4 Evaluate the opinion that inductive arguments like the classical teleological argument will always fail to prove God exists. (30)
4 Evaluate the claim that a posteriori types of arguments for Gods existence will never be successful. (30)
4. Evaluate critically Aquinas’ Fifth Way. (30)
Aquinas’ Fifth Way represents a classic statement of the teleological argument qua purpose. Like Aquinas’ first four ways (Summa Theologica 1, Question 2, Article 3) the argument is inductive and draws the conclusion that God exists a posteriori, following observations of characteristics of the natural world and specifically that all things seem to act for an end (Greek “telos”). Also like Aquinas’ other ways, the fifth way cannot claim to prove God’s existence; as an inductive argument it is limited to concluding that God is the most probable explanation of the aspects of the universe named in the propositions. Apart from that obvious limitation, Aquinas’ argument is beset by significant problems and, as this essay will demonstrate, fails to achieve its aim of being a good argument for God’s existence.
Aquinas’ fifth way can be expressed through the following syllogism
P1: natural bodies, which lack intelligence, act for an end
P2: whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence
C: Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end (and this being we call God)
The first proposition – that natural bodies which lack intelligence act for an end – could easily be disputed. Might it not be that direction in natural bodies is more about how we see and understand them than about how they actually are? Arguably, the human brain is hard-wired to see patterns and infer causation in the natural world. Of course, without proposition one the whole argument will founder.
Even if this objection is dismissed as taking scepticism too far, proposition two – that whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end unless it be directed by some intelligent being – is problematic. Take a banana. Creationists often cite it as an example of “intelligent design” in the universe. The banana is a great size, shape, sweetness and colour for human consumption (even its skin features a reliable indicator of ripeness) it seems well designed for the end of being a tasty snack. Yet to say that ignores the fact that neither the colour, nor the shape, nor the sweetness nor the size of the banana has anything to do with a divine designer – modern bananas have been selectively bred by farmers to have these attributes from parent plants which evolved to appeal to other animals such as monkeys who would spread the seeds of the plant by consuming its fruit. While we can infer the existence of an intelligence from the brilliance of the modern banana in suiting the average human palate, to suggest that that intelligence is divine is a big step too far. Even setting aside the modern banana in favour of the original “wild banana”, the “intelligence” that designed it is more probably evolution by natural selection than any God. It seems that the second proposition “whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence” is seriously flawed and on this grounds as well could be said to fail in its aim of being a good argument for God’s existence.
Further, Aquinas proceeds to use the analogy of an arrow and an archer to illustrate his claim that all natural things act for an end and so must have been designed to do so by an intelligent being. The analogy is far from perfect and suggests a certain circularity in Aquinas’ reasoning. As Hume’s character Philo observes, the selection of an analogy for the universe is far from neutral. Scholars (including Aquinas) assume their own world-view in selecting something to compare the universe with and so by saying “the universe is like an arrow” or “the universe is like a watch” commit the fallacy of begging the question. If I compare teleology in the universe with an arrow then the suggestion of a necessary divine archer seems reasonable, yet if I compared the universe with a rock rolling down a mountain, which seems just as sensible an analogy – elements of the universe go through cycles, grow increasingly complex and make progress after all – then the inference that there must be an intelligent designer behind the process seems less obvious. Rocks can roll down mountains as a result of non-intelligent actions, whereas arrows don’t tend to hit their marks randomly. The “ends” which Aquinas claims that non-intelligent things act for could well be accounted for by natural processes such as evolution through natural selection, so it seems unnecessary to conclude that an intelligent designer, let alone the Christian God, exists.
Finally, Aquinas’ claim about direction and efficiency in the universe is a general one. There are many instances of natural things failing to fulfil their apparent end or indeed not having an apparent end. If God is the “intelligent designer” of the universe then what do the obvious inefficiencies in nature suggest about His competence, and (as Charles Darwin and John Stuart Mill both observed) what does the existence of beings whose end is to torment and destroy other beings say about His goodness? As Darwin wrote…
“I cannot persuade myself that a beneficent and omnipotent God would have designedly created the Ichneumonidae with the express intention of their feeding within the living bodies of Caterpillars, or that a cat should play with mice.”
