Students are expected to study a range of texts that support and underpin their knowledge and understanding. The assessment will include two extended-response questions on an excerpt, sourced from this extracts list. The following texts are not exclusive to the topic areas under which they appear; students will need to be able to apply these texts across any suitable topic area. These are published in the A level Religious Studies Anthology: Paper 2 – Religion and Ethics which can be downloaded from our website.
(2) Kant I – Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Text, second section, pp. 29–53 (Yale University Press, 2002) ISBN 9780300094879
(3) Aristotle – The Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, Moral Virtue, pp. 23–37 (Oxford World’s Classics edition, 1980) ISBN 9780192815187
(4) Wilcockson M – Issues of Life and Death, Chapter 4 Euthanasia and Doctors’ Ethics, pp. 56–69 (Hodder Education, 1999) ISBN 9780340724880
2023 Q
When we talk about ethics, we mostly mean a series of rules and laws and principles by which we act and which tell us what to do. Mostly we take it that ethics classifies words and actions into things which are good and things which are bad, and we take it that the goodness and the badness belong to the thing as such.
On the whole this is meant to simplify things and to make life easy. It means that we have got, so we think, a series of prefabricated rules and laws and principles, which we accept and apply. It saves us from the difficult and the often dangerous task of making our own judgments and deciding things for ourselves.
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
3 (a) Clarify the ideas illustrated in this passage about ideas of good and bad 2023 Q
3a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.
The quoted passage discusses the conventional understanding of ethics as a set of rules, laws, and principles that classify actions, simplifying life by providing prefabricated guidelines. It suggests that this conventional approach saves individuals from the difficult and often dangerous task of making their own judgments and decisions.
To further clarify the ideas presented in this passage, we can explore the context of situation ethics and freedom, drawing on other scholars and the broader philosophical discourse. The passage aligns with the principles of situation ethics, notably advocated by Joseph Fletcher. Situation ethics rejects rigid, predetermined moral rules and emphasizes the importance of the unique circumstances of each situation in determining the morality of actions.
Fletcher, in his book "Situation Ethics," challenges the conventional view of ethics as a set of pre-established rules. He argues that strict adherence to fixed principles may lead to moral legalism, where individuals prioritize rules over the compassionate and loving response required by the situation. Fletcher's approach is about recognizing the freedom of individuals to make ethical decisions based on the particular context they face.
William Barclay, mentioned in the passage, was a Scottish theologian and biblical scholar. His work "Ethics in a Permissive Society" explores various ethical perspectives, including situation ethics. In the context of situation ethics, Barclay might highlight the liberating aspect of this ethical framework. The rejection of rigid rules allows individuals the freedom to engage with moral decisions dynamically, considering the unique circumstances of each situation.
Existentialist philosophers like Jean-Paul Sartre also contribute to the discourse on freedom in ethics. Sartre's concept of "radical freedom" aligns with the passage's suggestion that a rigid ethical framework may save individuals from the difficulty of making their own judgments but, at the same time, deprive them of genuine freedom and responsibility. Sartre emphasizes the existentialist idea that individuals are condemned to be free, meaning that they must take responsibility for their choices.
The passage is situated within the broader context of a paradigm shift in ethical thinking, moving away from deontological or rule-based ethics towards more flexible and context-dependent approaches. It reflects the challenges posed to traditional ethical frameworks and the advocacy for a more nuanced understanding of morality that incorporates freedom and individual responsibility.
In summary, the passage critiques the conventional understanding of ethics as a set of rules, aligning with the principles of situation ethics that emphasize the importance of considering unique circumstances. The context involves the contributions of Joseph Fletcher, William Barclay's exploration of ethical perspectives, and the existentialist emphasis on individual freedom, contributing to a broader philosophical discourse on the evolving landscape of ethical theories.
But in 1966 an American professor called Joseph Fletcher wrote a book called Situation Ethics, which has proved to be one of the most influential books written this century. Fletcher’s basic principle is that there is nothing which is universally right or universally wrong; there is nothing which is intrinsically good or intrinsically bad. Goodness and badness are not built in, essential, unchangeable qualities of anything; they are only things which happen to actions in different situations; they are only descriptions of things in different circumstances; they are not properties, they are predicates. According to this theory of ethics, there is no such thing as a predefinition of goodness or badness. What we have to take to any situation is not a prefabricated decision, but an act of judgment.
arguments and the illustrations are taken mainly from Fletcher’s two books,
Situation Ethics and Moral Responsibility.
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
3 (a) Clarify the ideas illustrated in this passage about ideas of good and bad 2023 Q
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.
The quoted passage introduces Joseph Fletcher's book "Situation Ethics" and outlines its fundamental principles. It highlights Fletcher's rejection of the idea of universal right or wrong and the intrinsic nature of goodness or badness. Instead, Fletcher argues that these moral qualities are situational and not inherent properties but descriptions that apply in different circumstances. The passage emphasizes that, according to Fletcher's theory of ethics, there is no predetermined definition of goodness or badness, and ethical decisions require acts of judgment rather than relying on prefabricated decisions.
To further clarify the ideas presented in this passage, we can explore the context of situation ethics and freedom, drawing on other scholars and related philosophical discussions.
Joseph Fletcher, as the proponent of situation ethics, challenges traditional ethical frameworks by rejecting the idea of fixed moral rules. His emphasis on the situational nature of ethics aligns with the broader philosophical movement of ethical relativism. Scholars like James Rachels, in his work "The Elements of Moral Philosophy," discuss ethical relativism, arguing that moral judgments are contingent on cultural, societal, or individual perspectives. Fletcher's situation ethics resonates with this relativistic view, asserting that ethical evaluations are not universally applicable but context-dependent.
