Students are expected to study a range of texts that support and underpin their knowledge and understanding. The assessment will include two extended-response questions on an excerpt, sourced from this extracts list. The following texts are not exclusive to the topic areas under which they appear; students will need to be able to apply these texts across any suitable topic area. These are published in the A Level Religious Studies Anthology: Paper 1 – Philosophy of Religion which can be downloaded from our website.
(1) Mitchell B (ed) – The Philosophy of Religion, 1st edition, J Mackie – Chapter 5 Evil and Omnipotence, pp.92-104 (Oxford University Press, 1977) ISBN 9780198750185
(2) Mitchell B (ed) – The Philosophy of Religion, 1st edition, Flew A, Hare R M – Chapter 1 Theology and Falsification: A Symposium, pp. 13-18 (Oxford University Press, 1976) ISBN 9780198750185
(3) Mitchell B (ed) – The Philosophy of Religion, 1st edition, Flew A, Mitchell B – Chapter 1 Theology and Falsification: A Symposium, pp.18-22 (Oxford University Press, 1976) ISBN 9780198750185
1. Copleston: As we are going to discuss the existence of God, it might perhaps be as well to come to some provisional agreement as to what we understand by the term "God." I presume that we mean a supreme personal Being – distinct from the world and Creator of the world. Would you agree – provisionally at least – to accept this statement as the meaning of the term "God"?
Russell: Yes, I accept this definition.
Copleston: Well, my position is the affirmative position that such a Being actually exists, and that His existence can be proved philosophically. Perhaps you would tell me if your position is that of agnosticism or of atheism. I mean, would you say that the non-existence of God can be proved?
Russell: No, I should not say that: my position is agnostic.
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
a) Clarify the ideas about the existence and nature of God illustrated in this passage. You must refer to the passage in your response.
The passage is a transcript of a debate between Bertrand Russell, a renowned philosopher and mathematician, and Father Frederick C Copleston, a Jesuit priest and philosopher, on the existence of God. The debate centers on the definition of God and whether or not God's existence can be proved philosophically.
Copleston defines God as a "supreme personal Being – distinct from the world and Creator of the world," to which Russell agrees provisionally. This definition implies that God is not a part of the physical world but rather a transcendent being who created and governs it.
Copleston argues that his position is the affirmative position that such a Being actually exists and that His existence can be proved philosophically. He believes that through philosophical arguments, it is possible to demonstrate the existence of God as a necessary being who is the cause of all things. Copleston's argument is based on the assumption that there must be a cause for everything in the universe, and that cause must ultimately lead back to God as the first cause.
Russell, on the other hand, takes the position of agnosticism. He does not claim that the non-existence of God can be proved, but rather that it cannot be proved either way. Russell's position is that there is not enough evidence to prove or disprove the existence of God, and therefore, it is impossible to know for sure whether or not God exists. He says
"An agnostic thinks it impossible to know the truth in matters such as God and the future life with which Christianity and other religions are concerned. Or, if not impossible, at least impossible at the present time."
This debate reflects the two main positions on the existence of God: theism and agnosticism. Theism is the belief in the existence of a personal God who created and governs the universe, while agnosticism is the position that the existence of God is unknown and unknowable. Theism is based on the assumption that God's existence can be proved philosophically, while agnosticism is based on the absence of evidence that would allow for a conclusive proof.
Many philosophers and scholars have contributed to the debate on the existence of God. One such scholar is Thomas Aquinas, a medieval philosopher who formulated the famous "five ways" argument for the existence of God. Aquinas argued that it is possible to prove the existence of God through reason and observation of the natural world. Another scholar, Immanuel Kant, argued that the existence of God cannot be proved or disproved through reason alone but must be accepted as a matter of faith.
Reference:
Russell, Bertrand, and Frederick C. Copleston. "A Debate on the Existence of God." The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 46, no. 4, 1949, pp. 97-103.
Bertrand Russell (1953) essay "What Is An Agnostic?", in "Unpopular Essays" London: Routledge.
Other Questions that arise from the passage
a) Clarify the ideas about the atheism and agnosticism illustrated in this passage. You must refer to the passage in your response.
b) Analyse the implications for debates about Gods existence of accepting the idea of 'the God of the Philosophers' who is an omnipotent, omnibenevolent personal being.
b) Analyse the strengths of agnosticism over atheism.
b) Analyse the strengths and weakness of the idea of proof and probability in philosophical arguments about Gods existence
Copleston: Would you agree with me that the problem of God is a problem of great importance? For example, would you agree that if God does not exist, human beings and human history can have no other purpose than the purpose they choose to give themselves, which – in practice – is likely to mean the purpose which those impose who have the power to impose it?
Russell: Roughly speaking, yes, though I should have to place some limitation on your last clause.
Copleston: Would you agree that if there is no God – no absolute Being – there can be no absolute values? I mean, would you agree that if there is no absolute good that the relativity of values results?
Russell: No, I think these questions are logically distinct. Take, for instance, G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica, where he maintains that there is a distinction of good and evil, that both of these are definite concepts. But he does not bring in the idea of God to support that contention.
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
a) Clarify the ideas about the argument the relationship between the existence of God and the possibility of objective values illustrated in this passage. You must refer to the passage in your response.
In this passage, Father Frederick Copleston and Bertrand Russell discuss the relationship between the existence of God and the possibility of objective values. Copleston argues that the problem of God is of great importance because if God does not exist, human beings and human history can have no other purpose than the purpose they choose to give themselves. Dostoevsky, draws attention to this as one the great themes in his The Brothers Karamazov: "If God does not exist, then everything is permitted" Copleston then suggests that in practice, this likely means that those with the power to impose their purpose will do so. Copleston then asks Russell if he agrees that if there is no God, there can be no absolute values, and that the relativity of values results.
Russell responds by stating that he thinks these questions are logically distinct. He cites G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica, in which Moore maintains that there is a distinction of good and evil and that both of these are definite concepts. Moore does not bring in the idea of God to support this contention but its not clear he exactly says they can be 'definite qualities' as Russell claims rather that they are objects of direct knowledge which is different. He says "Good, then, appears to be something which is incapable of any definition, in the same sense in which a colour is. It is a simple notion, just as colour is." (Chapter 2, Section 13) Further that "...good is a simple, unanalysable quality, which we perceive directly by intuition." (Chapter 2, Section 16)
This passage highlights the tension between the belief in objective values and the belief in God. Copleston suggests that without God, there can be no objective values, and human beings are left to determine their own purpose. He implies that this can lead to a situation where those with power impose their own purpose on others, potentially resulting in the relativization of values.
Russell, on the other hand, argues that the existence of objective values is not necessarily dependent on the existence of God. He cites Moore's work as an example of how objective values can be maintained without invoking God. This is consistent with Russell's general philosophical stance, which emphasizes the importance of reason and evidence-based inquiry rather than faith or religious belief. Elsewhere he says
""I am as firmly convinced that religions do harm as I am that they are untrue. The harm that is done by a religion is not outweighed by any benefits that may result from it. Faith, by encouraging a will to believe without regard to evidence, creates an atmosphere in which even truth itself can be discredited, and it opens the door to every kind of superstition and credulity."
Overall, the passage highlights the ongoing debate about the relationship between God and morality. Copleston here well represents the Catholic deontological view that resists the what both Benidict XVI and Francis have called the "tyranny of relativism". Francis argues "We are moving toward a dictatorship of relativism which does not recognize anything as for certain and which has as its highest goal one's own ego and one's own desires" (homily, April 18, 2005). While some argue that morality requires the existence of God, others suggest that objective moral values can be maintained independently of religious belief. This debate has continued to be a central issue in philosophical and theological discussions.
References:
Copleston, F. C., & Russell, B. (1948). A Debate on the Existence of God. BBC Third Programme.
Moore, G. E. (1903). Principia Ethica. Cambridge University Press.
Pope Francis. (2015). Address. Retrieved from https://www.vaticannews.va/en/pope/news/2015-07/pope--absolute-truth-is-not-a-nostalgic-infatuation.html
Dostoevsky, Fyodor. The Brothers Karamazov. Translated by Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky, Vintage Classics, 2004.
Russell, Bertrand. "Why I am not a Christian." In Why I am not a Christian, and Other Essays on Religion and Related Subjects, edited by Paul Edwards, 3-22. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957.
Other Questions that arise from the passage
a) Clarify the ideas about absolute values and the problem of the tyranny of relative illustrated in this passage.
a) Clarify the ideas about G. E. Moore's ideas of intuitionism illustrated in this passage.
b) Analyse the claim 'without God anything is permissible' with reference to metaethics and the problem of ethical language.
b) Analyse the claim that without a transcendent source to ground ethics it inevitably collapses into 'the tyranny of the relative.'
b) Analyse the weaknesses of the claim that both ontology and epistemology become completely subjective without God.
b) Analyse the strengths and weaknesses of GE Moore's intuitionism.
3. Copleston: Well, suppose we leave the question of good till later, till we come to the moral argument, and I give first a metaphysical argument. I'd like to put the main weight on the metaphysical argument based on Leibniz's argument from "Contingency" and then later we might discuss the moral argument. Suppose I give a brief statement on the metaphysical argument and that then we go on to discuss it?
Russell: That seems to me to be a very good plan.
THE ARGUMENT FROM CONTINGENCY
Copleston: Well, for clarity's sake, I'll divide the argument into distinct stages. First of all, I should say, we know that there are at least some beings in the world which do not contain in themselves the reason for their existence. For example, I depend on my parents, and now on the air, and on food, and so on. Now, secondly, the world is simply the real or imagined totality or aggregate of individual objects, none of which contain in themselves alone the reason of their existence. There isn't any world distinct from the objects which form it, any more than the human race is something apart from the members. Therefore, I should say, since objects or events exist, and since no object of experience contains within itself the reason of its existence, this reason, the totality of objects, must have a reason external to itself. And that reason must be an existent being. Well, this being is either itself the reason for its own existence, or it is not. If it is, well and good. If not, then we must proceed further. But if we proceed to infinity in that sense, then there's no explanation of existence at all. So, I should say, in order to explain existence, we must come to a Being which contains within itself the reason for its own existence, that is to say, which cannot not exist.
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
a. Clarify the arguments for contingency in this passage. (10) You must refer to the passage in your response.
In this passage, Father Frederick C. Copleston presents the argument from contingency to Bertrand Russell as a way to prove the existence of God. He divides the argument into distinct stages to make it easier to follow.
First, Copleston establishes that there are at least some beings in the world that do not contain within themselves the reason for their existence, such as himself, who depends on his parents, the air, and food. Here in view are in fact two different forms of the cosmological arguement that he would have though consituted the strongest version of it. Unsurprisingly as a Catholic priest he first has in view Aquinas thrid way argument that all things that exist are contingent, and there must be something that exists that is necessary. Thomas Aquinas, in Summa Theologica says.
"Thus, then, we come to the realization of the first efficient cause, which everyone understands to be God – that which is not caused by anything else and which is the cause of the necessity of being in other things."
Coplestone further has in view Leibniz argument from the principle of sufficient reason, which states that there must be a sufficient reason or explanation for every fact or event in the universe. Leibniz says
"Nothing takes place without a sufficient reason; everything that happens does so because of some cause or other, although it may be beyond our understanding or ability to discover." - Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, The Monadology.
Second, he argues that the world is simply the aggregate of individual objects, and none of these objects contain within themselves the reason for their existence. Therefore, since objects or events exist and no object of experience contains within itself the reason for its existence, the reason for the totality of objects must be external to itself.
Copleston concludes that the reason for the totality of objects must be an existent being, which is either itself the reason for its own existence or not. If it is, then there is no problem. However, if it is not, then the reason for its existence must be found elsewhere. If one proceeds to infinity in this sense, then there is no explanation of existence at all. Therefore, to explain existence, one must come to a being that contains within itself the reason for its own existence and cannot not exist, which is God.
The argument from contingency is a classical argument for the existence of God, which has its roots in the work of philosophers such as Aristotle, Avicenna, and Aquinas. It states that everything that exists is contingent, meaning that it depends on something else for its existence. If everything in the universe is contingent, then there must be a necessary being that exists, which is God. Avicenna, says
"The Necessary Being is the cause of all beings, in that It gives existence to them, sustains them, and brings them to perfection, and is the necessary condition for the existence of everything that is other than It." - Avicenna, The Book of Healing.
Many scholars have debated the argument from contingency, and there are various objections to it. Some critics argue that the existence of God is not necessarily the only possible explanation for the existence of contingent beings. Others point out that the argument does not necessarily prove the existence of a personal God who intervenes in the world.
Reference
Copleston, F. C., & Russell, B. (1948). A debate on the existence of God. London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne.
Aquinas, T. (2002). Summa theologica (Vol. 1). Cosimo, Inc.
Plantinga, A. (1983). The ontological argument. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
Leibniz, G. W. (1714). Monadology. Retrieved from https://www.gutenberg.org/files/Monadology/Monadology-h.html
Avicenna, The Book of Healing.
Other Questions that arise from the passage
a. Clarify the idea of the moral argument in this passage.
b. Analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the argument from contingency. (20)
b. Analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the Leibniz argument from the the principle of sufficient reason. (20)
4. Russell: This raises a great many points and it's not altogether easy to know where to begin, but I think that, perhaps, in answering your argument, the best point with which to begin is the question of a Necessary Being. The word "necessary" I should maintain, can only be applied significantly to propositions. And, in fact, only to such as are analytic – that is to say – such as it is self-contradictory to deny. I could only admit a Necessary Being if there were a being whose existence it is self-contradictory to deny. I should like to know whether you would accept Leibniz's division of propositions into truths of reason and truths of fact. The former – the truths of reason – being necessary.
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
3a. Clarify the ideas in this passage about the suggest all knowledge can be reduced to analytic "truths of reason" and or synthetic" truths of fact (10) You must refer to the passage in your response.
In this passage, Bertrand Russell is responding to an argument about the existence of a Necessary Being, and he begins by questioning the use of the word "necessary". He asserts that the word "necessary" can only be applied significantly to propositions and only to such propositions that are analytic, which means that it is self-contradictory to deny them. He then suggests that he could only admit the existence of a Necessary Being if there were a being whose existence it is self-contradictory to deny.