And as the Biologist JBS Haldane wrote…
“The Creator would appear as endowed with a passion for stars, on the one hand, and for beetles on the other, for the simple reason that there are nearly 300,000 species of beetle known, and perhaps more, as compared with somewhat less than 9,000 species of birds and a little over 10,000 species of mammals. Beetles are actually more numerous than the species of any other insect order. That kind of thing is characteristic of nature.” (“What is life?”)
As Hume’s character Philo concluded, the problems attendant on suggesting that God is the necessary designer of this universe, with all of its quirks and inefficiencies, are many. Further, why one God? Why not an apprentice God, a senile God… or one working as part of a committee? The final step in Aquinas’ argument, that of saying “this being we call God” is a giant leap and probably a leap too far.
In conclusion it seems that quite apart from the limitation of being an inductive argument, Aquinas’ fifth way fails to achieve its aim of being a good argument for God’s existence. Aquinas’ first proposition can be questioned, his second seems to have no foundation in a post Darwin world, his analogy of the arrow and the archer is imperfect and so his conclusion that an intelligent designer-God must exist cannot be upheld. Nevertheless and despite its failure Aquinas’ argument retains value as an extremely clear statement of the teleological argument qua purpose, an argument which remains the most persuasive and which is probably the most widely cited reason for belief in God. Although the propositions fail to stand up to scientific scrutiny they seem reasonable, even undeniable to many people on an intuitive level. On this basis modern scholars such as Alister McGrath and Richard Swinburne appeal to probability asking “which is more probable; that the apparent order and purpose nature is explained by chance and natural selection or that there is an intelligence shaping the process?” They have more success in this limited endeavour than Aquinas had in seeking to advance a good inductive argument for God’s existence.
4. Evaluate the meaning and significance of Aquinas 5th way with reference to types of order and regularity. (30)
4 Evaluate the relative importance of types of order and regularity in the Teleological argument . (30)
4 Evaluate the opinion 'The teleological argument successfully proves that God exists.' (30)
The teleological arguments are and a posteriori approach to prove the existence of God. Aquinas and Paley have put forward the most famous approaches and arguments from saying there must be a designer who designed the world and everything must be designed by the designer God. This approach is very convincing fourthly a spot many have criticised that this is not convincing and has suggested different approaches for example, the cosmological argument and ontological saying that the existence of God should be proved through reason
Aquinas advocated that nature seems to have a purpose and order in it. Everything has a purpose and it comes from the will of God. Things that are inanimate do not have purpose itself; they are directed to their goal by God, they cannot move in order without the aid of the “guiding hand” (for example the archer shooting and arrow). The regularity of the sun and moon coming out in going in the same time each day suggest the purpose and orderliness behind it. Therefore things that are moving even when they have no intelligence in it because somebody has caused it and the first on caused causer is God. However, Anthony flew has pointed out that there is no clear evidence to prove and show things are directed towards some purpose. The things occur and motion in the world could be through natural selection or evolution. As Charles Darwin has suggested that, evolution theory does not suit the idea of reason/purpose behind things, evolution suggests we, and all species, all evolved rather randomly. In natural selection, the best suited to the environment will survive but those who do not will die, survival is a pure chance and is according to external influences. If the world is designed, natural selection would become a wasteful process.
Yet F.R.Tenant has suggested an anthropic principle, saying that the world is exactly right in creating a precise environment for man to survive, if anything changed for example if the sun had moved a little further away, no life would be possible to survive. He adds on saying that creation includes everything in the universe, not just things we can see or touch but also concepts. How do we argue concepts came into existence without a designer creating it? He points out the aesthetic form of our concepts on beauty music love suggesting that the designer was also concerned and interested in personal aspects in the world. With such complexity, it seems implausible saying that it is just result. Nevertheless people may argue that they may not feel uncomfortable with the world being the result of random chance but the unpalatable does not mean it is an error, it just means that it is an uncomfortable fact.
