, and Logic," "The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content. Thus if I say to someone, 'You acted wrongly in stealing that money,' I am not stating anything more than if I had simply said, 'You stole that money.'" Ayer's quote further supports the idea that ethical terms lack factual content and do not add any empirical information to a statement. These arguments align with the perspective of ethical nihilism. J.L. Mackie in "Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong" further argues, "If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe. Correspondingly, if we are aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else."
COUNTER COUNTER ARGUMENT While ethical nihilism presents a compelling challenge, it has also generated substantial criticisms and counterarguments. Moore and Prichard are intuitionists or cognitivist non-naturalists. Such ethical non-cognitivists propose an alternative to ethical nihilism. They argue that ethical terms do not express propositions or convey factual claims but rather convey emotional or prescriptive attitudes. According to this view, when we say something is "good," we are expressing approval or recommending a course of action. Non-cognitivism provides a way to understand ethical terms without positing objective moral facts. G.E. Moore in his "Principia Ethica" says, "It may be true that all things which are good are also something else, just as it is true that all things which are yellow produce a certain kind of vibration in the light. But it does not follow that the thing which produces that kind of vibration in the light is what we mean by 'yellow,' and it is equally unmeaning to say that the thing which is good is what we mean by 'good.'"
John Stuart Mill in his "Utilitarianism" sought to develop a cognitivist form of Non-theological ethical naturalism, arguing, "The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals 'utility' or the 'greatest happiness principle' holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness." Mill is a Natural Moral Realist who contends that ethical terms have objective referents, asserting that moral facts exist independently of individual beliefs or cultural practices. For example, they argue that certain actions, like torturing innocent children, are inherently wrong and immoral independently of personal preferences or cultural norms. W.D. Ross, also a moral realist, argues in "The Right and the Good," "We do believe, in fact, that what is our duty coincides with what is right and is the same for all rational beings." Further, C.S. Lewis in his "The Abolition of Man" argues, "It is no use trying to 'see through' first principles. If you see through everything, then everything is transparent. But a wholly transparent world is an invisible world. To 'see through' all things is the same as not to see." Each emphasizes the perspective of moral realism, asserting that ethical terms have objective referents, and certain actions can be considered inherently wrong and immoral independently of personal preferences or cultural norms. This perspective contradicts ethical nihilism by positing the existence of objective moral facts.
Still, other philosophers like John Rawls propose that ethical terms derive their meaning through a process of reflective equilibrium. John Rawls argues in "A Theory of Justice," "In working out the conception of justice that is most appropriate for specifying the content of our moral sense, we try to fit and justify the considered judgments we believe in and the principles we are prepared to recognize." This process involves reconciling our moral intuitions, principles, and background beliefs to arrive at a coherent and justified ethical framework. Reflective equilibrium suggests that ethical terms can be meaningful within the context of a well-developed moral theory.
SYNOPTIC LINKS In Buddhism, there are intriguing parallels to the debate over the meaningfulness of ethical terms. Buddhist ethics, rooted in traditions such as Theravada and Mahayana, explores the nature of moral concepts and the role they play in guiding human conduct. Like ethical nihilists, some Buddhist perspectives emphasize the subjective nature of ethical judgments. In Buddhist thought, concepts like "good" and "bad" are seen as conditioned by individual perceptions and cultural influences, akin to the relativistic perspective.
However, Buddhism also offers a counter perspective to ethical nihilism. It proposes the idea of objective moral principles, such as the Eightfold Path, that guide individuals toward ethical conduct and spiritual development. These principles are not contingent on cultural beliefs but are seen as universal guidelines for leading a virtuous life.
Furthermore, the concept of "karma" in Buddhism suggests that moral actions have consequences, which implies an inherent meaningfulness to ethical terms and judgments. The interplay between subjectivity and objectivity in Buddhist ethics mirrors the broader philosophical discourse on ethical language.
CONCLUSION One of the central issues in the debate over ethical nihilism and the problem of ethical meaningful language is the challenge of subjectivity. Ethical nihilists contend that ethical terms are subjective expressions of individual feelings or cultural practices, rendering them devoid of objective meaning. However, it is crucial to recognize that subjectivity does not necessarily equate to meaninglessness.
On the non-cognitivist side (emotivism and prescriptivism), it is interesting how Hare argues for prescriptivism. His argument essentially says, “MR Ayer, you have missed a key dimension of moral language which makes it unique – this is the prescriptive dimension.” Put another way, Mr. Ayer has concentrated, like Mr. Gradgrind in Dickens’ Hard Times, on “facts, facts, facts,” and his argument is that there is no such thing as a 'moral fact' – that ethical language spray-paints an emotive gloss on the facts. If Hare is correct, the key thing to grasp is that morality may not just be talking about real facts – that is, if you are a utilitarian naturalist, for example – but is adding something special to ethical language, namely a prescription. So, it’s possible the shoe naturalistic fallacy attack is misconceived (as MacIntyre would argue in After Virtue).
Ethical terms may be rooted in subjective experiences, but this does not preclude them from having meaning within the context of human communication and interaction. Language is inherently tied to subjectivity, as it is a tool for expressing our thoughts, emotions, and values. When we communicate using ethical terms, we convey information about our moral beliefs, preferences, and evaluations. While these expressions may not correspond to external, mind-independent moral facts, they are not meaningless; they serve as vehicles for conveying our perspectives on moral issues.
From a pragmatic standpoint, ethical terms serve essential functions in human society. They facilitate moral discourse, cooperation, and the establishment of social norms. Even if one subscribes to ethical nihilism, it may still be recognized that ethical language plays a practical role in our lives. Ethical terms help individuals express their values, negotiate differences, and make moral decisions. They provide a framework for moral reasoning, deliberation, and the resolution of ethical dilemmas. In this sense, ethical terms may lack objective referents, but they possess practical significance in our everyday lives and interactions.
The nub of the issue is how we justify the contention that morality is based on natural facts. If we can point to some common shared experience (pain, pleasure) or a consensus on what it means to be human and to flourish as human (Natural Law), then surely it might be argued that there is a way of handling whether my view of goodness is any better than yours. Put rather bluntly – let’s ask people whether pain is good (answer no) or whether a poor education leads to a flourishing life (answer “no”). Such issues aren’t just subjectively up to me! And neither is the badness of genocide 'up to me'! The assertion that "ethical terms are meaningless" challenges the foundations of ethics and moral discourse. While ethical nihilism raises thought-provoking questions about the nature of ethical language, it does not necessarily render ethical terms meaningless. Ethical terms may be subjective in origin, rooted in cultural practices, or resistant to reduction to non-moral properties, but they continue to serve vital functions in human communication and moral reasoning. The debate over the meaning of ethical terms remains a dynamic and ongoing conversation within philosophy. Philosophers, ethicists, and scholars continue to explore these questions, seeking to bridge the gap between subjectivity and objectivity in ethics and to understand the role that ethical language plays in our complex moral landscape. While ethical nihilism offers a challenging perspective, it ultimately falls short of demonstrating that ethical terms are devoid of meaning, as they continue to play a vital role in shaping our moral understanding and guiding our moral choices.