4. Evaluate the claim that there can be no disembodied existence after death. (30)
Introduction: The claim that there can be no disembodied existence after death is based on a monist or materialist conception that there is no soul distinct from body. For someone to survive the death of their body and to live on without a physical body some form of dualism would have to be accepted , where the soul mind or spirit is seen to be a separate entity from the body, or at the very least capable of detaching from the body.
Thesis: My aim is to establish that disembodied existence is plausible.
Argument: There are some philosophers who claim that even the notion of ‘surviving one’s death’ is literally non-sensical , as death means the end of life and thus survival . Antony Flew takes such a view. This however, seems to beg the question of what death is – of course it is the end of physical life but the question remains as to whether life comes down to simple biological processes. As Ayer says : there is no “reason why the meaning of words should be indissolubly tied to the context in which they were learnt” .
In order to show that there can be disembodied existence we would need to first show whether it is reasonable to believe in an identity or me that exists in this world – if there is not really a me in this world then it would be hard to claim that I exist in another (although some kind of post – death survival occurs in Vedanta Hinduism in which atman or self ceases to exist as an illusion and gets dissolved in Brahman or ultimate reality).
Materialists claim that we are our bodies, and that consequently there is no soul. However this is problematic – Swinburne gives the example of the two hemispheres of the brain being divided and transplanted into two different bodies – could you choose which was to be tortured and which to be made happy ? Swinburne (1997 p.29) says
"Suppose that the two hemispheres of your brain were divided and transplanted into two different bodies, and one of those bodies was to be tortured while the other was to be made happy. Which body would you choose to be identified with?"
Swinburne says the fact that it is unclear how to establish which transplant will be you shows although a body is a critical part of our current existence, it is not all we are. Locke also shows this with his analogy of the cobbler and the prince- if the cobbler awoke in the princes body and vice versa how would you establish which constituted identity, body or memory? Memories and states of consciousness themselves are also not enough to constitute us as persons – you can have false memories , awareness can be altered with drugs, we can forget things, and yet we do not cease to exist as persons , so it seems clear from the above that the soul or self is something other than body , memory, thought or feeling – those are all things I have , whereas a soul is what I am.
Counter Argument: However there are real problems with the idea of a soul or self- Hume said “I can never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never observe anything but the perception”. What I think of as me is simply a name I give to a stream of experiences – there is no underlying reality to it. Ryle has a similar notion – the soul is a ‘category mistake’ it is the name we give to a collection of experiences , and then assume that that has an independent existence apart from the collection. This he says is like looking for Oxford university after having been shown all the college buildings that comprise it.
Further there are some significant criticisms of the concept of the soul. Scholars argume there is a lack of empirical evidence: There is no scientific evidence to support the existence of a soul or its properties. Brain argues "The concept of the soul has been criticized for being vague and ill-defined, lacking empirical evidence, and being incompatible with a materialist worldview." (Bain, 2019, p. 325) The concept of a soul is purely philosophical and speculative in nature. Further that the soul is an Incoherent concept. The soul is often described as a non-physical entity that animates the body, but it is not clear how such an entity could interact with the physical world. Goff argues "Materialism, in its various forms, denies the existence of a non-physical soul and holds that mental states and processes are entirely reducible to, and causally dependent upon, physical states and processes." (Goff, 2017, p. 3) Finally that there are contradictions with neuroscience. Neuroscience suggests that all mental processes are produced by the brain, and there is no need for a non-physical entity like the soul to explain consciousness.
Moreover there are alternatives to the soul thesis according to materialists and monists. They first argue from Identity theory. This theory proposes that mental states are identical to brain states. In other words, the mind is reducible to the physical brain. Further from Functionalism. This theory proposes that mental states are defined by their function or role in cognitive processes, rather than by their physical makeup. Finally from Eliminative materialism: This theory proposes that there are no mental states, and that all talk of mental states should be eliminated in favor of a purely physicalist account of the world.
Counter Counter Argument: These are attractive views but they have problems. For behaviourists like Ryle there would be no such thing as a private experience or inner mental states at all these are all just propensities to act in a certain way. Keith Ward points out that alongside intentionality ‘interior’ mental events are very hard to define as precursors to behaviour. Ward gives the example that sometimes his wife thinks he is asleep when he’s actually thinking very deeply about something.
So perhaps dualism is correct and there is a self or soul separate from the body. The problem with this is that it seems to be a superfluous hypothesis – why posit a me apart from the physical, and how would this me exist ‘within’ the physical frame? Descartes with interactionism said that the body and mind affect each other – the problem here is how is the non- spatial supposed to affect the spatial? Emergent dualism doesn’t claim that the soul is some kind of divine addition to the body but that it emerges from physical according to the complexity of the creature, so many creatures will have varying degrees of consciousness and thus souls of differing complexity. Keith Ward (2018, p73) holds something like this view and says that a divine consciousness that wants good would have very good reasons to create a universe where minds evolve that were free and able to contemplate their position in the universe. This view would be a post-Darwinian theory, as evolution takes a role in it even though its teleological dimension would be unpalatable to many biologists.
The priest and palaeontologist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (2008, p.192), however considered that mind or the ‘noosphere’ evolved out of the biosphere, this is truly dualistic as mind is not ultimately reducible to the biological but is ontologically prior to it.If we cannot show how disembodied existence might function then we cannot decide whether it does. H H Price (Quoted in John Hick 1994 p. 16) believed that it is a coherent concept and tried to show this by positing the idea that the next world would consist of souls with mental images about which they have dreams and desires. If we can have some kind of life when we are physically asleep and therefore unconscious through dreams, then it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that when dead our world would be similarly composed of mental states interacting with other mental states through telepathic communication. As we shall see this theory is severely limited by the closeness of brain events and mental states such that it is hard to see how mental states might continue with the death of the brain – but this is not to say that it can’t happen in some way unexplained to us.