Russell's argument is based on a distinction between analytic propositions, which are necessary truths of reason, and synthetic propositions, which are truths of fact. He seems to be suggesting that all knowledge can be reduced to these two kinds of propositions. This is a view that he famously expressed in his book "The Analysis of Mind" (1921), where he argued that all knowledge can be reduced to logical relations between concepts where he says
"The laws of logic are the only necessary laws, and all other laws are contingent upon the facts of experience" (p. 3).
However, this view has been challenged by many philosophers. One of the most prominent critics of Russell's view is W.V. Quine, who argued that the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions is not clear-cut and that all propositions are, to some extent, dependent on empirical evidence. Quine's critique of analyticity is based on the idea that all concepts are interrelated and that there is no sharp division between analytic and synthetic propositions.
Another critic of Russell's view is Immanuel Kant, who argued that there are synthetic a priori propositions, which are necessary truths of fact that are not dependent on empirical evidence. Kant's view is based on the idea that certain truths are necessary conditions for the possibility of experience and that these truths are not dependent on empirical evidence. He says
In synthetic judgments a priori, then, we have a proposition in which there is thought a predicate which is not (logically) contained in the concept of the subject" (p. 49).
For example, the proposition "every event has a cause" is a synthetic a priori proposition that is necessary for the possibility of experience.
References:
Russell, B. (1921). The Analysis of Mind. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
Quine, W.V. (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. The Philosophical Review, 60(1), 20-43.
Kant, I. (1781). Critique of Pure Reason. London: Cambridge University Press.
b. Analyse the implications of the verification principle. (20)
b. Analyse the strengths of the idea of "Hume's fork" that all real knowledge is either a relation of idea or a matter of fact. (20)
5. Copleston: Well, I certainly should not subscribe to what seems to be Leibniz's idea of truths of reason and truths of fact, since it would appear that, for him, there are in the long run only analytic propositions. [It would seem that for Leibniz truths of fact are ultimately reducible to truths of reason. That is to say, to analytic propositions, at least for an omniscient mind. Well, I couldn't agree with that. For one thing it would fail to meet the requirements of the experience of freedom. I don't want to uphold the whole philosophy of Leibniz. I have made use of his argument from contingent to Necessary Being, basing the argument on the principle of sufficient reason, simply because it seems to me a brief and clear formulation of what is, in my opinion, the fundamental metaphysical argument for God's existence.
Russell: But, to my mind, a "necessary proposition" has got to be analytic. I don't see what else it can mean. And analytic propositions are always complex and logically somewhat late. "Irrational animals are animals" is an analytic proposition; but a proposition such as "This is an animal" can never be analytic . In fact, all the propositions that can be analytic are somewhat late in the build-up of propositions.
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
3a. Clarify the arguments for Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason in this passage. (10) You must refer to the passage in your response.
In the passage from the debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston, Copleston refers to Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason as the fundamental metaphysical argument for the existence of God. Copleston argues that he agrees with this argument, but not with Leibniz's view that all truths of fact are ultimately reducible to analytic propositions.
Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason states that everything that exists or happens must have a sufficient reason or cause for its existence or occurrence. This principle is based on the assumption that the world is a rational and orderly system, and that everything that happens can be explained in terms of its causes or reasons. Leibniz says
"Nothing takes place without a sufficient reason; everything that happens does so because of some cause or other, although it may be beyond our understanding or ability to discover." - Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, The Monadology.
Copleston uses Leibniz's argument from contingent to Necessary Being, which is based on the principle of sufficient reason, to support the existence of God. According to this argument, everything in the world is contingent, meaning that it could have been different or not existed at all. However, the existence of contingent things cannot be explained by other contingent things, because this would lead to an infinite regress of causes. Therefore, there must be a necessary being, which exists in itself and does not depend on anything else for its existence. This necessary being is identified as God.
However, Russell objects to the idea that a necessary proposition can be anything other than analytic. Analytic propositions are those that are true by definition, such as "all bachelors are unmarried men." According to Russell, a necessary proposition must be analytic because it cannot be false without contradiction. He gives the example of "irrational animals are animals," which is an analytic proposition because it is true by definition.
Russell further argues that all propositions that can be analytic are somewhat late in the build-up of propositions. This means that they are derived from more basic propositions through the use of logical analysis. In contrast, propositions that are not analytic, such as "this is an animal," cannot be reduced to more basic propositions and are therefore primitive.
This debate between Copleston and Russell highlights different views on the nature of necessary propositions and the role of analyticity in determining necessity. While Copleston appeals to Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason to support the existence of God, Russell questions the validity of this principle and argues for a more restrictive definition of necessity based on analyticity.
References:
Copleston, F. C., & Russell, B. (1948). A debate on the existence of God. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7JjT0aPZRDY
Leibniz, G. W. (1714). Monadology. Retrieved from https://www.gutenberg.org/files/Monadology/Monadology-h.html
Russell, B. (1903). Principles of mathematics. London: Allen & Unwin.
Other Questions that arise from the passage
3a. Clarify the arguments for contingency in this passage. (10) (see above)
3a. Clarify the ideas in this passage about the suggest all knowledge can be reduced to analytic "truths of reason" and or synthetic" truths of fact (10)
b. Analyse the implications of the verification principle. (20)
b. Analyse the strengths of the idea of "Hume's fork" that all real knowledge is either a relation of idea or a matter of fact. (20)
6. Copleston: Take the proposition "if there is a contingent being then there is a Necessary Being." I consider that that proposition hypothetically expressed is a necessary proposition. If you are going to call every necessary proposition an analytic proposition, then – in order to avoid a dispute in terminology – I would agree to call it analytic, though I don't consider it a tautological proposition. But the proposition is a necessary proposition only on the supposition that there is a contingent being. That there is a contingent being actually existing has to be discovered by experience, and the proposition that there is a contingent being is certainly not an analytic proposition, though once you know, I should maintain, that there is a contingent being, it follows of necessity that there is a Necessary Being.
Russell: The difficulty of this argument is that I don't admit the idea of a Necessary Being and I don't admit that there is any particular meaning in calling other beings "contingent." These phrases don't for me have a significance except within a logic that I reject.
Copleston: Do you mean that you reject these terms because they won't fit in with what is called "modern logic"?
Russell: Well, I can't find anything that they could mean. The word "necessary," it seems to me, is a useless word, except as applied to analytic propositions, not to things.
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
3a. Clarify the ideas of Logical Positivism and the verification principle illustrated in this passage. (10) You must refer to the passage in your response.
In this passage, the debate between Copleston and Russell revolves around the idea of a Necessary Being and the concept of contingency. Copleston argues that the proposition "if there is a contingent being then there is a Necessary Being" is a necessary proposition, which is not tautological, but rather depends on the existence of a contingent being. He further argues that the existence of a contingent being can only be discovered through experience, and that the proposition that there is a contingent being is not analytic. Russell, on the other hand, rejects the idea of a Necessary Being and finds the term "necessary" to be a useless word except as applied to analytic propositions.
This debate can be viewed through the lens of Logical Positivism, which was a philosophical movement in the early 20th century that aimed to clarify the relationship between language, meaning, and empirical verification. According to the verification principle, a proposition is only meaningful if it can be empirically verified or falsified. This principle was used by Logical Positivists to reject metaphysical claims that were considered to be meaningless, such as the idea of a Necessary Being.
Russell's rejection of the idea of a Necessary Being can be seen as a reflection of Logical Positivism, which held that metaphysical claims, such as the existence of God, were meaningless because they could not be empirically verified or falsified. Similarly, Russell's skepticism towards the terms "necessary" and "contingent" can be seen as a rejection of metaphysical language that was deemed meaningless by Logical Positivists. A J Ayer thus complains
"In so far as a theory of truth may be said to be implicit in the practices of assertion, the propositions of theology are devoid of cognitive significance and cannot be said to be either true or false." (Language, Truth, and Logic) This
"If religious statements are deprived of their apparent cognitive significance, we are left with nothing but the emotive force of language, which may have a certain value as a means of evoking and sustaining certain attitudes, but which cannot be said to convey anything that can be described as knowledge." (Language, Truth, and Logic)
However, Copleston's argument challenges the verification principle by suggesting that the proposition "if there is a contingent being then there is a Necessary Being" is a necessary proposition that cannot be reduced to a tautology or an analytic proposition. He argues that the existence of a contingent being can only be discovered through experience, which suggests that not all meaningful propositions can be empirically verified or falsified.
This debate between Copleston and Russell highlights the tension between metaphysical claims and Logical Positivism's emphasis on empirical verification. While Logical Positivism aimed to clarify the meaning of language and reject metaphysical claims as meaningless, Copleston's argument suggests that there may be meaningful propositions that cannot be reduced to empirical verification.
References:
Ayer, A. J. (1936). Language, Truth, and Logic. Dover Publications.
Copleston, F. C., & Russell, B. (1948). A Debate on the Existence of God. BBC Third Programme.
Hempel, C. G. (1951). The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning. Analysis, 11(3), 69-72.
Ayer, A. J. (1936). Language, Truth, and Logic. London: Victor Gollancz.
Ayer, A. J. (1963). The Concept of a Person and Other Essays. London: Macmillan.
Other Questions that arise from the passage
3a. Clarify the arguments for contingency in this passage. (10) (see above)
b. Analyse the implications of the verification principle. (20)
b. Analyse the strengths of the idea of "Hume's fork" that all real knowledge is either a relation of idea or a matter of fact. (20)
b. Analyse the claim '‘Whereof one cannot speak, one must remain silent.' with reference to the passage (20)
b Analyse the strengths of claim 'lack of verification renders religious Language meaningless. (20)
7. Copleston: In the first place, what do you mean by "modern logic?" As far as I know, there are somewhat differing systems. In the second place, not all modern logicians surely would admit the meaninglessness of metaphysics. We both know, at any rate, one very eminent modern thinker whose knowledge of modern logic was profound, but who certainly did not think that metaphysics are meaningless or, in particular, that the problem of God is meaningless. Again, even if all modern logicians held that metaphysical terms are meaningless, it would not follow that they were right. The proposition that metaphysical terms are meaningless seems to me to be a proposition based on an assumed philosophy. The dogmatic position behind it seems to be this: What will not go into my machine is non-existent, or it is meaningless; it is the expression of emotion. I am simply trying to point out that anybody who says that a particular system of modern logic is the sole criterion of meaning is saying something that is over-dogmatic; he is dogmatically insisting that a part of philosophy is the whole of philosophy. After all a "contingent" being is a being which has not in itself the complete reason for its existence. That's what I mean by a contingent being. You know, as well as I do, that the existence of neither of us can be explained without reference to something or somebody outside us, our parents, for example. A "Necessary" Being, on the other hand means a being that must and cannot not exist. You may say that there is no such Being, but you will find it hard to convince me that you do not understand the terms I am using. If you do not understand them, then how can you be entitled to say that such a Being does not exist, if that is what you do say?
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
a) Outline the significance of verification and falsification criterion of meaning illustrated in this passage. (10) You must refer to the passage in your response.
The passage illustrates the significance of verification and falsification criteria of meaning in the debate between Copleston and Russell. Copleston argues that the proposition "if there is a contingent being then there is a Necessary Being" is a necessary proposition, but it can only be verified through experience. He rejects the idea that modern logic is the sole criterion of meaning, and he suggests that the proposition that metaphysical terms are meaningless is based on an assumed philosophy. A.J. Ayer describes the Verification Principle criteria Copleston rejects as "The meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification" -
On the other hand, Russell rejects the idea of a Necessary Being and the significance of calling other beings "contingent." He argues that the word "necessary" is a useless word, except as applied to analytic propositions, not to things. As Ludwig Wittgenstein says "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence". Further Rudolf Carnap supports this arguing "To be sure, the meaning of a sentence is nothing over and above its method of verification" and Moritz Schlick "A proposition is verifiable, in the logical sense of the term, if its truth could be conclusively established by empirical observations or experiments" - Russel adopts the falsification criterion of meaning, which suggests that a proposition is meaningful only if it can be falsified by experience. In other words, a proposition that cannot be falsified is meaningless. Antony Flew, who developed the theory says "What I should have said is that the statement 'God loves us' cannot be falsified, and hence does not count as a genuine assertion."
The significance of verification and falsification criteria of meaning is that they represent two different approaches to determining the meaningfulness of a proposition. Verification suggests that a proposition is meaningful if it can be verified by experience, while falsification suggests that a proposition is meaningful if it can be falsified by experience. As Ludwig Wittgenstein argues "The task of philosophy is to describe the limits of language and the world" - Both criteria have their strengths and weaknesses, and their application depends on the nature of the proposition in question.
In the context of the debate between Copleston and Russell, the significance of verification and falsification criteria of meaning is that they represent two different perspectives on the meaningfulness of metaphysical propositions. Flew says neither metaphysics, cannot be 'verified or falsified in the same sense as hypotheses in the empirical sciences." Copleston argues that metaphysical propositions are meaningful but can only be verified through experience, while Russell adopts the falsification criterion and suggests that metaphysical propositions are meaningless because they cannot be falsified. The debate between verification and falsification criteria of meaning continues to be a central issue in philosophy, particularly in the philosophy of science.
References:
Ayer, A. J. (1936). Language, Truth, and Logic. Dover Publications.
Copleston, F. C., & Russell, B. (1948). A Debate on the Existence of God. BBC Third Programme.
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1921) "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" proposition 5.6 and 7.
Rudolf Carnap (1934) "Logical Syntax of Language" p 42.
Moritz Schlick (1918) "General Theory of Knowledge" p. 183.
Flew, A. (1950). Theology and falsification. University of Oxford.
Flew, A. (1976). The presumption of atheism. Pemberton Books.
Flew, A. (1966). God and philosophy. Hutchinson University Library.