The rejection of intrinsic moral properties aligns with the broader debate between ethical absolutism and relativism. Immanuel Kant, representing the absolutist perspective, argues for universal moral principles that apply regardless of the context. Fletcher's position challenges this absolutist stance by asserting that goodness and badness are not inherent qualities but descriptions that emerge in specific situations.
William Barclay, the author mentioned in the passage, engages with Fletcher's ideas in his book "Ethics in a Permissive Society." Barclay explores various ethical perspectives, and in the context of situation ethics, he might emphasize the liberating aspect of this framework. The rejection of predetermined definitions of goodness and badness allows individuals the freedom to make ethical decisions based on the unique circumstances they face.
Existentialist philosophers like Jean-Paul Sartre also contribute to the discourse on freedom in ethics. Sartre's concept of "radical freedom" aligns with Fletcher's rejection of prefabricated decisions. Both emphasize the idea that individuals have the freedom and responsibility to make ethical judgments without being bound by predetermined moral rules.
In summary, the passage introduces Joseph Fletcher's situation ethics, emphasizing the rejection of universal moral principles and intrinsic moral qualities. The context involves a broader philosophical discourse on ethical relativism, the rejection of absolutist perspectives, and the existentialist emphasis on individual freedom. Fletcher's ideas, as presented in "Situation Ethics," challenge traditional ethical frameworks and advocate for a more flexible, context-dependent approach to ethical decision-making.
Throughout this chapter the man does not as it were start from nothing. He knows all the rules and the principles; he knows all that the accumulated experience of human beings has found out. He knows that there are rules and principles; but he refuses to say that any principle is absolutely binding and always valid, right or wrong in itself. Bonhoeffer said: ‘Principles are only tools in the hand of God, soon to be thrown away as unserviceable.’ The situationist does not deny that there are principles; he does not for a moment deny the classifications of things that experience has built up; but he completely refuses to be shackled or bound by anything.
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.
The quoted passage addresses the concept of situation ethics and the associated rejection of absolute moral principles. It suggests that individuals, referred to as "the man," possess knowledge of rules and principles derived from accumulated human experience. However, the central idea is that despite acknowledging the existence of principles, the situationist refuses to consider any principle as absolutely binding, universally valid, or inherently right or wrong. The mention of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's perspective further emphasizes the provisional nature of principles, likening them to tools in the hand of God that may be discarded when deemed unserviceable. The situationist is characterized by the complete refusal to be shackled or bound by any fixed moral principles.
To further clarify the ideas presented in this passage, we can explore the context of situation ethics and freedom, drawing on other scholars and related philosophical discussions.
Joseph Fletcher, a prominent advocate of situation ethics, rejected the rigidity of traditional moral frameworks. His central argument was that ethical decisions should be context-dependent, with the unique circumstances of each situation determining the morality of actions. The rejection of absolute binding principles aligns with Fletcher's emphasis on the need for flexibility and adaptation in ethical decision-making.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, mentioned in the passage, was a German theologian known for his contributions to Christian ethics. His statement, "Principles are only tools in the hand of God, soon to be thrown away as unserviceable," suggests a theological perspective on the role of principles in moral decision-making. Bonhoeffer's view aligns with the rejection of fixed moral principles in situation ethics, emphasizing that principles are not inherently binding but serve a purpose and may be discarded when no longer useful.
William Barclay, the author mentioned in the passage, likely explores various ethical perspectives, including situation ethics, in his work "Ethics in a Permissive Society." In the context of situation ethics, Barclay might emphasize the liberating aspect of this framework. The rejection of predetermined definitions of goodness and badness allows individuals the freedom to make ethical decisions based on the unique circumstances they face.
Existentialist philosophers like Jean-Paul Sartre also contribute to the discourse on freedom in ethics. Sartre's concept of "radical freedom" aligns with the passage's suggestion that a rigid ethical framework may save individuals from the difficulty of making their own judgments but, at the same time, deprive them of genuine freedom and responsibility. Sartre emphasizes the existentialist idea that individuals are condemned to be free, meaning that they must take responsibility for their choices.
In summary, the passage explores the rejection of absolute moral principles in situation ethics, emphasizing the refusal to be bound by predetermined rules. The context involves the contributions of Joseph Fletcher, Dietrich Bonhoeffer's theological perspective on principles, and the broader engagement of scholars like William Barclay in the philosophical discussions of their time. Situation ethics is presented as a perspective that allows for flexibility, freedom, and adaptation in ethical decision-making.
We have got to qualify all this; for to the situationist there is one thing and one thing only that is absolutely, always and universally good – and that one thing is love. So Fletcher’s first two propositions are:
Only one thing is intrinsically good, namely love: nothing else. The ultimate norm of Christian decisions is love: nothing else.
Quite clearly we will have to be sure of just what love is. The situationist is not talking about what we might call romantic love. In Greek there are four words for love, there is erōs, which means passion; there is always sex in erōs. There is philia, which is friendship-feeling; there is physical love in philia, but there is loyalty and companionship as well. There is storgē, which is love in the family circle; there is no sex in it; it is the love of a father for a daughter, a son for his mother, a brother for a sister. And there is agapē; this is the word. Agapē is unconquerable goodwill; it is the determination always to seek the other man’s highest good, no matter what he does to you. Insult, injury, indifference – it does not matter; nothing but goodwill. It has been defined as purpose, not passion. It is an attitude to the other person.
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.
The quoted passage discusses the central idea of situation ethics, particularly emphasizing the role of love as the only thing that is intrinsically, always, and universally good. The passage outlines Joseph Fletcher's first two propositions, asserting that love is the ultimate norm of Christian decisions, and it is the only intrinsic good.
