I know our students are using the quizlets to polish up your scholars and quotes but just how do you ensure your getting A02 not just A01? I thought I would write blog to show you how on teh arguments for Gods existence. Remember in the exam of
30 mk only 5mks for A01 and 25 for A02!;
20 mark only 5mks for A01 and 15 for A02!;
12 mark only 4mks for A01 and 25 for A02.
So yes some AO1 you have to know (and some ideas to impress the examiner) Could be
● Aquinas’ Fifth Way. Summa Theologica. Argument qua regularity. Archer and arrow.
● Paley. Natural Theology. Argument qua purpose/telos. Argument from analogy. Watch and stone found on heath. Human eye.
● Swinburne’s design argument (qua regularity or temporal sequences).
● FR Tennant’s use of the anthropic principle.
● Hume’s criticisms: aptness of the analogy (vegetable), Epicurean Thesis (chance), effect to cause (committee, apprentice).
● Challenge of evolution (chance).
● Dawkins: evolution is blind, “purpose-tinted spectacles”.
● Aquinas’ three ways. How he rejects infinite regress.
● Leibniz’s cosmological argument — principle of sufficient reason, book analogy.
● Copleston v Russell radio debate.
● Hilbert’s hotel paradox.
● Big Crunch theory.
● Anscombe: rabbit out the hat.
● Hume’s criticisms: the causal principle, Epicurean Thesis.
● Hume and Russell: no necessary being, fallacy of composition.
● Russell: brute fact (chance).
A02 is where the action is at! In What follows I will address the following themes
1.Are A posteriori arguments for God are more persuasive than a priori arguments?
2.Is the teleological argument be defended against the challenege of chance?
3.Is the cosmological argument persuasive?
4.Does the cosmological argument simply leap to the conclusion of a transcendent creator?
5.Do the a posteriori arguments for God have logical fallacies that they cannot overcome?
This is a big question, so you can choose to say less about one of the a posteriori arguments if you need to — just make sure each is mentioned and evaluated.
Intro: The cosmological and teleological arguments a posteriori, ontological argument a priori and deductive. “Persuasive” could mean different things: which might persuade a nonbeliever of God’s existence, or which preserves the attributes of the God of classical theism. Ultimately, a posteriori arguments are more persuasive to nonbelievers, even if the a priori ontological argument better preserves God’s attributes.
AO1: There are two key a posteriori arguments for God’s existence. The teleological argument, from Aquinas and Paley, argues that because of observable design-like features in the universe, it is reasonable to infer, inductively (based on past experience) that the universe has a designer. In Natural Theology, Paley uses an argument from analogy. He argues that a watch is complex and ordered with a purpose. Similarly, the natural world is complex and orderly with a purpose: he gives the example of the human eye, which through complicated mechanisms allows us to see. So, by analogy, it is reasonable to suppose the natural world also has a designer — God. In Summa Theologica, Aquinas puts forward three versions of the cosmological argument. The Third Way states that given that we can observe each thing in the universe exists contingently (conditionally), and each thing it relies on also exists contingently, we can reason back along a series of contingent beings to a necessary being — God. An infinite regress makes no sense, he argues, because it is like saying the universe depends on nothing.
AO2: There are many challenges to these arguments. *In particular, against the teleological Hume said the argument from analogy fails because the universe is less like a machine and more like a vegetable, meaning the initial analogy fails and therefore the whole argument fails. *This seems more convincing when we consider Darwin’s theory of evolution, which indeed seems to offer empirical evidence that the universe developed over time, “blindly”, as Dawkins put it, rather than teleologically. Dawkins, an atheist, goes on to say we have “purpose-tinted spectacles” and just assume there must be a purpose to things. *Given the argument is a posteriori, these empirical counters are particularly challenging, because the argument relies on observation and appears to have made bad observations. *Against the cosmological argument, Hume argued that the universe could in fact be infinite in time and cycle through random structures (the Epicurean thesis). This seems supported by contemporary science with the “multiverse” theory, that every version of events that can happen will happen, including apparent order in the universe. *Russell went further, and suggested the universe could be a “brute fact” and require no explanation — if this criticism works, it would devastate the cosmological argument, which relies on trying to explain the observable universe. [Link back to the wording of question and tell us where the argument is currently].