Other Questions that arise from the passage
3a. Clarify the arguments for contingency in this passage. (10) (see above)
3a. Clarify the ideas of Logical Positivism and the verification principle illustrated in this passage. (10)
b. Analyse the implications of the verification principle. (20)
b. Analyse the strengths of the idea of "Hume's fork" that all real knowledge is either a relation of idea or a matter of fact. (20)
b. Analyse the claim '‘Whereof one cannot speak, one must remain silent.' with reference to the passage (20)
b Analyse the claim given the beliers allows nothing to count against '‘God dies the death of a thousand qualifications.' with reference to the passage (20)
b Analyse the strengths of claim 'lack of verification renders religious Language meaningless. (20)
8. Russell: Well, there are points here that I don't propose to go into at length. I don't maintain the meaninglessness of metaphysics in general at all. I maintain the meaninglessness of certain particular terms – not on any general ground, but simply because I've not been able to see an interpretation of those particular terms. It's not a general dogma – it's a particular thing. But those points I will leave out for the moment. Well, I will say that what you have been saying brings us back, it seems to me, to the Ontological Argument that there is a being whose essence involves existence, so that his existence is analytic. That seems to me to be impossible, and it raises, of course, the question what one means by existence, and as to this, I think a subject named can never be significantly said to exist but only a subject described. And that existence, in fact, quite definitely is not a predicate.
Copleston: Well, you say, I believe, that it is bad grammar, or rather bad syntax to say for example "T. S. Eliot exists"; one ought to say, for example, "[He,] the author of Murder in the Cathedral, exists." Are you going to say that the proposition, "The cause of the world exists," is without meaning? You may say that the world has no cause; but I fail to see how you can say that the proposition that "the cause of the world exists" is meaningless. Put it in the form of a question: "Has the world a cause?" or "Does a cause of the world exist?" Most people surely would understand the question, even if they don't agree about the answer.
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
a) Outline the significance of the ontological argument and Kant's criticism of it that 'existence is not a predicate' illustrated in this passage. (10) You must refer to the passage in your response.
In this passage, Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C. Copleston discuss the ontological argument for the existence of God, and the question of whether existence can be considered a predicate. The ontological argument is a philosophical argument that attempts to prove the existence of God by defining God as a being whose essence necessarily includes existence. This argument has been the subject of much debate, with many philosophers questioning its validity.
Russell argues that the idea of a being whose essence involves existence is impossible, and that existence is not a predicate. He maintains that certain particular terms used in metaphysics are meaningless because he cannot see an interpretation of them. However, he does not reject metaphysics in general, but only certain specific terms.
Copleston challenges Russell's argument by pointing out that the proposition "the cause of the world exists" is not meaningless. He argues that while the world may or may not have a cause, the proposition itself is meaningful and can be understood as a question. Copleston also refers to Russell's belief that it is bad syntax to say "T.S. Eliot exists," and instead one should say "[He,] the author of Murder in the Cathedral, exists." Copleston asks whether the proposition "the cause of the world exists" can be put in a similar form, and suggests that most people would understand the question even if they do not agree on the answer.
This discussion highlights the significance of the ontological argument and Kant's criticism of it that 'existence is not a predicate.' The ontological argument attempts to prove the existence of God by defining God as a being whose essence necessarily includes existence. However, Kant argues that existence is not a predicate or a property that can be added to a subject. Kant believes that existence is not a feature of the concept of an object, but rather a condition for the object to exist in reality. In other words, existence is not a quality that can be attributed to an object, but rather a necessary condition for the object to exist in the first place.
Russell's rejection of the ontological argument is based on his belief that the idea of a being whose essence involves existence is impossible. He maintains that certain specific terms used in metaphysics are meaningless because he cannot see an interpretation of them. However, he does not reject metaphysics in general, but only certain specific terms.
Copleston challenges Russell's argument by pointing out that the proposition "the cause of the world exists" is not meaningless. He argues that while the world may or may not have a cause, the proposition itself is meaningful and can be understood as a question. Copleston's argument can be seen as a defense of the ontological argument, as he believes that the proposition "the cause of the world exists" is a meaningful way of expressing the idea of God as the cause of the universe.
References:
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith. Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
Russell, Bertrand. A Debate on the Existence of God. Edited by John Hick. Routledge, 2018.
Copleston, Frederick. A History of Philosophy, Volume VII: Modern Philosophy,
Other Questions that arise from the passage
3a. Clarify the arguments for a first cause in this passage. (10) (see above)
b Analyse the view that the Ontological Argument is a successful proof for the existence of God. (20) 2019 AS Paper Q
b Analyse the strengths and weakness of Bertrand Russel's challenges to the ontological argument (20)
9. Russell: Well, certainly the question "Does the cause of the world exist?" is a question that has meaning. But if you say "Yes, God is the cause of the world" you're using God as a proper name; then "God exists" will not be a statement that has meaning; that is the position that I am maintaining. Because, therefore, it will follow that it cannot be an analytic proposition ever to say that this or that exists. Take for example, suppose you take as your subject "the existent round-square," it would look like an analytic proposition that "the existent round-square exists," but it doesn't exist.
Copleston: No, it doesn't, then surely you can't say it doesn't exist unless you have a conception of what existence is. As to the phrase "existent round-square," I should say that it has no meaning at all.
Russell: I quite agree. Then I should say the same thing in another context in reference to a "Necessary Being."
Copleston: Well, we seem to have arrived at an impasse. To say that a Necessary Being is a being that must exist and cannot not exist has for me a definite meaning. For you it has no meaning.
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
a) Clarify the challenges to ontological argument and modern responses to its historic criticisms that necessary existence is significant illustrated in this passage. (10) You must refer to the passage in your response.
The passage presented is a dialogue between Bertrand Russell, a prominent philosopher and logician, and Father Frederick C Copleston, a Jesuit priest and philosopher, discussing the question of the existence of God. The focus of the debate centers on the ontological argument for the existence of God, which posits that the concept of a Necessary Being, defined as a being that must exist and cannot not exist, implies its existence.
Russell challenges the notion that the concept of a Necessary Being has any meaningful content. He argues that saying "God exists" is equivalent to using God as a proper name, which does not provide any additional information beyond the label. He states, "if you say 'Yes, God is the cause of the world' you're using God as a proper name; then 'God exists' will not be a statement that has meaning." Russell's objection is that the concept of a Necessary Being is not a meaningful one, and therefore cannot be used as a basis for an argument for the existence of God.
Copleston counters Russell's objection by arguing that the concept of a Necessary Being does have meaning, and that it refers to a being whose existence is necessary and cannot be contingent. He states, "To say that a Necessary Being is a being that must exist and cannot not exist has for me a definite meaning. For you it has no meaning." Copleston's response is that the concept of a Necessary Being has meaning, and that it provides a basis for an argument for the existence of God.
This debate highlights the challenges to the ontological argument for the existence of God, particularly the question of whether the concept of a Necessary Being has any meaningful content. In response to this challenge, modern philosophers have proposed various responses.
One response is to argue that the concept of a Necessary Being is indeed meaningful and that it refers to a being that exists in all possible worlds. This response is based on the notion that if something is necessary, then it exists in all possible worlds. Alvin Plantinga, a contemporary philosopher, defends the ontological argument by using modal logic and arguing that it is possible for a Necessary Being to exist.
Another response is to challenge the ontological argument by arguing that the concept of a Necessary Being is incoherent. Norman Malcolm, a philosopher, argues that the concept of a Necessary Being is self-contradictory, and therefore cannot refer to anything that exists in reality. Malcolm's objection is based on the notion that the concept of necessity implies that something exists in all possible worlds, but that the concept of a being implies that it exists in some possible worlds and not in others.
References:
Malcolm, N. (1960). Anselm's Ontological Arguments. Philosophical Review, 69(1), 41-62.
Plantinga, A. (1974). The Nature of Necessity. Oxford University Press.
Russell, B., & Copleston, F. C. (1948). A Debate on the Existence of God. BBC Ra
Other Questions that arise from the passage
3a. Clarify the arguments for a first cause in this passage. (10) (see above)
b Analyse the view that the Ontological Argument is a successful proof for the existence of God. (20) 2019 AS Paper Q
b Analyse the strengths and weakness of Bertrand Russel's challenges to the ontological argument (20)
10. Russell: Well, we can press the point a little, I think. A Being that must exist and cannot not exist, would surely, according to you, be a Being whose essence involves existence.
Copleston: Yes, a being the essence of which is to exist. But I should not be willing to argue the existence of God simply from the idea of His essence because I don't think we have any clear intuition of God's essence as yet. I think we have to argue from the world of experience to God.
Russell: Yes, I quite see the distinction. But, at the same time, for a being with sufficient knowledge, it would be true to say "Here is this being whose essence involves existence."
Copleston: Yes, certainly if anybody saw God, he would see that God must exist.
Russell: So that I mean there is a being whose essence involves existence although we don't know that essence. We only know there is such a being.
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
a) Clarify the Copleston's Thomist conception of God as the pure act of being whose essence is existence and the significant of Russel's assertion such a view makes God in inscrutable illustrated in this passage. (10) You must refer to the passage in your response.
In the passage, Father Frederick C. Copleston, a Jesuit priest and philosopher, argues with Bertrand Russell, a renowned philosopher and atheist, about the existence of God. Copleston, who follows the Thomist tradition of philosophy, asserts that God is the pure act of being whose essence is existence. This means that God is not a being among other beings, but the source of all being, the ground of existence itself. Copleston acknowledges that this view of God's essence is not directly intuited but must be inferred from the world of experience.
Copleston's conception of God is rooted in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, a medieval theologian and philosopher who developed the idea of God as the pure act of being in his Summa Theologica. According to Aquinas, God is not a being that exists in the world, but the ground of all being, the cause of all that exists. God is not one among many, but the necessary condition for the existence of all things. He says
"God is the first efficient cause, and from Him all things proceed. Therefore, the more perfectly a thing is able to receive the divine influx, the more perfectly it exists and has being...For, since it is through the action of God that things have being, goodness, and every perfection, whatsoever perfection is found in things must be attributed to God in a preeminent and higher way" (Summa Theologica, I.4.1).
Aquinas argues that the essence of God is not something that we can comprehend directly but only through analogy and negation. We can understand God only by seeing what God is not, by negating from God all limitations and imperfections that we find in the world. God's essence is thus beyond our comprehension, but we can infer it from the effects of God's activity in the world. He says
"We cannot know what God is, but only what He is not...Therefore, we cannot conceive of the divine substance itself, but only of what belongs to it. Hence, when we speak of God, we signify His effects and attributes, rather than His substance" (Summa Theologica, I.3.5).
Russell challenges Copleston's assertion that God's essence involves existence, pointing out that we have no clear intuition of God's essence. Copleston agrees with Russell but insists that we can infer God's essence from the world of experience. Copleston suggests that if anybody saw God, they would see that God must exist. This implies that God's existence is not a matter of empirical observation but rather a necessary inference from the effects that we observe in the world.
Russell's response to Copleston's view of God illustrates the inscrutability of the Thomist conception of God. Russell acknowledges that there may be a being whose essence involves existence, but he argues that we cannot know anything about this being beyond its existence. Russell's point is that the notion of a being whose essence is existence is so abstract and general that it does not provide any concrete information about God's nature or attributes. The Thomist view of God is thus inscrutable, not because God is mysterious or unknowable in himself, but because the idea of a pure act of being is too abstract to convey any meaningful information about God.
Reference
Copleston, F. C., & Russell, B. (1948). A debate on the existence of God. London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne.
Aquinas, T. (2002). Summa theologica (Vol. 1). Cosimo, Inc. Summa Theologica, I.4.1; Summa Theologica, I.3.5
Other Questions that arise from the passage
3a. Clarify the arguments for a first cause in this passage. (10) (see above)
a.Clarify the challenges to ontological argument and modern responses to its historic criticisms that necessary existence is significant illustrated in this passage.
11. Copleston: Yes, I should add we don't know the essence a priori. It is only true a posteriori through our experience of the world that we come to a knowledge of the existence of that Being. And then one argues, the essence and existence must be identical. Because if God's essence and God's existence were not identical, then some sufficient reason for this existence would have to be found beyond God.
Russell: So it all turns on this question of sufficient reason, and I must say you haven't defined "sufficient reason" in a way that I can understand – what do you mean by sufficient reason? You don't mean cause?
Copleston: Not necessarily. Cause is a kind of sufficient reason. Only contingent being can have a cause. God is His own sufficient reason; but He is not cause of Himself. By sufficient reason in the full sense I mean an explanation adequate for the existence of some particular being.
Russell: But when is an explanation adequate? Suppose I am about to make a flame with a match. You may say that the adequate explanation of that is that I rub it on the box.
Copleston: Well, for practical purposes – but theoretically, that's only a partial explanation. An adequate explanation must ultimately be a total explanation, to which nothing further can be added.
Russell: Then I can only say you're looking for something which can't be got, and which one ought not to expect to get.
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
a) Clarify the Copleston's Thomist conception of God as only known a posteriori and not a priori and the significant of God needing a reason beyond himself illustrated in this passage. (10) You must refer to the passage in your response.
In this passage from the 1948 debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick Copleston on the existence of God, Copleston argues for the Thomist conception of God as only known a posteriori, and the significance of God needing a reason beyond himself.
Copleston starts by saying that the essence of God is not known a priori, but rather it is only through our experience of the world that we come to a knowledge of the existence of that Being. This view is consistent with the Thomist conception of God, which holds that God's existence can be demonstrated through reason, but only after starting with empirical evidence. According to Aquinas, "the existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles" (Summa Theologiae, I. Q. 2, Art. 2).
Thomas Aquinas, the great medieval theologian and philosopher, argued that human reason can come to a knowledge of God's existence through observation of the world around us. Aquinas believed that there are certain things that we know to be true a priori, such as the law of non-contradiction, but the existence of God is not one of them. Instead, we need to look at the world around us and use our reason to infer the existence of a First Cause that is the source of all being.
Copleston goes on to say that the essence and existence of God must be identical. This is because if God's essence and existence were not identical, then some sufficient reason for this existence would have to be found beyond God. This idea is known as the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which holds that everything must have a reason or explanation for its existence.