To further clarify the ideas presented in this passage, we can explore the context of situation ethics and the concept of love, drawing on other scholars and related philosophical discussions.
Joseph Fletcher, the architect of situation ethics, advocates for a moral framework that prioritizes love as the guiding principle. The rejection of absolute moral rules in favor of love aligns with Fletcher's belief that ethical decisions should be context-dependent, with love serving as the ultimate norm. Fletcher's propositions emphasize the primacy of love in all moral considerations, suggesting that love is the only intrinsic good that remains constant across different situations.
William Barclay, the author mentioned in the passage, likely explores and elaborates on Fletcher's ideas in his work "Ethics in a Permissive Society." The emphasis on love in situation ethics reflects a departure from rule-based ethics and aligns with the idea that the moral quality of an action is determined by the presence or absence of love. Barclay might further delve into the various dimensions of love, as outlined in Greek terminology (erōs, philia, storgē, and agapē).
The passage introduces the Greek distinctions of love, providing a nuanced understanding of agapē, the form of love that situation ethics upholds. The Greek terms for love—erōs, philia, storgē, and agapē—offer a spectrum of meanings. Erōs involves passion and always includes a sexual component. Philia encompasses friendship-feeling, with physical love, loyalty, and companionship. Storgē refers to family love without a sexual dimension, and agapē, as emphasized in situation ethics, is described as unconquerable goodwill. Agapē is characterized by the determination to seek the other person's highest good, irrespective of their actions.
In the broader context of moral philosophy, the emphasis on love in situation ethics draws parallels with the ethical theories of virtue ethics and utilitarianism. Virtue ethics emphasizes the cultivation of virtuous character traits, including love, as central to moral decision-making. Utilitarianism, on the other hand, focuses on the greatest good for the greatest number, aligning with the idea of seeking the other person's highest good in situation ethics.
In summary, the passage outlines the core proposition of situation ethics, highlighting love as the only intrinsic good that is universally and always applicable. The context involves the contributions of Joseph Fletcher, William Barclay's exploration of situation ethics, and the broader philosophical discourse on the role of love in ethical decision-making. Situation ethics is presented as a framework that prioritizes love as the ultimate norm in Christian moral decisions.
This is all important, because if we talk about this kind of love, it means thatwe can love the person we don’t like. This is not a matter of the reaction of the heart; it is an attitude of the will and the whole personality deliberately directed to the other man. You cannot order a man to fall in love in the romantic sense of the term. Falling in love is like stepping on a banana skin; it happens, and that is all there is to it. But you can say to a man: ‘Your attitude to others must be such that you will never, never, never want anything but their highest good.’
Obviously, when we define love like this, love is a highly intelligent thing. We must, as the Americans say, figure the angles. We must in any situation work out what love is. What does love demand?
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.
The quoted passage discusses the nature of love in the context of situation ethics, emphasizing that the kind of love being referred to is not based on emotional reactions but is rather an attitude of the will and the whole personality deliberately directed towards others. It underscores the idea that this form of love is a conscious choice, not merely a romantic or emotional feeling. The passage further explores the intelligence required in understanding and applying love, emphasizing the need to figure out the angles and determine what love demands in different situations.
To further clarify the ideas presented in this passage, we can explore the context of situation ethics and the concept of love, drawing on other scholars and related philosophical discussions.
Joseph Fletcher, the key proponent of situation ethics, argues for a love-centered approach to ethics, where the moral quality of actions is determined by the presence or absence of love. The passage reflects Fletcher's emphasis on agapē, a selfless and unconditional form of love, as the guiding principle in ethical decision-making. This type of love, as mentioned in the passage, requires a deliberate choice of the will and the entire personality to seek the highest good for others, regardless of personal feelings.
William Barclay, the author of the cited text, likely builds on Fletcher's ideas in his work "Ethics in a Permissive Society." The focus on the deliberate and intelligent nature of love in the passage aligns with the core principles of situation ethics as presented by Fletcher. Barclay may elaborate on the practical implications of applying such love in various ethical situations and the challenges that individuals might face in determining what love demands.
The passage introduces the idea that this form of love allows individuals to love those they may not necessarily like. This aligns with the expansive nature of agapē, which extends beyond personal preferences and emotions. The passage stresses that this kind of love is not an impulsive reaction but a conscious and reasoned choice, highlighting the intellectual aspect of ethical decision-making within the framework of situation ethics.
In the broader context of moral philosophy, the passage resonates with discussions on the role of reason and intelligence in ethical decision-making. Immanuel Kant, a key figure in moral philosophy, emphasized the importance of rationality in determining moral principles. The passage aligns with the idea that love, when understood and applied intelligently, becomes a guiding force in ethical behavior.
In summary, the passage elucidates the nature of love in situation ethics, emphasizing its deliberate and intelligent character. The context involves the contributions of Joseph Fletcher, William Barclay's exploration of situation ethics, and the broader philosophical discourse on the role of reason in ethical decision-making. Situation ethics is presented as a framework that requires a thoughtful and intentional application of love in determining what love demands in various situations.
Suppose, for instance, a house catches fire and in it there is a baby and the original of the Mona Lisa; which do you save the baby or the priceless and irreplaceable picture? There is really no problem here; you save the baby for a life is always of greater value than a picture.
But think of this one – suppose in the burning house there is your aged father, an old man, with the days of his usefulness at an end, and a doctor who has discovered a cure for one of the world’s great killer diseases, and who still carries the formulae in his head, and you can save only one – whom do you save? Your father who is dear to you, or the doctor in whose hands there are thousands of lives? Which is love?