AO2: But these challenges to the a posteriori arguments can each be responded to with relatively convincing counters. *Against the theory of evolution, we can use Aquinas’s version of the design argument, qua regularity. In Summa Theologica, Aquinas focussed on the observation of regularity in the universe, pointing out how we know a posteriori that inanimate objects obey natural order like an arrow hitting a target, and reasoning that like an arrow must be fired by an archer, the universe must be made ordered by a designer. This is convincing because this means the regularity of a physical process itself now needs explaining, with a designer being a reasonable explanation. *This successfully counters the point from Dawkins, because Aquinas isn’t assuming there is purpose, only that there is order — and even Dawkins, a biologist, would have to admit the universe is ordered through physical laws. *To defend the cosmological argument, we could use Ockham’s Razor against the Epicurean Thesis: why imagine so many versions of the same universe, when all we have a posteriori evidence for is one universe? This should appeal to an empiricist like Hume because it is based on observation. *And against Russell’s “brute fact”, Copleston, in the radio debate with Russell, simply said that you cannot win or lose a game of chess if you don’t sit at the board. This is convincing, as Russell’s argument doesn’t actually explain the universe, whereas the cosmological argument does. [Link back to wording of question and tell us where the argument is currently].
AO1: The strongest rival argument for God is the a priori ontological argument, originally posed by Anslem in Proslogion. He argues that everyone has an a priori, innate idea of God as “that than which nothing greater can be conceived”. Then Anselm argues that it is greater to exist in reality than just in the mind. Between a God that exists and one that does not exist, the God that exists is, therefore, greater, and so to say “God does not exist” is a self-contradiction. A non-existent God would lack greatness. Therefore God’s existence is an analytic truth, and he exists by definition. Using the same logic, in the second version of the argument, Anselm argued necessary existence is greater than contingent existence so God must exist necessarily. The argument seems, prima facie, to be a valid deductive argument which shows God’s existence is entailed by its a priori premises.
AO2: There are apparent strengths to this approach over the a posteriori arguments. *Firstly, empiricists such as Hume cannot question whether Anselm’s observation of the universe is accurate, as he did with the design argument. This seems convincing because it limits the possible number of objections to the ontological argument to just the premises and logic of the argument itself. *Even more convincingly, if the argument is successful, the conclusion of God’s existence would be undoubtable. The conclusion of a sound deductive argument cannot be doubted, unlike the a posteriori arguments which can only establish the probable existence of God. *A crucially persuasive element of this a priori argument is that, unlike the a posteriori arguments, it better preserves the God of classical theism. As Hume pointed out about the design argument, there is no reason why the universe could not be designed by a committee of gods or an apprentice God. Mill went further, saying the evil in the world equally suggests an evil God. But the ontological argument asserts God has maximal greatness, and that there is only one God — whose greatness surely includes great morality, great wisdom, great power etc. This is a major theological advantage. [Link back to wording of question and tell us where the argument is currently].
AO2: But the ontological argument has some weaknesses compared to the a posteriori arguments. *The most crucial flaw is that the ontological argument assumes that existence is a predicate, but Kant successfully argues it is not. As Kant argues, a hundred silver coins in my imagination or a hundred silver coins in my hand are the same concepts — a predicate should describe a subject, but saying “the coins exist” tells us nothing about the coins. This is a major problem because the ontological argument treats God’s existence as a kind of predicate of greatness (a quality a thing can have more or less of). The a posteriori argument lacks any such major logical misstep. *There are other logical problems, too, such as Gaunilo’s perfect island — the same logic could “prove”, mutatis mutandis, that a perfect island exists, which is absurd. This suggests serious logical problems within this a priori argument. *However, the ontological argument has one advantage over the a posteriori arguments: it preserves the God of classical theism because it doesn’t rely on observations of a flawed natural world. Instead, it asserts God’s greatness and builds an argument from there. This is a single, though significant, advantage.[Link back to wording of question and tell us where the argument is currently].