The other famous approach was put forward by Paley. He famously uses the analogy of the watch to demonstrate that if we came across a watch one day somewhere, even if we don’t know what it is, why it is there and its purpose, from all the marks of contrivance and design we know it must be designed by a designer. His attacker, Hume, has criticised him at Paley’s analogy is weak, he should not compere watch the objects that occur in nature, the evidence in nature is not so obvious. He adds that comparing machines with nature – that with very less similarity, thinkers like Paley already determined the result he wants. Also, Hume says the argument start from the universe which is familiar to us but reaches the conclusion outside our experience of God and this seems nonsense. Besides, why do we assume the person who designed the world must be God, or even the perfect omnipotence Christian God? Similarly, cant argued that a cause/designer of something of our sense experience God is outside time and space. It seems that we have already assumed God already exists and we are just finding evidence to support our conclusion rather than proving God’s existence Paley responded using an example of an eye complexity within a natural object like the ITV shows crafts and skills on the smallest scale will stop
Richard Dawkins has given an example of the digger wasp, which lays eggs to a Caterpillar to feed themselves off; how can an omni-benevolent God create a world full of cruelty in nature. J.S.mill also put the idea of natural evil for example earthquakes and droughts, all else indicated a morally flawed designer, if he is perfect why should the designer want us to suffer. Our concept of God is perfect and omnipotence but the existence of evil seems to undermine our understanding of God and its accuracy.
Swinburn has commented on Hume’s argument that if there are so many marks of design that point to so many designers could that be different gods who are experts of different areas and create the universe together? Swinburn uses Ockham’s Razor to support his view that the idea of a single God is simpler than many gods. When two competing theories put together the one that has the less hypothesis is more likely to be true.
Yet somehow put forward the cosmological argument which thinks the universe exists because of cause. Leibnitz uses the principle of sufficient reason to suggest that everything that exists must have an x-ray nation for it. Whether or not something is moving, or is true, there must be a reason for it, could be known or unknown. The reason must be external and self-explanatory, therefore it is God. However, Russell has argued that just because every individual has a mother does not mean all mankind has a mother. This is a logical fallacy, things can be just there and require no explanation. Hume also made similar comments saying that we are taking an inductively, imagination makes connections between cause and effect, we think we know more about the world that we actually do. This is dangerous because we may be confusing ourselves from concepts to making us feel it is a reality.
The teleological arguments are useful and convincing in giving the reasons why they are so complicated and who has walked things into existence but the fact that we can’t find purpose in everything seems to dismiss the argument. Although it does not convince everyone, especially the atheist, the fact that somebody has designed it seems to give an answer as to why things are there the teleological argument is only seem to the extent of why things exist instead of proving the existence of God.
4 Evaluate the opinion the strengths and weakness of the claim that analogical language is not useful in proving God exists. (30)
4 Evaluate the view that the analogical language in design arguments for Gods existence has been effective. (30)
4 Evaluate the significance of the anthropic principle as a form of the teleological argument. . (30)
4 Evaluate the opinion that the implications of the success of the teleological argument are not significant to any great extent. (30)
4. Evaluate the meaning and significance of Swinburne's regularities of co-presence and regularities of succession in showing God exists in design arguments. (30)
4 Evaluate the claim that evolution and deism are successful alternative interpretations of design . (30)
4 Evaluate to what extent does Hume successfully argue that observation does not prove the existence of God. (30)
David Hume criticized all the classical arguments for God’s existence through his book “Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion“, which was published after his death in 1776. The Dialogues take place between four characters, with the interaction between Demea, a deist, Cleanthes, a theist and Philo, a sceptic, being the focus. Most scholars see Philo as a vehicle for Hume’s own views and arguments and because of this, A Level textbooks list simplified versions of Philo’s criticisms of the classical Cosmological and Teleological arguments from the Dialogues and credit them to Hume. It is probably fair to say that if the textbook was the sum total of one’s reading it would be easy to conclude that Hume was unsuccessful in arguing that observation does not prove the existence of God, in every case other than the criticism that the arguments do not support belief in all the attributes of the Christian God, which Christians accept in any case. Few believers suggest that arguments for God’s existence are sufficient support for Christian faith in themselves. For example, when the textbook suggests that Hume asks “and what caused God” in response to Aquinas’ Cosmological Argument, it would be natural to criticize Hume for missing the more subtle point that Aquinas is making about God’s necessary existence. Nevertheless, if one reads “Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion” it becomes clear that the criticisms Hume places in the mouth of Philo are subtle and support the conclusion that Hume was indeed successful in arguing that observation does not prove the existence of God.