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a. Clarify the ideas illustrated in this passage about love in relation to situation ethics. (10)You must refer to the passage in your response.
b. Analyse the extent to which situation ethics serves as a reliable foundation for ethical decision making. (20
The quoted passage raises a moral dilemma to illustrate the application of love within the framework of situation ethics. The scenario involves a choice between saving an aged father, who holds personal significance, and a doctor with the potential to save thousands of lives due to a life-saving formula he carries in his head. The question posed challenges the reader to consider which action aligns with the principle of love within the context of situation ethics.
To clarify the ideas presented in this passage, let's explore the context of situation ethics, the concept of love, and draw on other scholars.
Joseph Fletcher, the main proponent of situation ethics, advocates for a love-centered approach to morality. The scenario presented in the passage aligns with Fletcher's belief that ethical decisions should be context-dependent, with love as the guiding principle. The choice between saving a loved one and a person with the potential to save numerous lives reflects the situational nature of ethical decisions in situation ethics.
In this ethical dilemma, the passage suggests that the decision must be guided by love, which requires a thoughtful consideration of the circumstances. The inherent tension in choosing between a personal attachment (the aged father) and the potential for greater overall good (the doctor with the life-saving formula) brings to light the complexities involved in applying the principle of love in different situations.
Other scholars, such as utilitarian philosophers, may provide additional perspectives on this moral dilemma. Utilitarianism, notably associated with figures like Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, focuses on maximizing overall happiness or well-being. In the scenario, a utilitarian perspective might argue for saving the doctor, as this action has the potential to bring about the greatest overall good by saving thousands of lives.
However, situation ethics, as illustrated in the passage, emphasizes the centrality of love and allows for a more nuanced consideration of the specific context. William Barclay, the author of the cited text, may elaborate on how situation ethics guides individuals to make decisions based on love that are contextually appropriate, recognizing the unique factors at play in each situation.
The passage challenges a simplistic view of ethics and prompts readers to grapple with the complexities involved in applying the principle of love in real-life situations. It underscores the idea that ethical decisions are not always straightforward and may require a thoughtful examination of the circumstances to determine what love demands in a given situation.
In summary, the passage uses a moral dilemma to illustrate the application of love within the context of situation ethics. The choice between saving a loved one and a person with the potential to save many lives highlights the nuanced and context-dependent nature of ethical decisions within the framework of situation ethics. The tension between personal attachment and the potential for greater overall good invites readers to consider the complexities involved in applying the principle of love in different situations.
On the Wilderness Trail, Daniel Boone’s trail westward through Cumberland
Gap to Kentucky, many families in the trail caravans lost their lives to the Indians.
A Scottish woman had a baby at the breast. The baby was ill and crying, and the baby’s crying was betraying her other three children and the rest of the party; the party clearly could not remain hidden if the baby continued crying; their position would be given away. Well, the mother clung to the baby; the baby’s cries led the Indians to the position; and the party was discovered and all were massacred, there was another such occasion. On this occasion there was a Negro woman in the party. Her baby too was crying and threatening to betray the party. She strangled the baby with her own two hands to stop it’s crying – and the whole party escaped. Which action was love? The action of the mother who kept her baby and brought death to it and to herself and to all, or the action of the mother who killed the baby and saved the lives of the caravan? Here is the kind of decision with which the situationist confronts us; which action was love?
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.
The quoted passage presents a moral dilemma within the context of situation ethics, focusing on a scenario involving life-and-death decisions made by individuals in a trail caravan facing a threat from Indians. The situation involves two mothers, one deciding to keep her crying baby despite the danger it poses to the group, while the other mother chooses to strangle her crying baby to prevent the group's discovery and potential massacre. The passage challenges readers to consider which action aligns with the principle of love within the framework of situation ethics.
To clarify the ideas presented in this passage, let's explore the context of situation ethics, the concept of love, and draw on other scholars.
Joseph Fletcher, the main proponent of situation ethics, emphasizes the centrality of love as the guiding principle in ethical decision-making. In this scenario, the situationist approach would involve evaluating the circumstances and choosing the action that maximizes love in the given situation. The tension between preserving individual life (the mother who kept her baby) and prioritizing the greater good for the group (the mother who sacrificed her baby to save the caravan) reflects the nuanced decision-making process advocated by situation ethics.
In this moral dilemma, the passage prompts readers to question traditional moral absolutes and consider the contextual factors that may influence ethical choices. William Barclay, the author of the cited text, likely uses this scenario to illustrate how situation ethics challenges rigid ethical rules and allows for a more flexible, context-dependent approach based on the principle of love.
Other scholars, particularly those who advocate for deontological ethics, may provide contrasting perspectives. Deontological ethics, associated with philosophers like Immanuel Kant, emphasizes adherence to moral rules and duties regardless of the consequences. From a deontological standpoint, the intentional killing of an innocent child, even to prevent harm to others, might be deemed morally impermissible.
Utilitarian philosophers, such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, might analyze the scenario based on the principle of maximizing overall happiness or well-being. They could argue that the mother who sacrificed her baby for the greater good of the group acted in a way that aligns with utilitarian principles.
In summary, the passage uses a tragic scenario to highlight the complexities of ethical decision-making within the framework of situation ethics. The tension between individual well-being and the greater good challenges readers to reconsider traditional moral norms and adopt a more flexible, context-sensitive approach based on the principle of love. The passage underscores the dynamic nature of situation ethics, where decisions are contingent on the specific circumstances and the pursuit of love guides ethical choices.