Conclusion: [As with any conclusion, tell us the most important reason that you’ve argued for this side of the argument, and refer back to the wording of the question].
This question can easily be adapted to be a general “evaluate the teleological argument essay” but just emphasise the “chance” element of criticisms less.
Intro: The a posteriori teleological argument, from Aquinas in Summa Theologica and Paley in Natural Theology, relies on a view of the universe as ordered and purposeful, so a designer can be inferred. As such, if it can be shown that the universe is entirely random — the Epicurean Thesis — or involves random processes to produce supposed order — evolution — it may fail. It can be argued that Aquinas’ version can be defended, whilst Paley’s has serious weaknesses when challenged with the idea of chance.
AO1: In Natural Theology, Paley presents his version of the teleological argument using an argument from analogy. He argues that if you found a rock on a heath, given that it isb uncomplex and purposeless, it would be reasonable to say it had no designer. But if you found a watch, it would be reasonable to say it did have a designer: a watch is complex and ordered with a purpose, and past experience shows us, via induction, that this is because it was designed. Similarly, the natural world is complex and orderly with a purpose: he gives the example of the human eye, which through complicated mechanisms allows us to see. So, by analogy, it is reasonable to suppose the natural world also has a designer — God.
AO2: There are some apparent strengths to this theory when compared to the view that the universe can be explained by “chance”. *The Epicruean Thesis from Hume is the idea that the universe is infinite in time and changes randomly, so any version of the universe can be explained as a random arrangement that will occur given infinite time. But Paley can convincingly ask of this why it is any more persuasive than just saying the universe is designed. There is a lack of empirical evidence for the Epicurean Thesis, making it at least at likely or unlikely as Paley’s argument. *Even more convincingly for Paley’s argument, there is evidence for the Big Bang theory (that the universe has an origin and is still expanding). This convincingly suggests that the universe isn’t infinite in time and cycling through random arrangements, and therefore that Paley’s proposal of a designer is a viable explanation for the complexity and purpose of the universe. [Link back to wording of question and tell us where the argument is currently].
AO2: However, Paley’s argument cannot withstand another challenge of “chance” — evolution. Darwin’s theory of evolution proposes that each generation of species contains random genetic mutations. The mutations that suit the environment survive and pass on their genes (natural selection). *This is very challenging for Paley, because his example of the human eye now has a more scientific, empirical explanation: random genetic mutations of millions of years favoured creatures with sight, and so eventually the human eye evolved. Much fossil evidence and observation (such as in Darwin’s Origin of Species) supports this view, whereas Paley’s argument relies heavily on inference. *Darwin’s explanation was foreshadowed by Hume, who criticised the aptness of the analogy between the universe and machine, and said the universe was more like a vegetable that developed over time — combined with Darwin’s theory, Hume’s critique seems devastating. *Evolution, with its element of chance, also better survives Ockham’s Razor — it is more persuasive because it doesn’t have to propose belief in a divine entity, just the observable process of evolutionary biology. [Link back to wording of question and tell us where the argument is currently].
AO1: In Summa Theologica, Aquinas put forward a version of the teleological argument qua regularity. He focussed on the observation of regularity in the universe, pointing out how we know a posteriori that inanimate objects obey natural order (tides come in, go out) which is like an arrow hitting a target. He said that usually, when an inanimate object such as an arrow is put into motion to hit a target, it is because a person (like an archer) made it move. As such, he reasoned that the ordered, regular motion of objects in the universe was better explained by the idea that a person — God — put them into motion, rather than simply saying that inanimate objects somehow move themselves. This argument doesn’t have to assert that nature is teleological, necessarily, only that it is ordered and regular through natural laws.