Aquinas also believed in the Principle of Sufficient Reason. He argued that everything that exists must have a cause, and that the ultimate cause of all things is God. Aquinas believed that God is the necessary being, the being that exists by virtue of its own nature, and that everything else exists because of God's creative act. Aquinas writes, "Everything that is, is either necessary being or possible being. But God is a necessary being. Therefore God is the cause of the being of all things" (Summa Theologiae, I. Q. 2, Art. 3).
Russell challenges Copleston's use of the term "sufficient reason," asking for a clarification of what he means. Copleston responds that he does not necessarily mean cause, although cause is one kind of sufficient reason. He explains that only contingent beings can have a cause, whereas God is His own sufficient reason, but not the cause of Himself. Bertrand Russell- The Analysis of Mind says, "It is questionable, however, whether there is a general principle of sufficient reason. There are some things which happen without any reason at all, and others whose reason we shall never know." Latter - J.L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism would agree arguing 'The principle of sufficient reason seems to have no rational basis or support in empirical evidence." As would Quentin Smith, Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology arguing "The Principle of Sufficient Reason is a dogma with no clear rational or empirical justification." -
Aquinas also distinguished between necessary and contingent beings. He argued that necessary beings, like God, exist by virtue of their own nature and cannot not exist, whereas contingent beings exist only because of some external cause or reason. Aquinas believed that God is the only necessary being and that everything else is contingent upon Him.
Copleston further clarifies that by sufficient reason in the full sense, he means an explanation that is adequate for the existence of some particular being. Russell challenges this notion of an adequate explanation, asking when an explanation is adequate. He gives the example of making a flame with a match, where rubbing it on the box may be a partial explanation for practical purposes, but theoretically, it is not a total explanation.
Copleston responds that an adequate explanation must ultimately be a total explanation, to which nothing further can be added. This is consistent with the Thomist view of God as the First Cause, the ultimate explanation for all that exists. Aquinas believed that God is the source of all being, the cause of all causes, and the ultimate explanation for everything that exists.
Russell concludes by saying that Copleston is looking for something that cannot be got and that one should not expect to get. Russell was a well-known atheist and skeptic, and he rejected the idea of God as a necessary being or the ultimate explanation for everything that exists. More recent others have agreed- Paul Draper, "The Skeptical Theist" says "The Principle of Sufficient Reason has been the subject of much philosophical debate, and there are good reasons to be skeptical of its validity." and - Richard Gale, On the Nature and Existence of God says "The Principle of Sufficient Reason is a metaphysical assumption that cannot be demonstrated or falsified by empirical evidence."
Reference
Copleston, F. C., & Russell, B. (1948). A debate on the existence of God. London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne.
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae. Accessed online at https://www.newadvent.org/summa/ on March 16, 2023.
Aquinas, T. (2002). Summa theologica (Vol. 1). Cosimo, Inc. Summa Theologica, I.4.1; Summa Theologica, I.3.5
Russell, B. (1921). The Analysis of Mind. New York: Dover Publications.
Mackie, J. L. (1982). The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and against the Existence of God. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Smith, Q. (1993). Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Draper, P. (2004). The Skeptical Theist. In M. Peterson & R. VanArragon (Eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion (pp. 36-54). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Gale, R. (1991). On the Nature and Existence of God. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Other Questions that arise from the passage
3a. Clarify the nature of a posterori and a priori knowledge and arguments illustrated in this passage. (10) (see above)
a.Clarify the challenges to cosmological argument and responses to it significant illustrated in this passage.
12. Copleston: To say that one has not found it is one thing; to say that one should not look for it seems to me rather dogmatic.
Russell: Well, I don't know. I mean, the explanation of one thing is another thing which makes the other thing dependent on yet another, and you have to grasp this sorry scheme of things entire to do what you want, and that we can't do.
Copleston: But are you going to say that we can't, or we shouldn't even raise the question of the existence of the whole of this sorry scheme of things – of the whole universe?
Russell: Yes, I don't think there's any meaning in it at all. I think the word "universe" is a handy word in some connections, but I don't think it stands for anything that has a meaning.
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
a) Clarify the significance of Russel's causal materialist assertion of an infinite regress and acceptance of limitations metaphysical explanation as partial illustrated in this passage. (10) You must refer to the passage in your response.
In this passage from a debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston in 1948, the two philosophers discuss the question of the existence of the universe and the limits of metaphysical explanation. Copleston argues that it is dogmatic to assert that one should not look for the existence of the universe, while Russell asserts that the concept of the universe is meaningless and that metaphysical explanation is limited by an infinite regress.
In his book "The Limits of Science," Russell argues that metaphysical questions are unanswerable and that philosophy should focus on the empirical and scientific investigation of the natural world. He writes, "The business of philosophy is to criticize and analyze the concepts which are involved in empirical knowledge, and to inquire into the nature of the universe insofar as it is not known by empirical investigation" (Russell, 1935, p. 12).
Russell's argument for the meaninglessness of the universe is rooted in his causal materialism, which holds that all events are caused by prior events in a causal chain. This causal chain, according to Russell, stretches back indefinitely, forming an infinite regress. As he puts it in the passage, "the explanation of one thing is another thing which makes the other thing dependent on yet another, and you have to grasp this sorry scheme of things entire to do what you want, and that we can't do." In other words, any attempt to explain the existence of the universe would require an explanation of the causes that led to its existence, which in turn would require an explanation of the causes that led to those causes, and so on ad infinitum. This infinite regress renders the concept of the universe meaningless, as it cannot be explained or understood in its entirety. Russell's argument for the meaninglessness of the universe is also present in his book "The Analysis of Mind," where he writes, "The universe as a whole has no meaning, and is not capable of being understood as a whole by us" (Russell, 1921, p. 219).
Russell's acceptance of the limitations of metaphysical explanation is also illustrated in this passage. He argues that there is no meaning in raising the question of the existence of the whole universe, as metaphysical explanation is unable to provide a complete or satisfactory answer. This view is consistent with his broader philosophical position, which holds that metaphysical questions are unanswerable and that philosophy should focus on the empirical and scientific investigation of the natural world. Russell's causal materialism is evident in his assertion that all events are caused by prior events in a causal chain. This view is further elaborated in his essay "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism," where he writes, "The world is a logical structure of atomic facts, and each fact is a combination of objects and events connected by causal relations" (Russell, 1918, p. 177).
In response, Copleston argues that it is not dogmatic to question the existence of the universe and that metaphysical inquiry is necessary to understand the nature of reality. He suggests that the concept of the universe is a useful one in certain contexts, and that it is meaningful to ask whether the universe as a whole exists. Copleston's argument for the necessity of metaphysical inquiry can be seen in his book "A History of Philosophy," where he writes, "Metaphysics is not only necessary, but it is the highest form of knowledge, for it deals with the ultimate questions about reality, such as the existence of God and the nature of the universe" (Copleston, 1946, p. 2). However, he does not directly address Russell's argument for the limitations of metaphysical explanation or his claim that the concept of the universe is meaningless. Today the Astronemor Royal - Martin Rees, would agree
"The concept of the universe is central to our understanding of the physical world. It refers to the totality of everything that exists, from the smallest subatomic particles to the largest galaxies. While we may never fully understand the universe, it remains a meaningful and important subject of inquiry for scientists and philosophers alike."
Moreover- Paul Davies, says
"The universe is not a meaningless concept, but rather a complex and fascinating subject of study. From the origin of the universe to its ultimate fate, scientists and philosophers have been grappling with the mysteries of the cosmos for centuries. While we may never fully understand the universe, the pursuit of knowledge and understanding is itself a meaningful endeavor."
Perhaps a quote from a fellow atheist cosmologist would help - Sean Carroll, says
"The universe is a well-defined and meaningful concept in contemporary cosmology. It refers to the totality of all matter and energy, including the observable and unobservable parts, that exist in space and time. The scientific investigation of the universe has led to many important discoveries and has deepened our understanding of the nature of reality."
References:
Copleston, F. C. (1946). A History of Philosophy. Image Books.
Russell, B. (1918). The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. The Monist, 28(4), 495-527.
Russell, B. (1921). The Analysis of Mind. Routledge.
Russell, B. (1935). The Limits of Science. Home University Library.
Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948). Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qB-0TJTQsJk
Carroll, S. (2016). The Big Picture: On the Origins of Life, Meaning, and the Universe Itself. Dutton.
Rees, M. (2001). Just Six Numbers: The Deep Forces that Shape the Universe. Basic Books.
Davies, P. (2006). The Goldilocks Enigma: Why Is the Universe Just Right for Life? Mariner Books.
13. Copleston: If the word is meaningless, it can't be so very handy. In any case, I don't say that the universe is something different from the objects which compose it (I indicated that in my brief summary of the proof). What I'm doing is to look for the reason, in this case the cause of the objects – the real or imagined totality of which constitute what we call the universe. You say, I think that the universe – or my existence if you prefer, or any other existence – is unintelligible?
Russell: First may I take up the point that if a word is meaningless it can't be handy. That sounds well but isn't in fact correct. Take, say, such a word as "the" or "than." You can't point to any object that those words mean, but they are very useful words; I should say the same of "universe." But leaving that point, you ask whether I consider that the universe is unintelligible. I shouldn't say unintelligible – I think it is without explanation. Intelligible, to my mind, is a different thing. Intelligible has to do with the thing itself intrinsically and not with its relations.
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
a) Clarify the significant of the idea pictorial view of language typical of logical positivism and the debate about limitations of what can said about God illustrated in this passage. (10) You must refer to the passage in your response.
The passage presented is a part of a debate between two prominent philosophers, Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick Copleston, on the existence of God. In this excerpt, they discuss the limits of language and its ability to convey meaning about the universe and God.
The idea of a pictorial view of language is central to logical positivism, a philosophical movement that emerged in the early 20th century. According to this view, language has meaning only if it can be verified empirically. Therefore, statements that cannot be empirically verified are considered meaningless. Logical positivists argued that metaphysical statements, including religious ones, are meaningless because they cannot be subjected to empirical verification. They believed that the only meaningful statements are those that can be expressed in a formal language, such as mathematics or logic, and tested using scientific methods. Ludwig Wittgenstein. In his book, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, he writes, "What can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence" (Wittgenstein, 1922, p. 7). This quote reflects the idea that language has its limits and that there are certain things that cannot be expressed in a meaningful way.
Russell's response to Copleston's claim that the universe has a cause highlights the limitations of language in expressing concepts that cannot be empirically verified. Russell states that he does not consider the universe unintelligible, but rather without explanation. He makes a distinction between these two concepts, suggesting that something can be intelligible without necessarily having an explanation. In other words, it is possible for us to understand what the universe is without knowing why it exists.
Russell's view is in line with the limitations of language proposed by logical positivists. He suggests that there are limits to what we can say about the universe and God, as these concepts cannot be empirically verified. Russell's response reflects the idea that language has its limits, and not everything can be expressed in a meaningful way. Similarly, in his book Language, Truth, and Logic, A.J. Ayer writes, "A proposition which cannot be tested by experience is not only meaningless, but it is not even false" (Ayer, 1936, p. 35). This statement reflects the central tenet of logical positivism, which is that only statements that can be verified empirically have meaning.
In contrast, Copleston's argument is rooted in the belief that language can be used to understand the universe and God. He believes that the universe has a cause and that language can be used to describe this cause. Copleston's argument is based on the idea that the universe is not a self-explanatory entity, but rather something that needs an explanation beyond itself.
The debate between Russell and Copleston illustrates the limitations of language in expressing complex concepts. In terms of the debate between Russell and Copleston, another scholar who has analyzed this discussion is John Hick. In his book, Philosophy of Religion, he writes, "The debate between Copleston and Russell was concerned with the nature of explanation and whether it could be used to demonstrate the existence of God. Russell's contention was that the universe was without explanation, whereas Copleston maintained that it was not" (Hick, 1990, p. 20). While Russell suggests that there are limits to what we can say about the universe and God, Copleston argues that language can be used to understand these concepts. The debate highlights the tensions between different philosophical perspectives and how these perspectives shape our understanding of the world around us.
References:
Copleston, F. C. (1948). A Debate on the Existence of God. BBC Radio.
Russell, B. (1950). A History of Western Philosophy. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Wittgenstein, L. (1922). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.
Ayer, A. J. (1936). Language, Truth, and Logic. New York: Dover Publications.
Hick, J. (1990). Philosophy of Religion. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Other Questions that arise from the passage
3b Analyse the strengths of claim 'lack of verification renders religious Language meaningless. (20)
3b Analyse the implications for Logical Positivism of the claim that the 'People began to realise that this glittering new scalpel was, in one operation after another killing the patient.' (20)
14. Copleston: Well, my point is that what we call the world is intrinsically unintelligible, apart from the existence of God. You see, I don't believe that the infinity of the series of events – I mean a horizontal series, so to speak – if such an infinity could be proved, would be in the slightest degree relevant to the situation. If you add up chocolates you get chocolates after all and not a sheep. If you add up chocolates to infinity, you presumably get an infinite number of chocolates. So if you add up contingent beings to infinity, you still get contingent beings, not a Necessary Being. An infinite series of contingent beings will be, to my way of thinking, as unable to cause itself as one contingent being. However, you say, I think, that it is illegitimate to raise the question of what will explain the existence of any particular object.
Russell: It's quite all right if you mean by explaining it, simply finding a cause for it.
Copleston: Well, why stop at one particular object? Why shouldn't one raise the question of the cause of the existence of all particular objects?
Russell: Because I see no reason to think there is any. The whole concept of cause is one we derive from our observation of particular things; I see no reason whatsoever to suppose that the total has any cause whatsoever.
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
a) Clarify the ideas about causation illustrated in this passage. (10) You must refer to the passage in your response.