The situationist is always confronting us with decisions. There is no absolute right and wrong; we have to work it out in each situation. There are principles, of course, but they can only advise; they do not have the right of veto. Any principle must be abandoned, left, disregarded, if the command to love your neighbour can be better served by so doing.
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.
A friend of Fletcher’s arrived in St Louis just as a presidential campaign was ending. He took a cab and the cabdriver volunteered the information: ‘I and my father and my grandfathers and their fathers have always been straight ticket Republicans.’ ‘Ah,’ said Fletcher’s friend who is himself a Republican, ‘I take it that means you will vote for Senator So-and-so.’ ‘No,’ said the driver, ‘there are times when a man has to push his principles aside, and do the right thing!’ There are times when principles become wrong – even when they are right.
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.
The quoted passage encapsulates the key ideas of situation ethics, emphasizing the centrality of decision-making, the absence of absolute right and wrong, and the priority of the command to love one's neighbor. Let's explore and clarify these ideas, drawing on other scholars and providing context.
The passage suggests that situation ethics places a significant emphasis on the act of decision-making. According to Joseph Fletcher, the main proponent of situation ethics, ethical decisions are not predetermined by absolute rules or principles. Instead, individuals are constantly confronted with unique situations, and the moral choice must be worked out in each specific circumstance. This dynamic and context-dependent approach to decision-making distinguishes situation ethics from more rule-based ethical theories.
The passage asserts that there is no absolute right and wrong in situation ethics. This aligns with Fletcher's rejection of rigid moral absolutes and his insistence that the morality of an action depends on the specific context. Unlike deontological ethical theories, which prescribe fixed rules, situation ethics allows for a more flexible evaluation of actions based on the principle of love.
While principles exist in situation ethics, the passage suggests that their role is advisory rather than prescriptive. Principles can offer guidance, but they do not have the authority to veto a decision if acting contrary to the principle would better serve the command to love one's neighbor. This highlights the primacy of the love command in situation ethics, allowing for a nuanced and context-sensitive application of moral principles.
William Barclay, the author of the cited text, likely uses this passage to articulate the fundamental tenets of situation ethics and its departure from more traditional ethical frameworks. The rejection of moral absolutism and the emphasis on love as the guiding principle showcase the distinctive features of situation ethics. Barclay may intend to encourage readers to grapple with the challenges and responsibilities that come with making ethical decisions in diverse and complex situations.
Scholars such as Immanuel Kant, associated with deontological ethics, would likely critique situation ethics for its rejection of absolute moral rules. Kant's categorical imperative posits that moral principles are universal and must be followed irrespective of the consequences.
Utilitarian philosophers, on the other hand, might find common ground with situation ethics in the emphasis on consequences. However, situation ethics focuses on the well-being of individuals in specific situations, whereas utilitarianism seeks to maximize overall happiness or pleasure.
In summary, the passage succinctly captures the essence of situation ethics, emphasizing the role of decision-making, the absence of absolute moral standards, and the paramount importance of the command to love one's neighbor. This ethical framework encourages a flexible and context-dependent approach to moral choices, challenging traditional notions of right and wrong.
The other is a story from Nash‘s play The Rainmaker. The Rainmaker makes love to a spinster girl in a barn at midnight. He does not really love her, but he is determined to save her from becoming spinsterised; he wants to give her back her womanhood, and to rekindle her hopes of marriage and children. Her morally outraged brother threatens to shoot him. Her father, a wise old rancher, says to his son: ‘Noah, you’re so full of what’s right that you can’t see what’s good.’ For the situationist a thing that is labelled wrong can be in certain circumstances the only right thing.
This leads us to the second of Fletcher’s basic principles. Fletcher lays it down:
Love and justice are the same thing, for justice is love distributed, nothing else.
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.
The passage illustrates a scenario from Nash's play The Rainmaker, where a character known as The Rainmaker engages in a sexual encounter with a spinster girl in a barn. The Rainmaker's motivation is not genuine love but a determination to prevent the girl from remaining unmarried and childless. The brother reacts with moral outrage, threatening violence, while the father offers a perspective that challenges a rigid adherence to what is deemed morally right.
The passage discusses the challenge to Traditional Morality: The father's statement, "Noah, you’re so full of what’s right that you can’t see what’s good," challenges conventional notions of morality. It suggests that a strict adherence to societal norms or moral labels may obscure the potential goodness or positive outcomes in certain situations, even if the actions are conventionally considered wrong. The passage introduces a scenario from Nash's play, illustrating the situationist perspective that challenges conventional moral labels. The Rainmaker's actions, engaging with a woman in a barn at midnight, may be labeled as morally wrong, but the situationist argues that in certain circumstances, what is conventionally seen as wrong could be the morally right thing to do. This challenges rigid moral categorizations and emphasizes the importance of considering the context in ethical evaluations.
The passage further discusses the Situational Morality and Fletcher’s Principle: The passage introduces Joseph Fletcher's second basic principle of situation ethics, asserting that "Love and justice are the same thing, for justice is love distributed, nothing else." This principle implies that in a situational context, actions motivated by love can be synonymous with just actions. Justice, in this framework, is seen as the distribution of love in varying circumstances.
The passage further discusses the prioritizing the Good over the Right: The father's remark, "Noah, you’re so full of what’s right that you can’t see what’s good," underscores the tension between what is perceived as morally right and what is genuinely good in a given situation. This aligns with situation ethics' emphasis on prioritizing the overall good, especially in situations where rigid adherence to moral rules might overlook the greater good. It suggests that a narrow focus on what is conventionally deemed right might hinder the recognition of genuine goodness in specific contexts.