AO2: As with Paley’s argument, Aquinas faces various challenges from chance. *Whilst he can be defended against the Epicurean Thesis in the same way Paley can (the Epicurean Thesis has no empirical basis and doesn’t fit with the Big Bang theory), there is another kind of challenge of “chance” that Russell used against the cosmological argument: what if the universe is just a “brute fact”? This is a kind of challenge of “chance” because suggests natural laws just are that way with no reason, like the roll of dice. This has the advantage of surviving Ockham’s Razor — it doesn’t require belief in a divine designer, because the universe has no explanation. *In addition, quantum physics may support this notion of the universe being based on “chance” — subatomic particles can be either a wave or particle in a way that physicists cannot predict, suggesting Russell might be right that the universe is just a “brute fact” built on randomness, without any designer. [Link back to wording of question and tell us where the argument is currently].
AO2: But Aquinas can be defended against all these challenges from chance. *Firstly, and most convincingly, he is not vulnerable to the challenge of evolution. This is because Aquinas is seeking to explain the very existence of natural laws such as evolution itself. As Swinburne’s version of the argument puts it, the “temporal order” of the laws of nature cannot be explained by science, which only explains how they operate. Why is the process of random genetic mutation and replication of genes there in the first place, unless it was designed? As FR Tennant points out, there seems to be an “anthropic principle” at work, which tends the universe toward intelligent life. “Chance” doesn’t explain such order which produces such unlikely outcomes. This is a major advantage to Aquinas because it answers the chief challenge from “chance”. *Against quantum physics, again, we can ask “why is there a process of random subatomic events in the first place?” As Swinburne says, sciences gives the “how” these laws operate but only theism can explain “why” these laws exist. *Against Russell and the “brute fact”, it is harder for Aquinas to answer. But we could simply say that Aquinas at least explains the universe, which should appeal to a contemporary, scientific mindset. Russell simply says the universe happens to have natural laws by change. Aquinas, more convincingly, seeks to explain why. [Link back to wording of question and tell us where the argument is currently].
Conclusion: [As with any conclusion, tell us the most important reason that you’ve argued for this side of the argument, and refer back to the wording of the question].
Intro: The cosmological argument is an a posteriori argument for God, proposed in Aquinas’ Summa Theologica. It argued that the universe can be explained by a transcendent creator — which means one outside of normal human experience. There is a distinction between the version of the argument in Aquinas’ first and second “ways” of proving God, and the third “way, which is more similar to the argument from Leibniz. It can be argued that Aquinas’ third way is stronger than the other versions, all versions do leap to the conclusion of a transcendent creator.
In Summa Theologica, Aquinas puts forward three versions of the cosmological argument. The First Way (from motion) and the Second Way (from causation) are broadly similar. In Second Way, Aquinas observes that each event in the universe has an “efficient cause” (is brought about by something), and that cause itself it caused by a prior cause (you are caused by your parent, they by your grandparents etc). Aquinas rejects that this can go on in an infinite series because to say there is an infinite series of causes is the same as saying there is no cause for the series (if your family tree goes back infinitely, it can never have begun — so how are you here?) As such, there must be a First Cause and “this all men call God”. This God, for Aquinas, is transcendent — not a physical cause like any other, but outside of normal human experience.
AO2: There are reasons to support this conclusion. *The argument is a posteriori, which could be convincing to empiricists or those of a scientific mindset. We can observe that events are caused, and the logic of the argument reasonably concludes there must be a first cause. *It seems equally reasonable to say this First Cause is transcendent, because as Aquinas says, if we reject an infinite regress God must be an “uncaused cause”, unlike anything else we experience in the universe. This is convincing because, if God was a physical cause like a parent causing a child, then God would surely be subject to physical laws and himself require a cause. *In addition, as Copleston argued, the cosmological argument has the strength of explaining the universe, giving it explanatory power. Explaining how the universe got here with a transcendent creator solves the puzzle of why anything exists at all, whilst avoiding the seemingly nonsensical idea of an infinite regress. [Link back to wording of question and tell us where the argument is currently].