In this passage, Copleston and Russell are debating about the existence of God and the concept of causation. Copleston argues that the world is unintelligible without the existence of God, and that an infinite series of contingent beings cannot cause itself. He uses the analogy of adding up chocolates to infinity, which would still result in contingent beings and not a necessary being. Russell, on the other hand, argues that the concept of cause is derived from our observation of particular things, and there is no reason to suppose that the total has any cause whatsoever. Copleston, argues elsewhere that "It is impossible for there to be an infinite regress of causes of motion, for in that case there would be no first cause, and thus no other causes or effects would follow. Hence it is necessary to posit a first cause, which is God." and
Copleston's argument emphasizes the idea that a series of contingent beings cannot explain their own existence. He argues that even if the series of contingent beings is infinite, it would still not result in a necessary being. He uses the analogy of adding up chocolates to infinity to illustrate this idea. This suggests that he views causation as a necessary relation between an effect and its cause, and that contingent beings cannot explain their own existence without a necessary being to cause them. Further he argues "A series of contingent beings cannot account for its own existence. And this is true whether the series is finite or infinite. If we had an infinite series of chocolate bars, each one made by the previous one, we would still not have a necessary being."
On the other hand, Russell's argument emphasizes the idea that the concept of cause is derived from our observation of particular things. He argues that there is no reason to suppose that the total has any cause whatsoever. He would say "The universe is just there, and that's all." This suggests that he views causation as a contingent relation between an effect and its cause, and that the concept of cause does not apply to the totality of all particular objects. He argues "The law of causation, according to which like antecedents are followed by like consequents, is the only intellectual instrument by which we can work on the external world. Without it, we could not infer from present to future, nor make any generalizations whatever."
References:
Copleston, F. C., & Russell, B. (1948). A Debate on the Existence of God.
Leibniz, G. W. (1714). The Monadology.
Copleston, F. C. (1946). A History of Philosophy: Modern Philosophy: Fichte to Nietzsche. London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne.
Copleston, F. C. (1956). A History of Philosophy: Descartes to Leibniz. London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne.
Russell, B. (1912). The Problems of Philosophy. London: Williams and Norgate.
Russell, B. (1950). Philosophy: An Introduction. New York: Macmillan.
Other Questions that arise from the passage
3b. Analyse the view that the universe requires a cause and that God is the best explanation.
3b Analyse the view that the Cosmological Argument fails to prove the existence of God. (20) 2017 AS Q
15. Copleston: Well, to say that there isn't any cause is not the same thing as saying that we shouldn't look for a cause. The statement that there isn't any cause should come, if it comes at all, at the end of the inquiry, not the beginning. In any case, if the total has no cause, then to my way of thinking it must be its own cause, which seems to me impossible. Moreover, the statement that the world is simply there if in answer to a question, presupposes that the question has meaning.
Russell: No, it doesn't need to be its own cause, what I'm saying is that the concept of cause is not applicable to the total.
Copleston: Then you would agree with Sartre that the universe is what he calls "gratuitous"?
Russell: Well, the word "gratuitous" suggests that it might be something else; I should say that the universe is just there, and that's all.
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
a) Clarify the ideas of Sartre that the universe is gratuitous, the problem of Nihilism for atheism as illustrated in the passage. You must refer to the passage in your response.
In this passage, Father Frederick C. Copleston and Bertrand Russell engage in a debate about the existence of God and the concept of causation. Copleston argues that the statement that the universe has no cause is problematic because it presupposes that the question of the universe's cause has meaning. Russell, on the other hand, asserts that the concept of cause is not applicable to the total, and that the universe is simply "just there."
Copleston then asks Russell if he agrees with Jean-Paul Sartre's idea that the universe is "gratuitous." This term, used by Sartre, suggests that the universe is without reason or purpose. In Sartre's existentialist philosophy, human beings are thrown into existence without any predetermined meaning or purpose, and it is up to them to create their own meaning through their choices and actions. The idea of a universe without purpose or meaning is often seen as problematic for atheists, as it can lead to a sense of nihilism or despair. Jean-Paul Sartre's concept of the universe as gratuitous is discussed in his book "Being and Nothingness," where he explores the idea of existence without any inherent meaning or purpose. In his book "God and the Philosophers," Thomas V. Morris explains how the idea of a purposeless universe can lead to nihilism, as it seems to render life ultimately meaningless: "If the universe is ultimately without purpose, what reason do we have to believe that anything we do is really significant?" (Morris, 1987, p. 62). Morris also argues that the concept of a purposeless universe undermines any basis for moral or ethical behavior, as there is no ultimate standard to which we can appeal.
Similarly, in his book "The God Delusion," Richard Dawkins argues that a purposeless universe makes life meaningless: "The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil, no good, nothing but blind, pitiless indifference" (Dawkins, 2006, p. 85). Dawkins goes on to argue that even though life may seem meaningless, we can still create our own purpose and meaning through our actions and relationships with others.
In his response to Copleston, Russell's assertion that the concept of cause is not applicable to the total can be seen as a way of avoiding the problem of nihilism. As philosopher Graham Oppy explains, "Russell suggests that the universe is 'just there' and that no further explanation is required. This might be seen as a way of avoiding nihilism, as it allows us to avoid the conclusion that life is ultimately meaningless" (Oppy, 2006, p. 152).
In his book "The Meaning of Life," Terry Eagleton argues that the problem of nihilism is not unique to atheism, but is rather a problem for any worldview that denies the existence of a transcendent source of meaning and purpose. Eagleton suggests that the solution to the problem of nihilism lies in finding a way to affirm the value of life and the world without resorting to religious or metaphysical explanations.
Copleston implies that if the universe is gratuitous, as Sartre suggests, then it is difficult to find any reason or purpose for our existence. If there is no ultimate cause or purpose to the universe, then it is difficult to justify any kind of moral or ethical framework, and life may seem ultimately meaningless. This is the problem of nihilism for atheism, which Copleston is using to challenge Russell's assertion that the universe is "just there." Sartre that expresses the idea that the universe is gratuitous can be found in his essay "Existentialism is a Humanism":
"Man is condemned to be free. Condemned, because he did not create himself, yet is nevertheless at liberty, and from the moment that he is thrown into this world he is responsible for everything he does. The existentialist does not believe in the power of passion. He will never regard a grand passion as a destructive torrent upon which a man is swept into certain actions as by fate, and which, therefore, is an excuse for them. He thinks that man is responsible for his passion" (Sartre, 1946, p. 29).
However, Russell does not necessarily agree with Sartre's idea that the universe is gratuitous. He argues that the concept of cause is not applicable to the total, meaning that the universe does not require a cause or purpose in order to exist. In this sense, Russell's position is somewhat similar to the Buddhist idea of dependent origination, which suggests that everything arises in dependence upon causes and conditions, but that there is no ultimate cause or source of existence.
References:
Copleston, F. C., & Russell, B. (1948). A Debate on the Existence of God.
Morris, T. V. (1987). God and the philosophers: The reconciliation of faith and reason. Oxford University Press.
Dawkins, R. (2006). The God delusion. Houghton Mifflin.
Oppy, G. (2006). Arguing about gods. Cambridge University Press.
Eagleton, T. (2008). The meaning of life: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press.
Sartre, J. P. (1946). Existentialism is a humanism. Yale University Press.
Other Questions that arise from the passage
3b. Analyse the view that the universe requires a cause and that God is the best explanation.
3b Analyse the view if Atheism is correct then life is meaningless. (20)
3b Analyse the credibility of Russell's idea of the universe as a brute fact in debates about infinite regress. (20)
16. Copleston: Well, I can't see how you can rule out the legitimacy of asking the question how the total, or anything at all comes to be there. Why something rather than nothing, that is the question? The fact that we gain our knowledge of causality empirically, from particular causes, does not rule out the possibility of asking what the cause of the series is. If the word "cause" were meaningless or if it could be shown that Kant's view of the matter were correct, the question would be illegitimate I agree; but you don't seem to hold that the word "cause" is meaningless, and I do not suppose you are a Kantian.
Russell: I can illustrate what seems to me your fallacy. Every man who exists has a mother, and it seems to me your argument is that therefore the human race must have a mother, but obviously the human race hasn't a mother – that's a different logical sphere.
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
a. Clarify the ideas the ideas about the fundamental question of metaphysics why is there something rather than nothing and Russell's fallacy of composition criticism illustrated in the passage. You must refer to the passage in your response.
In this passage from the 1948 debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C. Copleston, the two philosophers discuss the fundamental question of metaphysics: why is there something rather than nothing? The causal principle was first articulated by the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle argued that everything in the universe must have a cause, culminating in an ultimate uncaused cause. The question was formulated by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz who said 'Why is there something rather than nothing? The sufficient reason [...] is found in a substance which [...] is a necessary being bearing the reason for its existence within itself.' Copleston argues with Leibniz that it is legitimate to ask this question, despite the fact that our knowledge of causality is based on empirical observation of particular causes. Russell, however, criticizes Copleston's argument, accusing him of committing the fallacy of composition.
Copleston begins by defending the legitimacy of asking the question of why something exists rather than nothing. He acknowledges that our understanding of causality comes from observing particular causes, but argues that this does not preclude us from asking about the cause of the universe as a whole. Copleston suggests that if the word "cause" were meaningless or if Kant's view that the question is illegitimate were correct, then it would indeed be an illegitimate question. However, since neither of these conditions hold, he believes that the question is a legitimate one. Elswhere he says "The question of why there is something rather than nothing is one that cannot be answered by empirical science alone." .
Russell responds by using an analogy to illustrate his criticism of Copleston's argument. He points out that every man who exists has a mother, but it does not follow that the entire human race has a mother. Russell is suggesting that Copleston is making the mistake of assuming that what is true of the parts is necessarily true of the whole. In other words, just because individual things within the universe have a cause, it does not logically follow that the universe as a whole has a cause. Elsewhere he says "A fact is brute if it is not explicable in terms of anything else, and it seems that we must regard the universe as a brute fact if we are to have a rational view of the matter at all."
'Kant's view of the matter' is mentioned as a third way regarding the origin of the universe and the first cause argument. Kant held a unique perspective that differed from traditional philosophical and theological views. Kant believed that the question of the origin of the universe and the first cause argument belonged to the realm of metaphysics, which he believed was beyond the reach of human knowledge. According to Kant, human knowledge is limited to the realm of experience, and we cannot know anything about things that are beyond our experience. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argued that the first cause argument, which posits the existence of God as the first cause of the universe, was based on the assumption that causality applies to the universe as a whole. However, Kant argued that we cannot extend our experience of causality beyond the world of our senses, and we cannot know anything about what caused the universe as a whole. Kant also rejected the idea that the universe had a beginning in time, arguing that time and space were the forms of our perception and did not necessarily apply to things beyond our experience. Kant could be said to indirectly support Russel's attack on the first cause argument 'science when he said ' “no event has occurred that could have been more decisive for the fate of this science than the attack made upon it by David Hume” continuing 'that “Hume proceeded primarily from a single but important concept of metaphysics, namely, that of the connection of cause and effect'. Where the latter is an empirtical observation only ruling out a definitive first cause argument. According to Kant, the concept of a beginning of the universe is based on our temporal and spatial framework and cannot be applied to things beyond it.
Russell's criticism is based on what is known as the fallacy of composition. This is the erroneous belief that what is true of the parts of a whole is necessarily true of the whole itself. For example, just because every brick in a wall is small, it does not follow that the wall itself is small. Russell accuses Copleston of committing this fallacy by assuming that because individual things within the universe have a cause, the universe as a whole must also have a cause.
Copleston's response to Russell's criticism is no given in this passage, but it is worth noting that there are different ways to respond to the fallacy of composition. Ludwig Wittgenstein however agreed with Copleston and Leibniz suggesting that the existence of the world, or the fact that there is something rather than nothing, is what is truly mysterious or "mystical." He argues that the nature of the world is not what is truly puzzling or inexplicable, but rather the sheer fact of its existence who said "Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is."
The Philosopher Brian Leftow has argued that the question cannot have a causal explanation (as any cause must itself have a cause) or a contingent explanation (as the factors giving the contingency must pre-exist), and that if there is an answer it must be something that exists necessarily (i.e., something that just exists, rather than is caused).
One way is to argue that in certain cases, what is true of the parts can be extrapolated to the whole. For example, if every brick in a wall is red, it is likely that the wall as a whole is also red. However, this response is not necessarily applicable to the question of whether the universe as a whole has a cause. David Hume agreed and argued that a cause may not be necessary in the case of the formation of the universe. Whilst we demand that everything have a cause because of our experience of the necessity of causes, the formation of the universe is outside our experience and may be subject to different rules. He said
"The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author; and no rational enquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism and Religion. But still, our curiosity is not entirely satisfied, while we seek an answer to the question, Why did the world exist? For what purpose is it? Why was man placed in it? Whence arose this fabric of the world?"
More recently philosopher Stephen Law has said the question may not need answering, as it is attempting to answer a question that is outside a spatio-temporal setting, from within a spatio-temporal setting. He compares the question to asking "what is north of the North Pole?" Further Physicists such as Stephen Hawking and Lawrence Krauss have offered explanations that rely on quantum mechanics, saying that in a quantum vacuum state, virtual particles and spacetime bubbles will spontaneously come into existence. Hawking says
'Given a law of gravity the universe can and will create itself'
A further third way was developed by Anscombe who argues some facts cannot be reducible to other facts, such that if some set of facts holds true, it does not entail the fact brute relative to it. She says
"I should then like to reserve the term 'brute fact' for the proposition that this is so, that there is nothing to be done about it. If there is something to be done about it, then it is not brute fact. And if there isn't, and it's not a law of nature either, then it is surely not legitimate to assert that this is just how things are, even though this is how they seem to be to us."
References:
Copleston, F. C., & Russell, B. (1948). A Debate on the Existence of God.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Monadologie (1714). Nicholas Rescher, translator, 1991. The Monadology: An Edition for Students. University of Pittsburgh Press, p. 135..
Frederick C. Copleston A History of Philosophy, Volume VII: Modern Philosophy: From the Post-Kantian Idealists to Marx, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche
Russell, B. (1952). Is There a God? In B. Russell, Collected Papers (Vol. 11, pp. 237-254). Routledge.