In context Fletcher’s Contribution to Situation Ethics is signisificant. Joseph Fletcher, a key figure in the development of situation ethics, challenges absolutist moral frameworks. His emphasis on love as the guiding principle allows for a nuanced evaluation of actions based on the specific context. In situations where traditional moral labels may designate an action as wrong, Fletcher's principles suggest that the motivation of love can transform it into the morally right choice.
The passage further discusse the connection between love and justice: Fletcher's proposition that love and justice are indistinguishable underscores the interconnectedness of ethical considerations. In situation ethics, justice is not divorced from love but is, in fact, an expression of love tailored to the circumstances. This challenges notions that justice must adhere strictly to predetermined moral rules. Love and Justice are Equivalent. The passage introduces Fletcher's second basic principle: "Love and justice are the same thing, for justice is love distributed, nothing else." This principle emphasizes the inseparable connection between love and justice within the framework of situation ethics. Fletcher posits that justice, understood as the fair distribution of love, aligns with the central principle of love. This perspective challenges notions that depict love and justice as distinct ethical principles, emphasizing their intrinsic connection.
William Barclay's "Ethics in a Permissive Society" introduces these ideas to elucidate the nuanced approach of situation ethics. The examples from literature and drama serve to illustrate how situation ethics diverges from traditional moral frameworks. This passage illustrates the narrative dimension often employed by Fletcher to elucidate his ethical principles. Scholars like Immanuel Kant, who emphasized the importance of moral rules, might critique Fletcher's approach for its seemingly flexible stance on right and wrong. Such Deontological Views: Scholars adhering to deontological ethics, such as Immanuel Kant, might criticize situation ethics for seemingly justifying actions that are conventionally considered wrong. Kantian ethics prioritizes adherence to moral duties, emphasizing universal principles rather than context-specific judgments. However, situation ethics introduces a dynamic perspective where actions are evaluated based on the motivation of love in specific situations, challenging the rigidity of traditional moral frameworks.
We can relate love and justice in different ways. Sometimes people think of love versus justice, as if love and justice were against each other; or love or justice, as if you had to choose one or the other, but could not have both; or love and justice as if the two things complemented each other. But for Fletcher love is justice; love and justice are one and the same thing. This is a new idea. Niebuhr, the great American teacher, used to say that the difference is that love is transcendent and love is impossible; while justice is something by which we can live in this present society. Brunner held that the difference is that love must be between two persons; whereas justice exists between groups. But Fletcher will have it that love is the same thing as justice. How does he make this out?
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.
Accept the fact that the one absolute is love. Then love has to be worked out in the situations of life – and the working of it out is justice, Justice, it is said, consists of giving each man his due; but the one thing that is due to every man is love; therefore love and justice are the same. Justice, says Fletcher, is love distributed. When we are confronted with the claims of more than one person, of three or four people, we have to give them love, and it is justice which settles just how love is to be applied to each of them. Justice is love working out its problems.
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.
So then unless love is to be a vague sentimental generalised feeling, there must be justice, because justice is love applied to particular cases. This is precisely what is so often the matter with love, the fact that it never gets worked out and never gets beyond being a feeling and an emotion. Some time ago – Fletcher cites the case – Sammy Davis Jr. the great entertainer became a Jew, and thereby repudiated Christianity. ‘As I see it,’ he said, ‘the difference is that the Christian
religion preaches, Love thy neighbour, and the Jewish religion preaches justice, and
I think that justice is the big thing we need.’ Sammy Davis is black, and he knew all about so-called Christian love. As Fletcher says, there are many people who would claim that they love black people, and who at the same time deny them simple justice. Fletcher goes on: ‘To paraphrase the classic cry of protest, we can say: To hell with your love; we want justice.’ This is exactly what happens when justice and love are not equated.
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.
This means that love has always got to be thinking; love has always got to be calculating. Otherwise love is like the bride who wanted to ignore all recipes and simply let her love for her husband guide her when she was baking him a cake.
Love has to think, wisely, deeply, intelligently
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.
Are we going to be driven to this conclusion that nothing is absolutely right and that apparently still less is anything absolutely wrong, and that it all depends on the situation? Is it true that goodness and badness are not qualities which are built into actions, but things which happen to an action within a situation, that they are not properties but predicates?
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.
Let us take one last example from Fletcher. He entitles it Sacrificial Adultery.
As the Russian armies drove forward to meet the Americans and the British, a Mrs
Bergmeier, who was out foraging for food for her children and herself, was picked up. Without being able to get a word to the children she was taken away to a prison work camp in the Ukraine. Meanwhile her husband was captured and ended up in a prison camp in Wales. Ultimately the husband was released. He came back to Germany and after weeks of search he found the children, the two youngest in a Russian detention school and the oldest hiding in a cellar. They had no idea where their mother was. They never stopped searching for her. They knew that only her return could ever knit that family together again after all that had happened to them. Meanwhile away in the Ukraine a kindly camp commandant told Mrs Bergmeier that her family were together again and that they were trying to find her. But he could not release her, for release was only given for two reasons. First, a prisoner was released if he or she was suffering from a disease with which the camp could not cope, and was in that case moved to a Russian hospital. Second, a woman was released if she became pregnant. In that case women were returned to Germany as being a liability and no use for work. Mrs Bergmeier thought it out, and finally she decided to ask a friendly Volga German camp guard to make her pregnant. He did. Her condition was medically verified. She was sent back to Germany and received with open arms by her family. She told them what she had done and they thoroughly approved. In due time the baby was born. Dietrich they called him and they loved him most of all because they felt he had done more for them than any one of the others. And for the German guard they had nothing but a grateful and affectionate memory. So what? Right or wrong? Adultery or love? Which?
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.