*But the conclusion that the First Mover or First Cause must be transcendent does appear to be a leap. *Hume criticises the cosmological argument by saying that like effects must have like causes — a human gives birth to a human. [You can add the “scales” analogy here]. As such, it is a leap to say that the First Cause is “transcendent” when all other causes in the universe are knowable a posteriori. This is particularly convincing because, as a naturaltheologian, Aquinas is trying to use observation — but Hume’s observations seem more consistent. * In addition, as Hume points out against the teleological argument, there is no reason to say there is one creator, or that this is the God of classical theism (omnibenevolent, omnipotent etc). Aquinas’ argument is influenced by Aristotle’s Prime Mover, which could only think of itself because it could not be changed by anything — this is far from the God of Christianity. Hume convincingly suggests it is more likely that if there is a First Cause, it resembles the causes we can observe: finite, physical, and flawed. [Link back to wording of question and tell us where the argument is currently].
Aquinas’ Third Way, from necessity, was the influence for Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason and Copleston’s version of the argument. The Third Way states that given that we can observe each thing in the universe exists contingently (conditionally), and each thing it relies on also exists contingently, we can reason back along a series of contingency to a necessary being — God. Again, an infinite regress makes no sense, he argues, because it is like saying the universe depends on nothing. As Leibniz pointed out, this makes logical sense: just as a book cannot be a copy of a copy going back infinitely (there must be an original book), there can’t be an infinite series of explanations for the universe. As Copleston says, this version relies less on the physical nature of motion or causes, and so better supports the transcendent creator because a necessary being would have to be unlike all the contingent things we observe.
AO2: This version, prima facie, better supports the conclusion that there is a transcendent creator. *If the argument successfully shows there must be one necessary being that is the ultimate reason for contingent beings, then it makes sense to say this unique being is unlike anything in our experience. *Further, this version can respond to various classic objections to the cosmological argument. For example, Hume argued that the universe could in fact be infinite in time and cycle through random structures (the Epicurean thesis). Russell suggested the universe could be a “brute fact” and require no explanation. Both raised the fallacy of composition (even if each thing is contingent, it doesn’t mean the whole universe is contingent). But as Copleston points out, the fallacy doesn’t always apply (each element of my desk is wooden, it is reasonable to say the desk it wooden). He also says the universe is random or a brute fact it to just refuse an explanation, which is like refusing to play a game of chess so that you don’t lose. These appear to be convincing reasons to say a transcendent creator explains the universe better than the alternative. [Link back to wording of question and tell us where the argument is currently].
AO2: But the argument, even when based on necessity, does leap to its conclusion. *A crucial component of the cosmological argument is the rejection of an infinite regress. But many physicists now put forward the “Big Crunch” theory: the universe expands and recedes, Big Bang to Big Crunch. This offers a more scientific (rather than “transcendent”) explanation for the universe. *Crucially, the very idea of a necessary being, which is outside of our normal experience, faces serious challenges. As Hume, Kant, Russell and others argue, the idea of necessary existence makes no sense. If you can imagine a thing existing, you can imagine it not existing. To exist necessarily, as the transcendent creator supposedly does, means you cannot imagine God not existing — like a four-sided triangle. But clearly atheists, at least, can. *Perhaps most devastatingly from a theological point of view, this second version of the argument still doesn’t answer the challenge Hume posed about how there is no reason to say there is one creator, or that this creator has the transcendent attributes of the God of classical theism (omnibenevolent, omnipotent etc). [Link back to wording of question and tell us where the argument is currently].
Conclusion: [As with any conclusion, tell us the most important reason that you’ve argued for this side of the argument, and refer back to the wording of the question].