In Part VIII of the Dialogues, against a very basic form of the Cosmological Argument for a “voluntary agent or first mover” Philo points out that nobody can know whether all things in the universe have a cause, that it is fallacious to make the leap from all things in the universe being caused to proposing that the universe itself has a cause. He points out that for all we know some things in the universe could exist or happen without a cause… why not some natural process rather than a supernatural, divine agent deciding to create. He argues in favour of the Epicurean Hypothesis, the idea that the universe could be actually infinite, which was the commonly accepted scientific world-view at the time, rooted in Aristotle.
“But this presupposes, said Demea, that matter can come to move without any voluntary agent or first mover. And where’s the difficulty in that? replied Philo“
Superficially, Philo’s criticisms appear ill-founded. William Lane Craig and other Christian apologists argue that an actual infinity of causes is impossible and suggest that Big Bang theory supports them in the need for an absolute beginning for the universe as a whole and so in the need for an uncaused cause. However in fact, modern Physics supports Philo’s reasoning. Although it is true that the standard model suggests that time and space had a beginning – the Big Bang – no Cosmologist today sees the Big Bang as the absolute beginning in the sense of needing a divine cause to explain it. Stephen Hawking responded to a question about whether the universe needed a cause by saying that the question makes no sense to ask. True, causation applies within time and space, but within the singularity there is no sense in which it could apply. Cause and effect imply time and space; without either it makes no sense to think in terms of causation. Further, research confirms the hypothesis that (at least at the Planck scale) things in the universe exist and happen without a cause and it is possible that the natural action of sub-atomic particles could account for the Big Bang. Whatever the apologists claim, it seems that modern science supports Hume’s criticism of the attempt to prove God from observation and does not support the existence of God as the necessary uncaused cause.
In addition, through parts 8 and 9 of the Dialogues Philo makes the important point that…
“I won’t even allow any one part to justify conclusions about another part”
This is a point that builds on one he made in relation to the teleological argument in Part II
“can it be proper to argue from parts to the whole? Doesn’t the great disproportion between part and whole bar all comparison and inference?”
While superficially flippant, Philo’s point is actually subtle and far-reaching and extends beyond the point that the arguments from observation depend on the Fallacy of Composition. Although it what is true of parts is not necessarily true of the whole, it still could be so the most damage that the classic textbook criticism of the Cosmological Argument could do is to point out that the conclusion needs more support, not that the argument has no merit. In fact, Philo’s criticism of the Cosmological Argument is more damaging than the technical point about relying on the Fallacy of Composition. He points out that the argument makes the massive assumption that the part of the universe we can observe is a fair sample, that the whole universe behaves as this part behaves, and that the way we see the universe is the way it really is. The Cosmological Principle was first spelt out by Isaac Newton and Astronomer William Keel states that it…
“amounts to the strongly philosophical statement that the part of the universe which we can see is a fair sample, and that the same physical laws apply throughout. In essence, this in a sense says that the universe is knowable and is playing fair with scientists” [The Road to Galaxy Formation, 2006]
Following the discovery of Quantum Physics, science has had to abandon the Newtonian paradigm to the extent that today, the “Cosmological Principle”, the very principles of homogeneity and isotropy, are being questioned – even though that leads to the unwelcome conclusion that science is extremely limited in what it can claim to know about the universe. Philosopher Karl Popper criticized the Cosmological Principle on the grounds that it makes
“our lack of knowledge a principle of knowing something”
concluding that
“the “cosmological principles” were, I fear, dogmas that should not have been proposed”
and since then some Physicists have come to similar conclusions, including Steven Weinberg. Scientists might be as reluctant to accept the force of Philo’s argument as believers, but that doesn’t take away from the fact that there is no way to know that the way we perceive causation is actually what is happening or that the principle of causation that appears to apply here also applies everywhere in the universe, let alone to the universe as a whole. Certainly, what is true of parts of the universe is not necessarily true of the whole of the universe – but further, it is not possible to say what is true of parts of the universe and let alone what might be true of the whole. This argument of Philo’s alone shows that attempting to prove God from observation is impossible.