What, then, are we to say to all this? The situationist claims that nothing is absolutely right and nothing is absolutely wrong; it all depends on the situation. Goodness and badness are not something intrinsic, but things that happen to actions in the doing. What are we to say?
First, we can begin with something which is a criticism not so much of situation ethics as it is of Fletcher’s presentation of it. The trouble is that by far the greater number of Fletcher’s illustrations are drawn from the abnormal, the unusual and the extraordinary. I am not very likely to be confronted with an Arab blood feud or a war situation in Eastern Germany. It is much easier to agree that extraordinary situations need extraordinary measures than to think that there are no laws for ordinary everyday life.
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.
The quoted passage addresses the concept of ethical relativism within the framework of situation ethics, asserting that nothing is inherently right or wrong, and moral judgment is contingent on the specific circumstances. It suggests that goodness and badness are not intrinsic qualities but rather outcomes that occur during the execution of actions. The passage then introduces a critique, primarily directed at Joseph Fletcher's presentation of situation ethics. The criticism revolves around Fletcher's heavy reliance on illustrations from abnormal, unusual, and extraordinary situations, making it challenging to apply these principles to ordinary, everyday life. The passage implies that the overemphasis on extreme cases might undermine the practicality and relevance of situation ethics in more commonplace scenarios.
To further clarify these ideas, we can explore the context of ethical relativism and situation ethics. Ethical relativism posits that morality is not absolute and can vary based on cultural, societal, or individual perspectives. Situation ethics, as advocated by Joseph Fletcher, is a specific form of ethical relativism that emphasizes the importance of context in determining the morality of actions. Fletcher argues that rigid moral rules may not be universally applicable and that ethical decisions should be based on the unique circumstances of a situation.
The critique in the passage aligns with broader philosophical discussions on the challenges and criticisms of ethical relativism. Scholars like Bernard Williams have questioned the feasibility of purely situation-based ethics, expressing concerns about the lack of a stable moral framework. Williams argues that relying solely on situational factors might lead to moral inconsistency and a lack of moral guidance in ordinary life.
Additionally, the passage implicitly engages with the debate between absolutism and relativism in ethics. Absolutists argue for universal moral principles that apply regardless of the context, while relativists contend that moral judgments are contingent on specific situations. Scholars like Immanuel Kant represent the absolutist perspective, asserting the existence of categorical imperatives that prescribe universal moral duties. The passage's criticism of situation ethics echoes concerns raised by absolutists about the potential moral ambiguity and lack of clear ethical guidelines in relativistic approaches.
In summary, the passage delves into the ideas of ethical relativism within situation ethics, highlighting a critique of Joseph Fletcher's reliance on extraordinary examples. The broader context involves discussions on ethical relativism, the challenges of situation-based ethics, and debates between absolutist and relativist perspectives. The passage suggests a tension between the need for moral principles in ordinary life and the flexibility advocated by situation ethics in responding to unique situations.
Second – and this is a much more serious matter – situation ethics presents us with a terrifying degree of freedom. There we are in front of our situation; we have no prefabricated judgment; you – just you – have to make the right decision. Brunner has said that there is nowhere you can go – not even to the Sermon on the Mount and say: ‘Now I know what to do.’ There is no such thing as a readymade decision. Of course, we know the things that experience has discovered and teaches, but we are left alone in complete freedom to apply them.
Fletcher is quite right when he says that basically men do not want freedom.
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) Clarify the ideas illustrated in this passage about freedom within situation ethics. (10) You must refer to the passage in your response.
b. Analyse the extent to which the weaknesses in situation ethics undermine the strengths. (20)
There is no doubt that most people do not want to be continually confronted with the necessity of making decisions. They would rather have their decisions made for them; they would rather apply laws and principles to the situation. And it may well be that people are right.
The right use of freedom in our relationships with others depends on love. If love is perfect, then freedom is a good thing. But if there is no love, or if there is not enough love, then freedom can become licence, freedom can become selfishness and even cruelty. If you leave a man without love to do as he likes, then the damage that he can do is incalculable. It may well be that neither I nor any other person is at this stage ready for this lonely freedom which the situationist offers us. The situationists have a kind of phobia of law, but the lesson of experience is that we need a certain amount of law, being the kind of people we are.
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.
If all men were saints, then situation ethics would be the perfect ethics. John
A. T. Robinson has called situation ethics ‘the only ethic for man come of age’. This is probably true – but man has not yet come of age. Man, therefore, still needs the crutch and the protection of law. If we insist that in every situation every man must make his own decision, then first of all we must make man morally and lovingly fit to take that decision; otherwise we need the compulsion of law to make him do it. And the fact is that few of us have reached that stage; we still need law, we still need to be told what to do, and sometimes even to be compelled to do it.
Thirdly, the situationist points out again and again that in his view there is nothing which is intrinsically good or bad. Goodness and badness, as he puts it, are not properties, they are predicates. They are not inbuilt qualities; they happen to a thing in a given situation. I am very doubtful if the distinction between goodness and badness can be so disposed of.
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.
I think that there are things which can in no circumstances be right, To take but two examples, to start a young person in the name of experience on the experiments which can lead to drug addiction can never be right. To break up a family relationship in the name of so-called love can never be right. The right and the wrong are not so easily eliminated.
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.
Fourth, the situationist is liable to forget two things.