Intro: The cosmological argument is an a posteriori argument for God, proposed in Aquinas’ Summa Theologica. It argued that what we observe of the universe, such as causation, can only be explained by God. There is a distinction between the version of the argument in Aquinas’ first and second “ways” of proving God, and the third “way”, which is more similar to the argument from Leibniz. It can be argued that Aquinas’ third way is stronger than the other versions, all versions face fundamental problems.
In Summa Theologica, Aquinas puts forward three versions of the cosmological argument. The First Way (from motion) and the Second Way (from causation) are broadly similar. In Second Way, Aquinas observes that each event in the universe has an “efficient cause” (is brought about by something), and that cause itself it caused by a prior cause (you are caused by your parent, they by your grandparents etc). Aquinas rejects that this can go on in an infinite series because to say there is an infinite series of causes is the same as saying there is no cause for the series (if your family tree goes back infinitely, it can never have begun — so how are you here?) As such, there must be a First Cause and “this all men call God”.
AO2: There are reasons to support this version of the cosmological argument. *The argument is a posteriori, which could be convincing to empiricists or those of a scientific mindset. We can observe that events are caused, and the logic of the argument reasonably concludes there must be a first cause. *It seems equally reasonable to reject an infinite regress. As the mathematician Hilbert demonstrated with his “hotel paradox”, infinity surely cannot actually exist in reality — a hotel with infinite rooms and infinite guests would always be full but also always be able to take on more guests. This paradox makes Aquinas’ rejection of infinite regress seem convincing. *In addition, as Copleston argued, the cosmological argument has the strength of explaining the universe, giving it explanatory power. Explaining how the universe got here with God solves the puzzle of why anything exists at all, whilst avoiding the seemingly nonsensical idea of an infinite regress. [Link back to wording of question and tell us where the argument is currently].
AO2: But *Hume criticises the cosmological argument by saying that like effects must have like causes — a human gives birth to a human. As such, it is a leap to say that the First Cause is a God when all over causes are physical and finite knowable a posteriori. This suggests the premises do not support the conclusion. This is particularly convincing because, as a natural theologian, Aquinas is trying to use observation — but Hume’s observations seem more consistent. * In addition, as Hume points out against the teleological argument, there is no reason to say there is one creator, or that this is the God of classical theism (omnibenevolent, omnipotent etc). Aquinas’ argument is influenced by Aristotle’s Prime Mover, which could only think of itself because it could not be changed by anything — this is far from the God of Christianity. Hume convincingly suggests it is more likely that if there is a First Cause, it resembles the causes we can observe: finite, physical, flawed.*Then there is the fallacy of composition — as Russell said, just because each human has a mother, doesn’t mean there is a mother for all humans. This argument relies on the idea that a set has the same property as its members, which does not follow. This is very convincing because it means the cosmological argument would need extra evidence to support its conclusion. [Link back to wording of question and tell us where the argument is currently].
Aquinas’ Third Way, from necessity, was the influence of Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason and Copleston’s version of the argument. The Third Way states that given that we can observe each thing in the universe exists contingently (conditionally), and each thing it relies on also exists contingently, we can reason back along a series of contingencies to a necessary being — God. Again, an infinite regress makes no sense, Aquinas argues, because it is like saying the universe depends on nothing. As Leibniz pointed out, this makes logical sense: just as a book cannot be a copy of a copy going back infinitely (there must be an original book), there can’t be an infinite series of explanations for the universe. As Copleston says, this version relies less on the physical nature of motion or causes, and so better supports the conclusion of there being a God because a necessary being would have to be unlike all the contingent things we observe.
AO2: This version of the argument is more persuasive than Aquinas’ first two ways. *Firstly, as Leibniz’s suggested, this version of the argument relies on the convincing idea that things, in general, require an explanation. Whilst it is possible to say that something “just” exists as a “brute fact”, as Russell said of the universe, Anscombe says this is like saying that when a magicians pulling a rabbit from a top hat the rabbit simply popped into existence. Theoretically, it could have — but it seems more likely that there is an explanation. *This seems particularly persuasive when we consider that the scientific paradigm, which Russell claims to support, is precisely about explaining things. Every single entity in the universe we have observed is, indeed, explained by its dependency/contingency on something else. So why would the universe, as a whole, be the one exception to this general rule?