Synoptically Buddhist studies offer various perspectives on the concept of disembodied existence after death. Scholars like Damien Keown and Paul Williams argue that Buddhism does not posit the existence of a permanent, substantial self or soul, but rather posits the idea of "rebirth" or "reincarnation" based on the accumulation of karma. In Buddhism, the concept of anatta (not-self) denies the existence of an eternal soul or self that continues after death. Keown says
"Buddhism denies the existence of a permanent, substantial self or soul. According to Buddhist teaching, the individual is merely a temporary combination of physical and mental aggregates, which disintegrate at death. What is reborn is not the self, but rather the karmic energy that has been accumulated during the individual's lifetime." - (Damien Keown, 1996 p. 42)
Further Williams says
"The Buddhist denial of a self or soul in human beings is based on the recognition that all of our mental and physical constituents are impermanent and subject to change. The self is seen as an illusion, a product of our ignorance and attachment." -Williams, 2011, p. 129)
The Buddha said: "There is no self in relation to the five aggregates of clinging" (S. v. 47; A. iii. 433). (Buswell, 2014) Further that the Buddhist doctrine of impermanence also argues against the idea of a disembodied existence after death. The Buddha said: "All conditioned things are impermanent" (S. ii. 22; A. v. 9). This includes the aggregates (skandhas) that make up a person, which are constantly changing and not permanent. (Buswell, et al 2014). In Mahayana Buddhism, the concept of emptiness (sunyata) further emphasizes the lack of inherent existence in all phenomena, including the self. As the Heart Sutra states: "Form is emptiness, emptiness is form" (Heart Sutra). This means that everything, including the self, is empty of inherent existence and is dependent on other factors for its existence (Conze, 1978). Bhikkhu Bodhi, (2005 (p. 157), Rupert Gethin (p. 21) further suggest this view means that there can be no disembodied existence after death as there is no permanent self or soul to exist after death.
Similarly, Peter Harvey discusses the Buddhist concept of anatta, or "non-self," which implies that there is no fixed, unchanging self that survives death.
"Anatta, or 'non-self,' means that there is no abiding entity or soul that continues in the same unchanging form after death. Therefore, the idea of a disembodied existence after death is incompatible with Buddhist teachings." - (Harvey, 2013, p. 78)
Therefore, the idea of disembodied existence after death is incompatible with Buddhist teachings. The Buddhist concept of rebirth also suggests that there is no disembodied existence after death, but rather a continuation of the karmic energy that has been accumulated during one's lifetime. As the Buddha said: "According to the seed that's sown, so is the fruit you reap there from" (Dhammapada, v. 54). This means that one's actions in life determine the nature of one's rebirth, rather than any inherent self that continues after death. Furthermore, the Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination, as discussed by Rupert Gethin, (1998 p. 151)) suggests that all phenomena arise in dependence upon other phenomena, and there is no independently existing self or soul. This view further supports the notion that there can be no disembodied existence after death.
According to the Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu, "when the physical body is destroyed, one's consciousness, which is neither material nor produced from matter, continues on and is not annihilated." The Buddhist monk Thich Nhat Hanh (2002, p.8) writes, "there is no birth, there is no death; there is only transformation." The Buddhist scripture "The Diamond Sutra" states, "All composed things are like a dream, a phantom, a drop of dew, a flash of lightning. That is how to meditate on them, that is how to observe them." Finally the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna asserts, "neither from itself nor from another, nor from both, nor without a cause, does anything whatever, anywhere arise."
Yet there are a priori a posteriori arguments for disembodied existence. First the conceivability argument says it is possible to conceive of a disembodied existence, therefore such an existence is possible. This is linked Crane suggests to "Intentionality, or the directedness of mental states towards objects or properties in the world, is also difficult to explain within a materialist framework." (Crane, 2001, p. 89) Second for the soul the logical possibility argument says it is logically possible for a disembodied existence to exist, therefore it is possible. Kimle says "Some argue that the soul could survive death, based on a priori arguments such as the conceivability of disembodied existence or the indivisibility of the self." (Klima, 2007, p. 389) Finally there is the argument from introspection that we have direct access to our own mental states, which are not physical in nature, therefore a non-physical entity like the soul is necessary to explain them. David Chalmbers says "Qualia, or the subjective qualities of conscious experience, are notoriously difficult to account for within a materialist framework." (Chalmers, 1995, p. 202)
A posteriori arguments for disembodied existence include first from near-death experiences that people who have had near-death experiences often report seeing a bright light or a tunnel, which suggests the possibility of a non-physical existence beyond death. Second from reincarnation that some people claim to have memories of past lives, which suggests the possibility of a non-physical entity like the soul that can survive death and be reborn. Finally from paranormal phenomena that there are reports of paranormal phenomena such as ghosts, telekinesis, and precognition, which suggest the possibility of a non-physical entity that can interact with the physical world.
In conclusion while materialism provides a compelling account of the physical world, it fails to account for certain mental phenomena like qualia and intentionality. The concept of a soul provides a possible explanation for these phenomena, and the arguments for disembodied existence suggest that the soul could survive death. However, the lack of empirical evidence and coherence of the soul concept, and the contradicting neuroscience raise doubts about its existence. Ultimately, the question of the soul's existence remains a philosophical and metaphysical one, and is unlikely to be resolved by empirical science alone.
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