Further, also in Part 9 of the Dialogues, Philo attacks a version of the Cosmological Argument presented by Demea that echoes Jeremiah Clarke’s a priori argument. While not strictly an argument from observation, this version of the cosmological argument deduces God’s necessary existence and attributes from the contingent nature of other existences. Nevertheless, unless one is an idealist, understanding what it means for other things to exist must depend on observation, so it is worth considering Hume’s refutation of this version of the argument here. Although in 1996 Joseph K Campbell successfully argued that Philo fails to defeat this version of the Cosmological Argument – leaving open the possibility that God could be the necessary sustaining-cause of the universe – Philo’s point in asking why the cause of the universe would have to be intelligible renders Campbell’s argument in support of proving God from observation only a technical victory. While it is true that there might be the necessary sustaining-cause of the universe, it is also true (as Philo contends) that it is not meaningful to claim that this sustaining cause has the attributes of the Christian God. Jeremiah Clarke faced the same difficulties as Aquinas in trying to marry the attributes of a necessary being with those of the object of Christian faith. Neither thinker manages to do more than imply that Christian faith is misplaced, because there is no way that the being indicated by contingent existence could create or act in the way that the God of Abraham and Isaac creates and acts, let alone provide hope for salvation and/or personal survival beyond death. Nobody seriously claims that the Higgs Boson is omnipotent, let alone omniscient or omnibenevolent. Nobody worships quarks. Even if God might be whatever sustains the universe in being, there is no way to support religion on that basis. Further, there is now a sensible natural explanation for the universe which obviates the need to call the necessary sustaining cause of the universe “God” and so muddy the waters of Cosmology with Theological assumptions and associations. On this point also, despite Campbell’s work, Hume’s argument against proving God from observation has been vindicated.
Philo provides numerous other criticisms of the arguments from observation. For example, through Parts II-V of the Dialogues, Philo criticizes versions of the Teleological Argument presented by Cleanthes, pointing out that the analogies Cleanthes employs are weak, that there is no way to establish that everything in the universe which appears to have order and purpose really has, and that (because like effects prove like causes) the universe suggests a cause or designer who is far from perfect, not necessarily single and either way a long way from being the God of the Christian religion.
“what shadow of an argument, continued Philo, can you produce, from your hypothesis, to prove that God is one being? A great many men join together to build a house or ship, to found and develop a city, to create a commonwealth” … “For all he knows, the world is very faulty and imperfect by certain higher standards… only the first rough attempt of some infant god, who afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his poor performance… the work of some dependent, inferior god, whose superiors hold it up for ridicule… produced by some god in his old age and near-senility, and ever since his death the world has continued without further guidance, activated by the first shove he gave to it and the active force that he built into it.” (Part V)
As JCA Gaskin has argued, Philo’s individual criticisms are compelling, highlighting one by one the flaws and leaps in reasoning in two distinct versions of the teleological argument. They are far more serious than Philo’s flippant tone might suggest, as they demonstrate how far short of proving the existence of the Christian God classical arguments fall and how much believers must depend on revelations and authority.