AO2: But even this version of the cosmological argument faces devastating criticisms. *A crucial component of the cosmological argument is the rejection of an infinite regress. But many physicists now put forward the “Big Crunch” theory: the universe expands and recedes, Big Bang to Big Crunch. This offers a more scientific (rather than “transcendent”) explanation for the universe. *This scientific theory supports Hume’s Epicurean thesis: that the universe could in fact be infinite in time and cycle through random structures. This undermines even Hilbert’s argument that infinity is impossible: science and the Epicurean thesis both suggest otherwise. This is not, as Anscombe suggested, like saying a rabbit pops into existence. Instead, given infinite time, anything may come into existence, including an entire universe of contingent entities. *Crucially, the very idea of a necessary being, which is outside of our normal experience, faces serious challenges. As Hume, Kant, Russell and others argue, the idea of necessary existence makes no sense. If you can imagine a thing existing, you can imagine it not existing. To exist necessarily, as the transcendent creator supposedly does, means you cannot imagine God not existing — like a four-sided triangle. But clearly atheists, at least, can. *Perhaps most devastatingly from a theological point of view, this second version of the argument still doesn’t answer the challenge Hume posed about how there is no reason to say there is one creator, or that this creator has the transcendent attributes of the God of classical theism (omnibenevolent, omnipotent etc). [Link back to wording of question and tell us where the argument is currently].
Conclusion: [As with any conclusion, tell us the most important reason that you’ve argued for this side of the argument, and refer back to the wording of the question].
Intro: Both the cosmological and teleological arguments are a posteriori (observation-based) argument for God, and a “logical fallacy” is an example of invalid reasoning, i.e. when the premises do not support the conclusion or because of a contradiction. Therefore, the focus of this question is not on whether the premises can be challenged empirically, or if there is an alternative explanation for the universe, but rather on if the arguments are internally coherent. Arguably, the cosmological argument has serious logical fallacies, whilst the teleological argument is much stronger.
Aquinas’ Third Way, from necessity, is the strongest version of the cosmological argument and was the influence for Leibniz’s Principle of Sufficient Reason and Copleston’s version of the argument. The Third Way states that given that we can observe each thing in the universe exists contingently (conditionally), and each thing it relies on also exists contingently, we can reason back along a series of contingent entities to a necessary being — God. Aquinas rejects that this can go on in an infinite series because as Leibniz pointed out, a book cannot be a copy of a copy going back infinitely (there must be an original book), there can’t be an infinite series of explanations for the universe. As Copleston says, this version relies less on the physical nature of the motion or causes than Aquinas’s other two versions, and so better supports the conclusion that there is a God because a necessary being would have to be unlike all the contingent things we observe.
AO2: The cosmological argument prima facie, seems valid. *It can respond to various classic objections to the cosmological argument. For example, Hume argued the conclusion of there being a God does not follow the premises because the universe could in fact be infinite in time and cycle through random structures (the Epicurean thesis). That may be the case, but it is no more valid as a conclusion than there being a God, so the argument is not fallacious. *Another apparent invalidity is that the argument claims, for example, that each thing is contingent but logically contradicts itself by saying that God is not contingent — Hume says we should argue from like effects to like causes, and by this logic God should also be contingent. But this is not a fallacy, because if we reject an infinite regress, it does follow logically that there must be one exception to the rule that all things are contingent, which is a necessary God. The rejection of infinite regress is therefore a crucial premise for this argument. [Link back to wording of question and tell us where the argument is currently].