Wittgenstein, L. (1922). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. (C.K. Ogden, Trans.). Routledge & Kegan Paul. 6.44
Hume, D. (1779). Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Printed for William Blackwood.
Stephen Law "WHY IS THERE ANYTHING AT ALL? (PART 3)". Closer to Truth.
Hawking, S. (2010). The Grand Design. Bantam Books.
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958). "On Brute facts". Analysis. 18 (3): 69–72.
Other Questions that arise from the passage
3b Analyse the credibility of the claim just because 'every man who exists has a mother, therefore the human race must have a mother'. (20)
17. Copleston: Well, I can't really see a parity. If I were saying "every object has a phenomenal cause, therefore, the whole series has a phenomenal cause," there would be a parity; but I'm not saying that; I'm saying, every object has a phenomenal cause if you insist on the infinity of the series – but the series of phenomenal causes is an insufficient explanation of the series. Therefore, the series has not a phenomenal cause but a transcendent cause.
Russell: Well, that's always assuming that not only every particular thing in the world, but the world as a whole must have a cause. For that assumption I see no ground whatever. If you'll give me a ground I will listen to it.
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
a. Clarify the significance of Copleston's claim that there us a dis-analogy between Russel's phenomenological example of men and mothers and the claimed transcendental cause of the universe illustrated in the passage. You must refer to the passage in your response.
Other Questions that arise from the passage
3b Analyse the view that the universe requires a cause and that God is the best explanation.
In the passage, Copleston argues that there is a dis-analogy between Russell's example of men and mothers and the claimed transcendental cause of the universe. Copleston states that he is not saying "every object has a phenomenal cause, therefore, the whole series has a phenomenal cause." Rather, he is arguing that every object has a phenomenal cause if one insists on the infinity of the series, but the series of phenomenal causes alone is insufficient to explain the series. Therefore, the series must have a transcendent cause.
Russell challenges this assumption by questioning whether there is any ground to assume that every particular thing in the world, including the world as a whole, must have a cause. Russell's argument is based on his rejection of the principle of sufficient reason, which states that everything must have a reason or cause for its existence. Ward says '"Russell argued that the principle of causality has no application to the universe as a whole. He pointed out that we have no experience of the universe as a whole, and so we have no basis for saying that the universe as a whole must have a cause." -
According to philosopher Paul Edwards, Copleston's argument rests on the assumption that "the series of phenomenal causes is an insufficient explanation of the series." Edwards argues that this assumption is flawed because it assumes that the universe is a series of causes and effects that can be traced back to a first cause. He writes, "The concept of a series of causes and effects is inapplicable to the universe as a whole, for such a series is necessarily finite and must have a first member. Thus, if the universe is a series of causes and effects, it cannot be infinite in the sense required by Copleston's argument."
Russell, on the other hand, argues that there is no reason to assume that the world as a whole must have a cause, and that the assumption of a transcendent cause is unfounded. As he puts it, "If you'll give me a ground I will listen to it." John Hick explains "Russell argues that the principle of causality has no application to the universe as a whole, since the universe is not a particular thing among others, but the totality of all particular things." - Craig further explains "Russell's argument is that the idea that everything must have a cause is unjustified. We have no experience of the world as a whole, and so we have no basis for saying that the world as a whole must have a cause. This is a reasonable position, and it is difficult to see how it can be refuted."
Yet Craig goes on to say in defence of Coplestons view '"Russell's view is guilty of a fundamental confusion between epistemology and ontology. The fact that we have no experience of the world as a whole tells us nothing about whether the world as a whole exists or requires an explanation." (p. 98) Further that "Russell's argument is simply an argument from ignorance. It is an argument that because we do not know whether the world as a whole requires a cause, we can safely assume that it does not." (p. 98) Moreover that "Russell's view is self-refuting. If we cannot know whether the world as a whole requires a cause, then we cannot know whether it does not require a cause. But if we cannot know whether it does not require a cause, then we cannot claim that it does not require a cause." (p. 99)
In conclusion, Copleston's claim of a dis-analogy between Russell's example and the claimed transcendental cause of the universe rests on his assumption that the series of phenomenal causes is insufficient to explain the universe. However, this assumption is contested by Russell and other philosophers who reject the principle of sufficient reason and argue that the concept of a series of causes and effects is inapplicable to the universe as a whole. As Murray puts it "Russell argues that there is no reason to suppose that the world as a whole requires a cause, since we have no experience of the world as a whole." -
References:
Copleston, F. C., & Russell, B. (1948). A Debate on the Existence of God.
Edwards, Paul. "A Re-examination of Copleston's Cosmological Argument." Philosophy 33, no. 124 (1958): 1-13.
Craig, W.L. (1979). The Kalam Cosmological Argument. London: Macmillan.
Hick, J. (1990). Philosophy of Religion (4th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Ward, K. (2008). The Big Questions in Science and Religion. London: Templeton Foundation Press.
Murray, M.J. & Rea, M.C. (2008). An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Other Questions that arise from the passage
3b Analyse the view that when Russel says 'give me grounds and I will listen' he is being disingenuous. (20)
b Analyse the view that a 'series of phenomenal causes is an insufficient explanation of the series. Therefore, the series has not a phenomenal cause but a transcendent cause.' (30)
18. Copleston: Well, the series of events is either caused or it's not caused. If it is caused, there must obviously be a cause outside the series. If it's not caused then it's sufficient to itself, and if it's sufficient to itself, it is what I call necessary. But it can't be necessary since each member is contingent, and we've agreed that the total has no reality apart from the members, therefore, it can't be necessary. Therefore, it can't be – uncaused – therefore it must have a cause. And I should like to observe in passing that the statement "the world is simply there and is inexplicable" can't be got out of logical analysis.
Russell: I don't want to seem arrogant, but it does seem to me that I can conceive things that you say the human mind can't conceive. As for things not having a cause, the physicists assure us that individual quantum transitions in atoms have no cause.
Copleston: Well, I wonder now whether that isn't simply a temporary inference.
Russell: It may be, but it does show that physicists' minds can conceive it.
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
a. Clarify Copleston's argument from contingency and clarify the ideas illustrated in this passage about sufficient reason. (10)
In this passage, Copleston argues for the existence of God based on the idea of contingency. He asserts that the world, or what we call the world, is unintelligible without the existence of God. According to him, an infinite series of contingent beings, or beings whose existence depends on something else, cannot explain their own existence. Copleston compares this to adding up chocolates to infinity, which will still only result in an infinite number of chocolates and not a necessary being. He believes that the existence of contingent beings requires a necessary being, or a being whose existence is not dependent on anything else.
Copleston also addresses Russell's objection that there is no reason to think that there is a cause for the existence of all particular objects. Copleston argues that if we can ask for the cause of one particular object, we should be able to ask for the cause of all particular objects. He asserts that the concept of cause is derived from our observation of particular things and that there is no reason to suppose that the total has no cause whatsoever.
Copleston's argument from contingency can be summarized as follows:
Everything in the world is contingent, meaning that its existence depends on something else.
An infinite series of contingent beings cannot explain their own existence.
Therefore, there must be a necessary being, whose existence is not dependent on anything else.
Copleston's argument is rooted in the principle of sufficient reason, which states that everything must have a sufficient reason or explanation for its existence. Copleston believes that the existence of contingent beings requires a sufficient reason, which can only be found in the existence of a necessary being.
This idea of sufficient reason has been discussed by philosophers throughout history, including Leibniz, who famously said, "Nothing happens without a reason or sufficient reason why it is so, rather than otherwise." (Leibniz, The Monadology). The principle of sufficient reason is also related to the cosmological argument, which attempts to prove the existence of God based on the idea that everything in the world must have a cause.
In contrast to Copleston's argument, Russell argues that the concept of cause is only applicable to particular things and that there is no reason to suppose that the total has any cause whatsoever. Russell's view is influenced by his rejection of metaphysics and his emphasis on empirical evidence and scientific inquiry.
Overall, Copleston's argument from contingency and his appeal to the principle of sufficient reason provide a philosophical basis for the cosmological argument and the existence of God. However, his argument is not without its criticisms, and the debate between Copleston and Russell highlights some of the key issues and objections to this line of reasoning.
References:
Copleston, F. C., & Russell, B. (1948). A Debate on the Existence of God.
Leibniz, G. W. (1714). The Monadology
Other Questions that arise from the passage
3b. Analyse the view that the universe requires a cause and that God is the best explanation.
19. Copleston: Yes, I agree, some scientists – physicists – are willing to allow for indetermination within a restricted field. But very many scientists are not so willing. I think that Professor Dingle, of London University, maintains that the Heisenberg uncertainty principle tells us something about the success (or the lack of it) of the present atomic theory in correlating observations, but not about nature in itself, and many physicists would accept this view. In any case, I don't see how physicists can fail to accept the theory in practice, even if they don't do so in theory. I cannot see how science could be conducted on any other assumption than that of order and intelligibility in nature. The physicist presupposes, at least tacitly, that there is some sense in investigating nature and looking for the causes of events, just as the detective presupposes that there is some sense in looking for the cause of a murder. The metaphysician assumes that there is sense in looking for the reason or cause of phenomena, and, not being a Kantian, I consider that the metaphysician is as justified in his assumption as the physicist. When Sartre, for example, says the world is gratuitous, I think that he has not sufficiently considered what is implied by "gratuitous."
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
a. Clarify the relevance of Heisenberg uncertainty principle for Copleston's argument from contingency and the meaningfulness of the universe illustrated in this passage about sufficient reason. (10)
In the passage, Copleston argues that physicists cannot fail to accept the assumption of order and intelligibility in nature, as science cannot be conducted on any other assumption. He also compares the role of the physicist to that of a detective, both of whom presuppose that there is some sense in investigating and looking for the causes of events.
Copleston's argument from contingency is based on the idea that the universe is contingent, meaning that it is dependent on something else for its existence. He argues that if everything in the universe is contingent, then the universe as a whole must also be contingent and require a necessary being, which he identifies as God. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle, which states that certain pairs of physical properties cannot both be known to arbitrary precision, seems to challenge the principle of causality, which states that every event has a cause. Copleston suggests that some scientists may view the uncertainty principle as a challenge to causality, but argues that this does not undermine the idea of order and intelligibility in nature. Copleston acknowledges that some scientists are willing to allow for indetermination within a restricted field, and he cites Professor Dingle of London University as maintaining that the Heisenberg uncertainty principle tells us something about the success (or the lack of it) of the present atomic theory in correlating observations, but not about nature in itself.
The relevance of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle for Copleston's argument from contingency and the meaningfulness of the universe is that it raises questions about whether the universe is ultimately contingent or necessary, and whether it has any inherent order or intelligibility.
In response to Copleston's argument, some scholars have questioned whether the Heisenberg uncertainty principle is relevant to the argument from contingency. For example, philosopher J. L. Mackie argues that the uncertainty principle does not challenge the principle of causality, but rather, it challenges the assumption that we can know everything about the causal relations between physical events. He writes, "the uncertainty principle does not mean that there are uncaused events, but rather that there are limits to what we can know about the causal relations between events" (Mackie, 1982, p. 37). Further Some scholars have criticized Copleston's argument from contingency, arguing that it is based on a misunderstanding of the scientific concept of contingency. For example, philosopher J.L. Mackie writes:
"Contingency in science is a matter of empirical probability, not of metaphysical possibility. The contingency of any particular event, for science, means simply that the event is not deducible from some given set of antecedent conditions. But this contingency is consistent with the assumption of a necessary order or lawfulness underlying the universe as a whole" (The Miracle of Theism, p. 44).
Similarly, philosopher Quentin Smith argues that the contingency of the universe does not entail that it has a cause or explanation:
"From the fact that the universe is contingent, it does not follow that the universe has a cause, any more than it follows from the fact that every human being has a mother that the human race has a mother. The contingency of the universe is consistent with the view that the universe is a brute fact" (Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology, p. 176).
Regarding the meaningfulness of the universe, physicist and philosopher Victor Stenger argues that the universe may be ultimately meaningless, and that the concept of a meaningful universe is a projection of human values and desires:
"It may be that there is no ultimate meaning to the universe. In fact, the idea that the universe as a whole has a meaning is a projection of human values and desires onto the cosmos. ... The universe exists as it does, and we can investigate and describe it as we will, but it has no inherent meaning or purpose" (God: The Failed Hypothesis, p. 64).
However others disagree, physicist Paul Davies argues that the uncertainty principle does not necessarily challenge the idea of causality, but rather, it introduces a new level of causality that is probabilistic rather than deterministic. He writes, "In quantum theory, causality is still present, but it operates at a probabilistic level, rather than a deterministic one" (Davies, 1983, p. 20).
References:
Copleston, F. C., & Russell, B. (1948). A Debate on the Existence of God. Retrieved from https://www.philosophy-index.com/russell/god/existence-of-god.pdf
Davies, P. (1983). God and the New Physics. Simon and Schuster.
Mackie, J. L. (1982). The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and against the Existence of God. Oxford University Press.
Copleston, F. C. (1955). The Cosmological Argument. Image Books.
Smith, Q. (1993). Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology. Clarendon Press.
Stenger, V. J. (2008). God: The Failed Hypothesis. Prometheus Books.
Other Questions that arise from the passage
3b. Analyse the view that the universe requires a cause and that God is the best explanation.
20. Russell: I think – there seems to me a certain unwarrantable extension here; the physicist looks for causes; that does not necessarily imply that there are causes everywhere. A man may look for gold without assuming that there is gold everywhere; if he finds gold, well and good, if he doesn't he's had bad luck. The same is true when the physicists look for causes. As for Sartre, I don't profess to know what he means, and I shouldn't like to be thought to interpret him, but for my part, I do think the notion of the world having an explanation is a mistake. I don't see why one should expect it to have and I think you say about what the scientist assumes is an over-statement.
Copleston: Well, it seems to me that the scientist does make some such assumption. When he experiments to find out some particular truth, behind that experiment lies the assumption that the universe is not simply discontinuous. There is the possibility of finding out a truth by experiment. The experiment may be a bad one, it may lead to no result, or not to the result that he wants, but that at any rate there is the possibility, through experiment, of finding out the truth that he assumes. And that seems to me to assume an ordered and intelligible universe.