In addition, the broader criticism implicit in Philo’s line of argument is conclusive; despite the multi-layered theodicies of St Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas, and the less complete but more pastorally satisfying Irenaean theodicy proposed by John Hick, there has as yet been no satisfactory explanation of why a perfect creator would create an imperfect world. As JL Mackie observed in his essay “Evil and Omnipotence” (1955), St Augustine’s Free Will Defence fails to explain why an omnipotent God could not create free beings who always choose to do what is right. Further, St Thomas Aquinas’ approach to redefining evil as a lack of good and God’s attributes as meaning that He can do only what is actually possible and compatible with His wholly simple nature fails to do justice to the reality of peoples’ faith. The problem of evil and suffering remains the most persuasive objection to attempts to argue to the God of Christianity from observation.
In conclusion, Hume’s arguments – as proposed through the character Philo – successfully show that attempts to prove God from observation all fail. The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion present a persuasive case against belief in any sort of God which goes well beyond the petty point-scoring that the genre and style of the piece suggests. Nevertheless, while extremely persuasive, Philo’s line of argument is a skeptical one and there significant implications flow from accepting it. Philo casts doubt not just on belief in God, but also on the human ability to know that what we observe is really what we observe and on the human ability to deduce natural laws of any kind on the basis of observation. By this argument, people wouldn’t just have to drop their belief in God but also their belief in science, something which few people are willing to do. This, perhaps, is the best objection to Philo’s arguments against the attempt to prove God from observation, that they surely and persuasively lead people into a pit of despair. However, it is not reasonable to conclude from this that the arguments from observation prove God or that Hume’s criticisms, as presented through Philo, are less than successful.
4 Evaluate the strengths and weakness of Paley's design Argument. (30)
4 Evaluate the importance of the Tenants design argument from Aesthetics. (30)
4 Evaluate the strengths and weakness of anthropic principle as a design argument. (30)
4 Evaluate the opinion that the classical teleological argument is successful. (30)
Teleological arguments move from observations of purposiveness in the universe to the conclusion that God is the best explanation for the existence of the universe as it is. The Greek word TELOS originally referred to the target in archery and Aquinas, in his fifth way to God plays on this imagery by selecting an arrow as his analogy for purposiveness in the universe. He wrote…
“We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.”
The argument has its roots in Aristotle, who wrote of things in the universe and the universe as a whole advancing towards fulfilling a FINAL CAUSE, a telos or purpose, and suggested that there must be some mysterious force guiding this process and supporting the tendency towards fulfilment, goodness, in everything we see. It has been advanced many times and in many different variants since Aquinas, but it is characterised by arguing qua purpose and by the use of analogies to emphasise the improbability of efficient organisms and processes arising by chance. The classical teleological argument fell out of favour in the mid-19th century as Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection was accepted as offering a natural explanation for the appearance of purposiveness in things. This essay will argue that while evolution remains the best reason for rejecting teleological arguments, there are other good reasons for rejecting them as well.
In 1779 David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion was published. It contained a complete, and eminently readable, refutation of the classical teleological as well as other arguments for the existence of God. Hume’s character Cleanthes sets up the argument, using the analogy of a machine and its maker(s)…
“Look round the world, contemplating the whole thing and every part of it; you’ll find that it is nothing but one big machine subdivided into an infinite number of smaller ones… The intricate fitting of means to ends throughout all nature is just like (though more wonderful than) the fitting of means to ends in things that have been produced by us”[2]
He concluded…
“Since the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer by all the rules of analogy that the causes are also alike, and that the author of nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though he has much larger faculties to go with the grandeur of the work he has carried out.”[3]
In 1803 Cleanthes’ argument was famously reproduced by William Paley, who used the analogy of a watch and watchmaker, concluding that from the similarity between the watch, natural organisms and even the universe as a whole…
“the inference, we think, is inevitable, that the watch must have had a maker”
The arguments presented by both Cleanthes and Paley are arguments from analogy and, as such, both can only be as strong as the analogies they employ. As Hume’s character Philo observed, Cleanthes (and reasonably Paley) relies on a “very weak analogy”. He reduces the argument to absurdity by suggesting alternative analogies – a house, legs, a ship – and concludes that
“Doesn’t the great disproportion ·between part and whole· bar all comparison and inference? From observing the growth of a hair, can we learn anything about how men come into being? Would the way a leaf blows—even if we knew this perfectly—teach us anything about how a tree grows?”[5]
As Philo points out, there is a great dissimilarity between any analogy and the universe as a whole, and this is not just one of degree as Paley suggests in Chapter II Part V of Natural Theology. It is not reasonable, even from the perspective of the 19th Century Newtonian world-view, to suggest that
“Thought, design, intelligence, such as we discover in men and other animals, is just one of the springs and forces of the universe…”
It follows that the analogies commonly employed to persuade readers by proponents of the classical teleological argument add nothing to the strength of their argument as a whole.