AO2: But the cosmological argument faces some very persuasive challenges about its validity. *Firstly, Hume and Russell raised the fallacy of composition, which states that it is invalid to assume that the properties of a part apply to the whole. As Russell puts it, each human has a mother but it doesn’t follow there is one mother for all humanity. Even if each thing in the universe is contingent, it doesn’t mean the whole universe is contingent on something (God). *This is particularly devastating for the argument, even if we consider, as Copleston pointed out, that this fallacy doesn’t always apply (each element of my desk is wooden, it is reasonable to say the desk is wooden). But we can undermine this point with another point from Hume: we have not observed all events in the universe, so it is not valid to assume all events are caused or contingent in the first place. Unlike my desk, I can’t see all of the universe. So it is not valid to conclude that the only explanation for the universe is a necessary being — it either doesn’t follow, or at least needs more supporting premises. [Link back to wording of question and tell us where the argument is currently].
AO1: The teleological argument, from Aquinas and Paley, argues that because of observable design-like features in the universe, it is reasonable to infer that the universe has a designer. In Natural Theology, Paley uses an argument from analogy. He argues that a watch is complex and ordered with a purpose. Similarly, the natural world is complex and orderly with a purpose: he gives the example of the human eye, which through complicated mechanisms allows us to see. So, by analogy, it is reasonable to suppose the natural world also has a designer — God. In Summa Theologica, Aquinas offers another version of this argument based on the existence of regularity in the universe, which essentially says that the physical laws of the universe support the conclusion that God maintains such order and regularity through his will.
A02: There are fallacies in Paley’s version of the argument, even though strictly within the wording of the question Paley can survive certain powerful challenges. For example, Hume argued that the universe was not like a machine, that it could be infinite and cycle through random changes etc. But this isn’t a logical fallacy, only an alternative interpretation of the observable universe. *However, there is a fallacy at the heart of Paley’s argument — the teleological fallacy. Just because something (he gives the example of a human eye) serves a function, doesn’t mean it was designed with purpose. I can use a book as a functional doorstop, but it doesn’t follow the book was intended to be a doorstep. Here, Hume’s point about the universe being more like a vegetable, and the further point of Darwinian evolution (the human eye evolved because the genes were successful) do suggest a fallacy. These points highly the central assumption in Paley’s argument, that fulfilling a function implies purposeful design — this does not, locally, follow. *Even worse for Paley, a classic theist, we cannot use the teleological argument to validly conclude the God of classical theism exists. As Hume argues, there is no reason to say there is one creator, or that this God is omnibenevolent, omnipotent etc. None of these features follows from the premises of the argument. As Mill pointed out, the amount of evil in the universe makes it just as valid to conclude there is an evil God. [Link back to wording of question and tell us where the argument is currently].
AO2: But Aquinas can be defended against some of these accusations of logical fallacies. *Most convincingly, he is not guilty of the teleological fallacy because his argument is based on regulation, not telos. This is because Aquinas is seeking to explain the very existence of natural laws such as evolution itself. As Swinburne’s version of the argument puts it, it does follow logically that regularity is usually the result of a conscious person’s will (such as going for a walk at the same time every day), whereas inanimate objects have no will. As Swinburne says, the “temporal order” of the laws of nature cannot be explained by science, which only explains how they operate. Why is the process of random genetic mutation and replication o f genes there in the first place, unless it was designed? The point is not whether this interpretation of the universe is convincing. The point is Aquinas is not assuming there is a purpose to the natural world, so he avoids the teleological fallacy. *However, against the theological challenge that this argument cannot validly support the existence of the God of classical theism, Aquinas is just as vulnerable as Paley. It does not follow that a being which allowed laws of physics which produce earthquakes and cancer is “omnibenevolent”. There may be other arguments for that conclusion, but the design argument is fallacious if it tries to conclude there is a God of classical theism. But compared to the cosmological argument and Paley’s version of the argument, Aquinas is more convincing in avoiding logical fallacies.
Conclusion: [Link back to wording of question and tell us where the argument is currently].