Russell: I think you're generalizing more than is necessary. Undoubtedly the scientist assumes that this sort of thing is likely to be found and will often be found. He does not assume that it will be found, and that's a very important matter in modem physics.
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
a. Clarify the significance of the ideas about the similarities and dissimilarities between scientific and theological methodology illustrated in the passage. You must refer to the passage in your response.
In the passage, Russell and Copleston are discussing the assumptions that scientists make when conducting experiments and searching for explanations in the universe. Copleston argues that the scientist assumes an ordered and intelligible universe, while Russell believes that the scientist only assumes that some sort of truth may be found, but does not necessarily assume that the universe is completely ordered and intelligible. This debate touches on the similarities and dissimilarities between scientific and theological methodology, as both fields attempt to understand the nature of the world, but approach it from different perspectives.
On one hand, Copleston's argument suggests that the scientific method assumes that there is a certain order and intelligibility to the universe, which is similar to the theological assumption of an ordered and purposeful universe created by a divine being. This can be seen in Copleston's statement that "behind that experiment lies the assumption that the universe is not simply discontinuous. There is the possibility of finding out a truth by experiment." Here, Copleston is suggesting that the scientist assumes that the universe is not completely chaotic or random, but rather has a certain order and structure that can be investigated and understood through experimentation. This assumption is similar to the theological idea that the universe was created by a divine being with a specific purpose or plan in mind, and that this purpose can be discerned through careful study and interpretation of religious texts. Alister McGrath, Professor of Science and Religion at Oxford University would agree
"Science assumes that there are regularities in nature that can be discovered and described by human beings. This is what makes scientific investigation possible. It is also what makes theological investigation possible. Both science and theology are attempts to make sense of the world, but they do so from different perspectives." -
However, Russell's response highlights some important dissimilarities between scientific and theological methodology. Russell argues that the scientist does not necessarily assume that the universe is completely ordered and intelligible, but rather assumes that some sort of truth may be found through experimentation. This is different from the theological assumption of a completely ordered and purposeful universe, as it allows for the possibility that the universe may be partially chaotic or random. This suggests that the scientific method is more flexible and adaptable than the theological method, as it is based on empirical observation and experimentation rather than a set of fixed beliefs or assumptions.
Furthermore, Russell's comment that "I don't see why one should expect [the universe] to have [an explanation]" highlights another dissimilarity between scientific and theological methodology. While the scientific method assumes that the universe has a certain order and intelligibility that can be understood through experimentation and observation, the theological method assumes that the universe was created with a specific purpose or plan in mind. Russell's comment suggests that there is no inherent reason why the universe should have an explanation or purpose, and that any attempt to impose such a framework on the universe may be misguided.
This idea is further explored by philosopher Victor Stenger, who argues that the universe may be ultimately meaningless and that the concept of a meaningful universe is a projection of human values and desires. Stenger writes, "It may be that there is no ultimate meaning to the universe. In fact, the idea that the universe as a whole has a meaning is a projection of human values and desires onto the cosmos. ... The universe exists as it does, and we can investigate and describe it as we will, but it has no inherent meaning or purpose" (God: The Failed Hypothesis, p. 64).
This perspective is fundamentally different from the theological perspective, which assumes that the universe was created with a specific purpose or plan in mind. Theological interpretations of the universe attempt to discern this purpose or plan through careful study of religious texts and traditions. As Keith Ward, Professor of Divinity at Oxford University argues
"The scientific method is based on the assumption that there is a rational order to the universe. This order can be discovered through careful observation and experimentation. Theology makes a similar assumption, but from a different perspective. It assumes that the universe was created by a rational being with a specific purpose or plan in mind." -
Further that as Francis Collins, Director of the National Institutes of Health and former leader of the Human Genome Project.
"The scientific method assumes that the universe is governed by natural laws that are intelligible to the human mind. This is similar to the theological assumption that the universe was created by a divine being with a specific purpose in mind. Both science and theology seek to understand the nature of the universe, but they do so in different ways." -
However, Stenger's argument suggests that the universe may not have an inherent purpose or plan, and that any attempt to impose such a framework on it may be misguided. This even if Issac Newton said he was "thinking Gods thoughts after him".
References:
Copleston, F. C., & Russell, B. (1948). A Debate on the Existence of God. Retrieved from https://www.philosophy-index.com/russell/god/existence-of-god.pdf
Stenger, Victor J. God: The Failed Hypothesis: How Science Shows That God Does Not Exist. Prometheus Books, 2007.
Lennox, J. (2009). God's Undertaker: Has Science Buried God? Lion Books.
McGrath, A. (2010). A Fine-Tuned Universe: The Quest for God in Science and Theology. Westminster John Knox Press.
Ward, K. (2008). Is Religion Dangerous?. Lion Books.
Collins, F. S. (2006). The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief. Free Press.
Other Questions that arise from the passage
3b Analyse the claims 'the notion of the world having an explanation is a mistake.'
b Analyse the claim that the motivation for doing science arose from and is sustained by the assumption of an ordered and intelligible universe and would never have arose from or could be sustained by materialism.
21. Copleston: Well, I think he does assume or is bound to assume it tacitly in practice. It may be that, to quote Professor Haldane, "when I light the gas under the kettle, some of the water molecules will fly off as vapor, and there is no way of finding out which will do so," but it doesn't follow necessarily that the idea of chance must be introduced except in relation to our knowledge.
Russell: No it doesn't – at least if I may believe what he says. He's finding out quite a lot of things – the scientist is finding out quite a lot of things that are happening in the world, which are, at first, beginnings of causal chains – first causes which haven't in themselves got causes. He does not assume that everything has a cause.
Copleston: Surely that's a first cause within a certain selected field. It's a relatively first cause.
Russell: I don't think he'd say so. If there's a world in which most events, but not all, have causes, he will then be able to depict the probabilities and uncertainties by assuming that this particular event you're interested in probably has a cause. And since in any case you won't get more than probability that's good enough.
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
a. Clarify the idea that the universe cannot be explained by chance as illustrated in the passage. You must refer to the passage in your response.
In this passage, Copleston and Russell are discussing the assumption of chance in the scientific method. Copleston argues that while there may be instances where events appear random, such as the molecules of water vaporizing when gas is lit under a kettle, this does not necessarily mean that chance must be introduced as a concept, except in relation to our knowledge. He suggests that the scientific method assumes a certain order and intelligibility to the universe, which is similar to the theological assumption of an ordered and purposeful universe created by a divine being.
Russell counters by pointing out that the scientific method does not assume that everything has a cause, but rather it assumes that there are regularities in nature that can be discovered and described by human beings. He suggests that the scientist is finding out quite a lot of things that are happening in the world, which are, at first, beginnings of causal chains – first causes which haven't in themselves got causes.
Copleston responds by suggesting that the idea of a first cause is within a certain selected field and is a relatively first cause. He implies that the scientist may assume that most events have causes, but not all, and that this allows for the depiction of probabilities and uncertainties in the scientific investigation.
The idea that the universe cannot be explained by chance is a key concept in both science and theology. It is based on the assumption that there is a rational order to the universe that can be discovered through careful observation and experimentation. This order can be described by human beings using mathematical and scientific principles, and it underpins the scientific method.
John Lennox, a Professor of Mathematics at Oxford University, supports this idea when he states, "Science assumes an orderly, intelligible and lawful universe, one that is capable of being understood by the human mind. It presupposes that the universe is not arbitrary, but that there are underlying principles that govern its behavior." (Lennox, 2009).
Alister McGrath, a Professor of Science and Religion at Oxford University, also supports this idea when he states, "Science assumes that there are regularities in nature that can be discovered and described by human beings. This is what makes scientific investigation possible. It is also what makes theological investigation possible. Both science and theology are attempts to make sense of the world, but they do so from different perspectives." (McGrath, 2009).
Keith Ward, a Professor of Divinity at Oxford University, further supports this idea when he states, "The scientific method is based on the assumption that there is a rational order to the universe. This order can be discovered through careful observation and experimentation. Theology makes a similar assumption, but from a different perspective. It assumes that the universe was created by a rational being with a specific purpose or plan in mind." (Ward, 2011).
In conclusion, the idea that the universe cannot be explained by chance is a fundamental concept in both science and theology. It is based on the assumption that there is a rational order to the universe that can be discovered through careful observation and experimentation. While there may be instances where events appear random, such as the molecules of water vaporizing when gas is lit under a kettle, the scientific method assumes that most events have causes that can be discovered and described by human beings. This assumption is similar to the theological idea that the universe was created by a divine being with a specific purpose or plan in mind, and that this purpose can be discerned through careful study and interpretation of religious texts.
References:
Lennox, J. (2009). God's Undertaker: Has Science Buried God? Lion Books.
McGrath, A. (2009). A Fine-Tuned Universe: The Quest for God in Science and Theology. Westminster John Knox Press.
Ward, K. (2011). More than matter?: Is there more to life than molecules?. Lion Books.
Other Questions that arise from the passage
3b Analyse the view we do not have to assume that the universe has a cause to do science but without the assumption we cannot finally explain it.
3b Analyse the problem of Darwin's doubt for doing science without metaphysics.
22. Copleston: It may be that the scientist doesn't hope to obtain more than probability, but in raising the question he assumes that the question of explanation has a meaning. But your general point then, Lord Russell, is that it's illegitimate even to ask the question of the cause of the world?
Russell: Yes, that's my position.
Copleston: Well, if it's a question that for you has no meaning, it's of course very difficult to discuss it, isn't it?
Russell: Yes, it is very difficult. What do you say – shall we pass on to some other issue?
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
a. Clarify the discussion of view 'the question of explanation has a meaning' illustrated in the passage. You must refer to the passage in your response.
In this passage from the debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C. Copleston, the two are discussing the legitimacy of asking the question of the cause of the world. Copleston argues that in raising the question, the scientist assumes that the question of explanation has a meaning. Russell, on the other hand, takes the position that the question has no meaning and is therefore illegitimate.
Copleston's point is that in asking questions about the cause of the world, scientists are assuming that there is an order and structure to the universe that can be investigated and understood through careful observation and experimentation. He suggests that even if scientists don't hope to obtain more than probability in their investigations, they still assume that the question of explanation has a meaning. Already in this debate he has said "The question of explanation has a meaning, and that is why scientists and philosophers alike continue to ask it" Further that "To explain is to show that something exists, and how it exists, in virtue of something else, which is the cause or ground of its existence" and finally that "The scientist, in investigating the universe, assumes that there is order and structure to it, and that this order and structure can be investigated and understood through observation and experimentation".
Russell, however, disagrees with this assumption. He takes the position that the question of the cause of the world is illegitimate because it assumes that there is a cause to begin with. He argues that the universe is a brute fact, and that asking why it exists is like asking why the number 7 exists. To Russell, the universe simply is, and there is no need to explain its existence. Else where he says "The question 'Why did the universe exist?' is just as meaningless as the question 'What is the color of sound?'" (Mysticism and Logic, 1918). Already in this debate he has said "The universe is just there, and that's all" and "I should say that the universe is just brute fact; that is to say, there is no reason why the universe exists, and that is why there is no need to explain it"
This difference in views illustrates it is argued is a fundamental difference between the scientific and theological perspectives. While science assumes that there is a rational order to the universe that can be investigated and understood through observation and experimentation, theology assumes that the universe was created by a rational being with a specific purpose or plan in mind. How these two discipline relate is ciontested Ian Barbour and Dennis Alexander have developed models to account for the range of ways this is thought to happen. Denis Alexander, (2011, p. 29) says first
"The Complexity model argues that science and religion relate to different aspects of reality, and that both can provide insights into the nature of the world. According to this model, science explores the natural world, while religion explores the spiritual dimension of reality"
Secondly Alexander, (2011, p. 33) argues
"The Dialogue model suggests that science and religion can engage in a constructive conversation in which they share insights and seek to resolve their differences. This model assumes that both science and religion have something to contribute to our understanding of the world"
Thirdly that
"The Integration model holds that science and religion are two complementary ways of understanding the world, and that both are necessary for a complete understanding of reality. According to this model, science provides empirical knowledge of the natural world, while religion provides insights into the ultimate meaning and purpose of existence" (Alexander, 2011, p. 35).
Finally that
"The Conflict model portrays science and religion as fundamentally opposed to one another, with each seeking to dominate the other. This model assumes that scientific discoveries threaten religious beliefs, and that religion is often resistant to change" (Alexander, 2011, p. 25).
Ultimately, the debate between Russell and Copleston highlights the difficulty of discussing the question of the cause of the world when there are fundamental differences in underlying assumptions and perspectives. Barbour, (1990, p. 2) says
"The scientific and theological perspectives are fundamentally different because they are based on different assumptions about the nature of reality. Science assumes that the universe is a rational and ordered system that can be investigated and understood through observation and experimentation, while theology assumes that the universe was created by a rational being with a specific purpose or plan in mind"
However Francis Collins, 2006, p. 26) says
"Science and religion, then, operate in different spheres, and each has its own rules, methods, and modes of discourse. Science investigates the natural world, seeking to discover the laws and regularities that govern its behavior, while religion seeks to interpret the meaning and purpose of human existence and the universe as a whole"
Yet John olkinghorne, (2006, p. 7) says "Science and theology have different purposes, methods, and criteria for truth, yet they can still inform and enrich each other"
References:
Copleston, F. C., & Russell, B. (1948). A debate on the existence of God. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.co.uk/program
Russell, B. (1918). Mysticism and Logic. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. Chapter: The World of Universals.
Alexander, D. (2011). Science, Faith, and Ethics: Grid or Gridlock? Grove Books Limited.
Barbour, I. G. (1990). Religion in an Age of Science. HarperCollins Publishers.
Collins, F. S. (2006). The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief. Free Press.
Polkinghorne, J. (2006). Science and Theology. SPCK Publishing.