Apart from the analogies, the classical teleological argument can be summarised through this syllogism…
P1. Natural organisms act towards an end
P2. Natural organisms cannot act towards an end independently
C1. There must be some intelligence causing natural organisms to act towards an end
C2. This intelligence is what everybody calls God.
Clearly, both propositions can be disputed. There are many examples of inefficiency in nature and even where purposiveness is apparent, this can now be explained by evolution through natural selection. Yet the most problematic step in the argument is the secondary conclusion, that the “intelligence” is what everybody calls God. Surely God is usually seen to be whatever caused the universe to be the way that it is, however the qualities of omnipotence and omnibenevolence are usually imputed to God and there can be no doubt that the universe contains many examples of gratuitous innocent suffering. As Tennyson wrote “nature is red in tooth and claw”[7] – Darwin himself and later John Stuart Mill remarked how implausible it is to suggest that a loving God could create a world in which animals must kill each other to survive. To many people this world seems more like the project of a sick science-fiction project than of the God of Christianity! Is it not reasonable to suggest that this universe could be the first, “rude effort of an infant deity”[8]? This would better account for the imperfect characteristics of the universe as we find it than suggesting that it is the perfect product of a perfect God.
Further, there is nothing to suggest that the intelligent designer of the universe would have to be single. As Philo observed…
”a great number of men join in building a house or a ship, in rearing a city, in framing a commonwealth; why may not several deities combine in contriving and framing a world?”
This would render the secondary conclusion of the classical teleological argument, that the intelligence behind the universe could be called God, redundant. No Christian – and few members of other faiths – could accept that multiple Gods could have had a hand in creating the universe; to do so would place limits on the power of each, reducing the God’s to the status of spirits or demons. Philo admits that supposing the existence of multiple deities would be to “multiply causes unnecessarily” in a way that is philosophically unsound, and yet he argues that although it would be just as wrong to say that there must be one God as to say there must be multiple Gods. There is no way that human beings can know one way or the other. The secondary conclusion is not adequately supported by the premises and so the argument fails in its objective of being a demonstration of the existence of God.
Of course modern Intelligent Design arguments get around this difficulty by eliminating the secondary conclusion and leaving just the inference that God might be the intelligence that the argument has concluded to exist. Scholars such as Michael Behe and William Dembski point out the inadequacy of Darwin’s Theory of evolution through natural selection as a complete explanation for the universe.
Michael Behe points to irreducible complexity in microbiological organisms, such as the flagellum of certain bacteria, suggesting that linear evolution cannot account for complex organisms in which all parts need to work together for any function to be performed. Individual parts of irreducibly complex organisms are, Behe claims, without purpose unless all the other parts are present and correctly arranged. How could things evolve all at once to be this way? An intelligence is needed to explain these structures, some of which are the very building-blocks of life. It may be that evolution explains some aspects of nature, but without hypothesising intelligent design scientists cannot explain all of nature[9]. Of course Behe’s argument is rejected by most mainstream scientists, who point out that parts of organisms can evolve out of existence as well as into existence. It could well be that each part of an irreducibly complex organism had a purpose in relation to the organism as it was in a previous stage of evolution, but as the new purpose evolved the old one became redundant and other parts of the structure with no new purpose did not survive. Most critics of Behe claim that he has either misunderstood the science and is making invalid claims to irreducible complexity or claim that he is too hasty in his conclusion that an intelligent designer hypothesis is required. If they are right, as I am persuaded that they are – the critics vastly outnumber and outrank his supporters – then Behe’s modern version of the teleological argument fails, even with its scientific examples and lack of secondary conclusion.