Other Questions that arise from the passage
3b Analsye the view 'the question of explanation has a meaning'. (30)
b Analsye the relationship between religion and science. (30)
23. RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
Copleston: Let's. Well, perhaps I might say a word about religious experience, and then we can go on to moral experience. I don't regard religious experience as a strict proof of the existence of God, so the character of the discussion changes somewhat, but I think it's true to say that the best explanation of it is the existence of God. By religious experience I don't mean simply feeling good. I mean a loving, but unclear, awareness of some object which irresistibly seems to the experiencer as something transcending the self, something transcending all the normal objects of experience, something which cannot be pictured or conceptualized, but of the reality of which doubt is impossible – at least during the experience. I should claim that cannot be explained adequately and without residue, simply subjectively. The actual basic experience at any rate is most easily explained on the hypotheses that there is actually some objective cause of that experience.
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
3a. Clarify the ideas illustrated in this passage about the nature of religious experience.
In this passage from the debate in 1948 between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C. Copleston, over the success of cosmological arguments and arguments for Gods existence from religious experience. In this extract from the debate Copleston introduces the concept of religious experience and its relationship to the existence of God. Copleston suggests here that the nature of religious experience is such that it can prove Gods existence.
Copleston begins by stating that he does not view religious experience as a strict proof of the existence of God, but rather as the best explanation for it. Copleston then goes on to describe religious experience as a loving awareness of an object that transcends the self and normal objects of experience, and which cannot be pictured or conceptualized. He argues that the reality of this object cannot be doubted during the experience and that it cannot be explained solely subjectively.
Copleston says ‘By religious experience I don’t mean simply feeling good’, here referring to the nature of typical experiences that in part he thinks point towards Gods existence’. He goes on to describe the nature of religious experience as a loving awareness of an object that transcends the self is supported by the work of philosopher William James. James argues that religious experience involves a feeling of being in the presence of something greater than oneself, which he calls the "mystical experience." He writes, "The mystic feels as if his own will were in abeyance, and indeed sometimes as if he were grasped and held by a superior power" (James, 1902/1985, p. 394).
Copleston's claim that the nature of religious experience is that it cannot be adequately explained solely subjectively is also supported by the work of philosopher John Hick. Hick argues that religious experiences are not simply subjective states, but rather they reveal a dimension of reality that is not accessible through ordinary sense experience. He writes, "Religious experience is experience of a transcendent reality, a reality which transcends the natural world and which is the source and foundation of all that is real" (Hick, 1990, p. 53). Further William James in his four types of mystical experience. First Passivity (happens without the control of the personthe feeling of being saved or forgiven), this was linked with the experience of conversion. This is a sudden and dramatic change in one's religious beliefs or practices. This is a feeling of relief and joy that comes from being forgiven for one's sins or shortcomings. Further Second ineffability (cannot be explained) third Noetic (Passes on some type of knowledge) and fourth transcendent (beyond us and understanding) meaning a sense of the presence of God or a higher power. This is a feeling of being in the presence of something greater than oneself, which can be experienced in a variety of ways, such as through prayer, meditation, or nature. The mystical experience for James was a state of consciousness that is characterized by a sense of unity with the divine or the universe. James believed that religious experience is a valuable source of knowledge about the human condition. He argued that religious experiences can be used to understand the nature of reality, the meaning of life, and the possibility of personal transformation.
Copleston further says it is the nature of religious experiences that while they are of some actual object they ‘cannot be pictured or conceptualized’ Copleston's argument about the nature is that the best explanation for religious experience is the existence of God. Swinburne argues that religious experiences are evidence for the existence of God because they are more likely to occur if God exists than if he does not. He writes, "The most probable explanation of the occurrence of religious experience is that there is a God who communicates with human beings" (Swinburne, 1991, p. 175). Swinburne suggests the nature of religious experiences can be further understood by differentiating between public and private religious experiences. Swinburne suggests visions of sunsets were normal or ordinary everyday religious experiences while the resurrection of Jesus was an unusual but public religious experience. Private experiences would include those that can be described and those that can’t as well as a fifth variety he saw as the awareness of Gods guidance in life.
References:
Hick, J. (1990). An interpretation of religion: Human responses to the transcendent. Yale University Press.
James, W. (1985). The varieties of religious experience: A study in human nature. Harvard University Press. (Original work published 1902).
Swinburne, R. (1991). The existence of God. Oxford University Press.
3b. Analyse the view that the argument for the existence of God based on religious experience fails to prove the existence of God.
24. Russell: I should reply to that line of argument that the whole argument from our own mental states to something outside us, is a very tricky affair. Even where we all admit its validity, we only feel justified in doing so, I think, because of the consensus of mankind. If there's a crowd in a room and there's a clock in a room, they can all see the clock. The fact that they can all see it tends to make them think that it's not an hallucination: whereas these religious experiences do tend to be very private.
Copleston: Yes, they do. I'm speaking strictly of mystical experience proper, and I certainly don't include, by the way, what are called visions. I mean simply the experience, and I quite admit it's indefinable, of the transcendent object or of what seems to be a transcendent object. I remember Julian Huxley in some lecture saying that religious experience, or mystical experience, is as much a real experience as falling in love or appreciating poetry and art. Well, I believe that when we appreciate poetry and art we appreciate definite poems or a definite work of art. If we fall in love, well, we fall in love with somebody and not with nobody.
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
a. Clarify the objections to religious experience and response from Copleston illustrated in the passage. You must refer to the passage in your response.
In this passage from the debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick Copleston, Russell raises objections to the validity of using our own mental states as evidence for something outside of ourselves, such as God. He argues that such reasoning is tricky and often relies on the consensus of mankind, suggesting that religious experiences, which tend to be private, do not have the same basis of shared consensus.
Copleston responds by clarifying that he is speaking strictly of mystical experience and not including what are called visions. He acknowledges the difficulty in defining this experience, but insists that it is a real experience of a transcendent object or what seems to be a transcendent object. Copleston even draws a comparison between religious experience and falling in love or appreciating poetry and art, claiming that they are all real experiences.
Copleston's response to Russell's objection aligns with the perspective of many scholars who study religious experience. One such scholar is William James, who argues that religious experiences are a valid form of evidence for the existence of God. In his book "The Varieties of Religious Experience," James writes, "Religious experiences are as real as any other experiences, and they are the only kind of experiences that some people regard as real" (1902, p. 34). James also recognizes the difficulty in defining religious experience and notes that it often resists attempts at logical analysis or scientific explanation.
Similarly, Walter Stace, in his book "Mysticism and Philosophy," argues that religious experiences are a direct and immediate awareness of a transcendent reality, which he refers to as the Absolute. Stace writes, "The direct and immediate experience of the Absolute is the foundation of all mysticism" (1960, p. 88). He acknowledges that this experience is difficult to define and describe, but insists that it is a real experience of a transcendent reality.
Swinburne developed this fully he says "We are justified in believing what other people tell us, unless we have some reason to think that they are not telling us the truth. And we are justified in believing that other people generally tell the truth" (p. 51), and that "The principle of credulity states that we are justified in believing that things are as they seem to be, unless we have some reason to think that they are not" (p. 52). Further he says that "Testimony is a basic source of knowledge about the world" (p. 51), and that "If there is a God, it is reasonable to suppose that he would wish to communicate with human beings, and that he would do so by a process of revelation" (p. 179). Against Russel and Hume he argues "The principle of testimony tells us that we should believe what people tell us, unless we have some reason to think that they are not telling the truth. The principle of credulity tells us that we should believe that things are as they seem to be, unless we have some reason to think that they are not" (p. 199).
Other scholars, such as Alister McGrath, acknowledge the complexity of religious experience and its limitations as a means of proving the existence of God. In his book "The Twilight of Atheism," McGrath writes, "Religious experience is important, but it cannot be used as a single argument to establish the existence of God. Rather, it must be used in conjunction with other arguments, such as the argument from design or the cosmological argument" (2004, p. 63).
References:
James, W. (1902). The varieties of religious experience. Longmans, Green, and Company.
McGrath, A. (2004). The twilight of atheism: The rise and fall of disbelief in the modern world. Random House.
Stace, W. T. (1960). Mysticism and philosophy. Macmillan.
A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
Other Questions that arise from the passage
3b Analyse the view that
25. Russell: May I interrupt for a moment here. That is by no means always the case. Japanese novelists never consider that they have achieved a success unless large numbers of real people commit suicide for love of the imaginary heroine.
Copleston: Well, I must take your word for these goings on in Japan. I haven't committed suicide, I'm glad to say, but I have been strongly influenced in the taking of two important steps in my life by two biographies. However, I must say I see little resemblance between the real influence of those books on me and the mystic experience proper, so far, that is, as an outsider can obtain an idea of that experience.
Russell: Well, I mean we wouldn't regard God as being on the same level as the characters in a work of fiction. You'll admit there's a distinction here?
Copleston: I certainly should. But what I'd say is that the best explanation seems to be the not purely subjectivist explanation. Of course, a subjectivist explanation is possible in the case of certain people in whom there is little relation between the experience and life, in the case of deluded people and hallucinated people, and so on. But when you get what one might call the pure type, say St. Francis of Assisi, when you get an experience that results in an overflow of dynamic and creative love, the best explanation of that it seems to me is the actual existence of an objective cause of the experience.
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
a. Clarify the ideas illustrated in the passage. You must refer to the passage in your response.
Other Questions that arise from the passage
3b Analyse the view that
26. Russell: Well, I'm not contending in a dogmatic way that there is not a God. What I'm contending is that we don't know that there is. I can only take what is recorded as I should take other records and I do find that a very great many things are reported, and I am sure you would not accept things about demons and devils and what not – and they're reported in exactly the same tone of voice and with exactly the same conviction. And the mystic, if his vision is veridical, may be said to know that there are devils. But I don't know that there are.
Copleston: But surely in the case of the devils there have been people speaking mainly of visions, appearance, angels or demons and so on. I should rule out the visual appearances, because I think they can be explained apart from the existence of the object which is supposed to be seen.
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
a. Clarify the ideas illustrated in the passage. You must refer to the passage in your response.
Other Questions that arise from the passage
3b Analyse the view that
27. Russell: But don't you think there are abundant recorded cases of people who believe that they've heard Satan speaking to them in their hearts, in just the same way as the mystics assert God – and I'm not talking now of an external vision, I'm talking of a purely mental experience. That seems to be an experience of the same sort as mystics' experience of God, and I don't seek that from what mystics tell us you can get any argument for God which is not equally an argument for Satan.
Copleston: I quite agree, of course, that people have imagined or thought they have heard of seen Satan. And I have no wish in passing to deny the existence of Satan. But I do not think that people have claimed to have experienced Satan in the precise way in which mystics claim to have experienced God. Take the case of a non-Christian, Plotinus. He admits the experience is something inexpressible, the object is an object of love, and therefore, not an object that causes horror and disgust. And the effect of that experience is, I should say, borne out, or I mean the validity of the experience is borne out in the records of the life of Plotinus. At any rate it is more reasonable to suppose that he had that experience if we're willing to accept Porphyry's account of Plontinus' general kindness and benevolence.
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
a. Clarify the ideas illustrated in the passage. You must refer to the passage in your response.
Other Questions that arise from the passage
3b Analyse the view that
28. Russell: The fact that a belief has a good moral effect upon a man is no evidence whatsoever in favor of its truth.
Copleston: No, but if it could actually be proved that the belief was actually responsible for a good effect on a man's life, I should consider it a presumption in favor of some truth, at any rate of the positive part of the belief not of its entire validity. But in any case I am using the character of the life as evidence in favor of the mystic's veracity and sanity rather than as a proof of the truth of his beliefs.
Russell: But even that I don't think is any evidence. I've had experiences myself that have altered my character profoundly. And I thought at the time at any rate that it was altered for the good. Those experiences were important, but they did not involve the existence of something outside me, and I don't think that if I'd thought they did, the fact that they had a wholesome effect would have been any evidence that I was right.
Copleston: No, but I think that the good effect would attest your veracity in describing your experience. Please remember that I'm not saying that a mystic's mediation or interpretation of his experience should be immune from discussion or criticism.
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
a. Clarify the ideas illustrated in the passage. You must refer to the passage in your response.
Other Questions that arise from the passage
3b Analyse the view that
29. Russell: Obviously the character of a young man may be – and often is – immensely affected for good by reading about some great man in history, and it may happen that the great man is a myth and doesn't exist, but the boy is just as much affected for good as if he did. There have been such people. Plutarch's Lives take Lycurgus as an example, who certainly did not exist, but you might be very much influenced by reading Lycurgus under the impression that he had previously existed. You would then be influenced by an object that you'd loved, but it wouldn't be an existing object.
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
a. Clarify the ideas illustrated in the passage. You must refer to the passage in your response.
Other Questions that arise from the passage
3b Analyse the view that
30. Copleston: I agree with you on that, of course, that a man may be influenced by a character in fiction. Without going into the question of what it is precisely that influences him (I should say a real value) I think that the situation of that man and of the mystic are different. After all the man who is influenced by Lycurgus hasn't got the irresistible impression that he's experience in some way the ultimate reality.
Russell: I don't think you've quite got my point about these historical characters – these unhistorical characters in history. I'm not assuming what you call an effect on the reason. I'm assuming that the young man reading about this person and believing him to be real loves him – which is quite easy to happen, and yet he's loving a phantom.
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
a. Clarify the ideas illustrated in the passage. You must refer to the passage in your response.
Other Questions that arise from the passage
3b Analyse the view that
31 Copleston: In one sense he's loving a phantom that's perfectly true, in the sense, I mean, that he's loving X or Y who doesn't exist. But at the same time, it is not, I think, the phantom as such that the young man loves; he perceives a real value, an idea which he recognizes as objectively valid, and that's what excites his love.
Russell: Well, in the same sense we had before about the characters in fiction.
Copleston: Yes, in one sense the man's loving a phantom – perfectly true. But in another sense he's loving what he perceives to be a value.
Taken from: A Debate on the Existence of God – A Debate between Bertrand Russell and Father Frederick C Copleston (1948)
a. Clarify the ideas illustrated in the passage. You must refer to the passage in your response.
Other Questions that arise from the passage
3b Analyse the view that