Like Behe, William Dembski proposes that an intelligent designer hypothesis is needed to account for the characteristics of natural organisms. Dembski appeals to what he calls “specified complexity”, instances where incredibly complex structures occur where each part of the whole is finely tuned for its job. The obvious example is DNA – each “letter” of a strand of DNA, ACGT, has a specific role and there are millions and millions of them in the most basic genome. As a statistician, Dembski calculates the probability of such specified complex structures arising by chance and concludes that where the probability surpasses what he calls the “universal probability bound” (10×1150) then it is incredible to suppose that it happened by chance rather than design[10]. Dembski has as many critics as Behe. Again they claim that he has either misunderstood the science or jumped to his conclusion of intelligent design too hastily. Specifically, Dembski starts with specified complex structures as they are today and assumes that they were always meant to be this way when he calculates probability, which ignores the possibility that they genuinely exist by chance and could very well not exist or exist differently. Scientists are beginning to recognise that DNA contains a huge percentage of redundancy – code that was once relevant but which has been rendered redundant by new code which has been added as species evolve. Certainly, cutting out a section of DNA will change the efficacy of the whole strand, but that is because redundant elements are woven into the fabric of the whole. Take Brighton Pavilion as an example – its structure is highly complex and each bit is integral to the whole. This is not as a result of design but because the building was remodelled through several different designs and the present building incorporates and relies on elements of older buildings. The guttering runs inside the walls and now holds up the ceilings in some places. Start taking things away – even things as small as layers of wallpaper or light-fittings – and the whole building starts to crumble. As Richard Dawkins has observed, it is more reasonable to suggest that specified complex structures did arise naturally, over extended periods of time and as a result of environmental pressures, than to claim that they were created as they are my a mysterious “intelligence”[11]. Such a conclusion multiplies improbabilities and by the scientific and philosophical principle of Occam’s Razor, is illogical. It follows that Dembski’s argument fails as well.
In conclusion it seems that the classical teleological argument fails to demonstrate the existence of God. The versions proposed by Aquinas, Cleanthes and William Paley are undermined by their use of weak analogies, their propositions are questionable and the conclusions, both that an intelligence and that God exists, are not adequately supported by those propositions. Most persuasively, the argument fails to explain how a recognisable God could create an imperfect universe or why the characteristics of the universe should not be imputed to demonstrate the existence of an imperfect God, or even a committee of Gods. Yet, in the end, Darwin’s theory of evolution through natural selection remains the best reason for rejecting teleological arguments, whether in their classical or modern forms. The failure of Intelligent Design arguments such as those proposed by Michael Behe and William Dembski shows that any attempt to argue qua purpose to God lacks credibility when evolution offers an elegant and demonstrable explanation of purposiveness that does not demand recourse to the supernatural. Certainly, examples of structures which biology does not yet understand exist. However absence of evidence does not constitute evidence of absence! Science is by its nature a process and it is unreasonable for religious critics to demand that it present a complete explanation now or admit failure. There is ample evidence that evolution continues to offer explanatory power and that it is making progress in explaining even the most irreducibly complex or specifically complex structures. Nevertheless, the failure of classical arguments qua purpose and modern derivations of them does not obviate the possibility of arguing to God qua regularity. In particular, the aesthetic argument presented by Richard Swinburne could survive the criticisms outlined here[12]. That a universe should exist and evolve in the way that it does is incredible and this sense of awe and wonder could be the basis for a successful abductive argument for some sort of a God, if not the God of Classical Theism.
Footnotes
[1] Summa Theologica: First Part, Question 2, Article 3
[2] Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779) Part II
[3] Ibid.
[4] Natural Theology page 3.
[5]Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779) Part II
[6] Ibid.
[7] In Memoriam, Canto 56
[8] Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779) Part V
[9] See “Darwin’s Black Box” (1994)
[10] In books such as “No Free Lunch” (2002)
[11] See the case he presents in episode 2 of his documentary “Religion: The root of all evil” (2002)
[12] The Existence of God (2004)