(a) He is liable to forget what psychological aids can do for abnormal conditions. Fletcher took instances of cures being effected by what the Christian would simply regard as committing adultery. He cites the instance of the man who was a danger to small girls being cured by intercourse with a mature woman. It is to be noted that such an action would by no means guarantee a cure for a man in such a condition anyway. He quotes the play The Rainmaker, in which the Rainmaker deliberately seduces the farmer’s daughter to save her, as he claimed, from being ‘spinsterised’. This completely leaves out of account the very real possibility of sublimation... There is many an unmarried woman who is very, very far from being a ‘frustrated spinster’ because she has found fullness of life in some other outlet. There is many a man who has had to do without marriage and who has sublimated his sex drive into other achievements and other service. One may speculate whether John Wesley would have been such a dynamic founder of a new church if he had been happily married. He poured into the church what he might have kept within the limits of a home. There are cures and compensations for abnormal conditions which do not involve breaking what we have learned to call the moral law – and in point of fact these cures are far more effective.
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.
(b) And above all, the situationist is liable to forget quite simply the grace of
God. Unless Christianity is a total swindle, then it must make good its claim to make bad men good. To encourage towards permissiveness is no real cure; to direct to the grace of God is.
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.
The situationists have taught us that we must indeed be flexible; that we must
indeed look on the problems of others, not with self-righteousness, but with sympathy; that we must not be legalists; but in spite of that we do well still to remember that there are laws which we break at our peril.
In the background of our discussion of situation ethics there has always been the idea of law. Sometimes, in fact, it has almost seemed that the idea of law and the idea of situation ethics formed a contrast and even an antithesis. I did say at one point that the situationists seemed to have a phobia of law.
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.
I have left to the end one very important view of law. It is a view which is largely, but not quite universally, accepted. It is the view that it is always public morals with which the law is concerned, and never private morals, unless these private morals are an offence to public decency or a threat to public welfare. In other words, these are many things which are immoral, but which are not illegal. Or, to put it in another way, there is a wide difference between sin, with which the law is not concerned, and crime, with which the law is deeply concerned. To take the case of sexual morality, so long as a sexual act is by common consent between two adults, so long as it cannot be held to have hurt or injured either, and so long as it is carried on in a way that does not offend public decency or interfere with public order, then it is not the concern of the law. This has always been the law in regard to prostitution in this country. It has never been illegal to have sexual intercourse with a prostitute. What is illegal is solicitation, which is an offence against public order. Very recently, the situation has become the same in regard to homosexual practices, which until then were illegal as such.
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) a. Clarify the ideas illustrated in this passage about a situationist approach to sexual ethics. (10) You must refer to the passage in your response.
b. Analyse the strengths and weaknesses of situation ethics in dealing with the debates surrounding sexual ethics.
Similarly, the Wolenden Report says:
It should not be the duty of the law to concern itself with immorality as such...
It should confine itself to these activities which offend against public order and decency, or expose the ordinary citizens to what is offensive and injurious.
On this view the law has nothing to do with a man’s private morals, but everything to do with his public conduct.
…So the official and the personal point of view combine to hold that private morality is no affair of the State or of the law, unless it has public effects. For the moment we shall leave this, and we shall very soon return to it.
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.
The trouble about this whole question is that it presents us with a series of tensions, which are built into the problem of the connection between morality and law.
i. There is the tension between freedom and law. Here the situationists are very definite. Fletcher writes: ‘Nothing we do is truly moral unless we are free to do otherwise. We must be free to decide what to do before any of our actions even begin to be moral. No discipline but self-discipline has any moral significance. This applies to sex, politics or anything else. A moral act is a free act, done because we
want to . . . Morality is meaningless apart from freedom’ (J. Fletcher, Moral
Responsibility, p. 136).
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.
On the face of it, this is true. But – and it is a very big but – who of us is, in fact, free? Our heredity, our environment, our upbringing, the traditions we have inherited, our temperament, the cumulative effect of our previous decisions all have an effect upon us. Again it is of the first importance that freedom does not only mean that a man is free to do a thing; it must also mean that he is free not to do it – and that is exactly where our past comes in. Most of us have made ourselves such that we are not free. The whole trouble about freedom is that for many of us it is an illusion.
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.
ii. There is the tension between immorality and illegality. We have already made the point that there are many things which are immoral but which are not illegal. For instance, to take a crude example, prostitution is immoral, but it is not illegal. We have seen that the common, one might say the orthodox, view is that the law has nothing to do with private morals, but only with public morality. Not everyone agrees with that. So prominent a jurist as Lord Devlin did not agree with the Wolfenden Report. He said that it was wrong to talk of ‘private morality’ at all. He holds that ‘the suppression of vice is as much the law’s business as the suppression of subversive activities’.
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.
But suppose we do accept the Christian ethic as it is in the teaching of Jesus; suppose we accept it ourselves and suppose that we are convinced that it is the best prescription for the life of society. Are we then quite happy if the law progressively makes what we think wrong easier? Are we quite happy about the legalising of consenting homosexuality? Are we quite happy about the easing of divorce regulations? Would we be quite happy to find it enacted that unmarried students living together and begetting a child should then become eligible for the same grants as married people? The trouble is that once a thing is not forbidden, it may be felt not only to be permitted but to be encouraged. It could be argued that what the law permits, it approves… It is here, in fact, that the public aspect of private morality comes in. A man can live his own life, but when he begins deliberately to alter the lives of others, then a real problem arises, on which we cannot simply turn our backs, and in which there is a place for law as the encourager of morality.
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.
iii. There is the tension between the individual and the community. This is the tension between individualism and solidarity. In the early days of Judaism there was such solidarity that the individual as an individual had hardly any independent existence... They say that to this day if you ask a man in a primitive society what his name is, he will begin by telling you, not his name, but his tribe. But in our time it is the individual who is stressed. Self-development, self-expression, selfrealisation have become the watchwords of modern society. Too much law means the obliteration of the individual; too much individualism means the weakening of law. It so happens that today we are living in a time of individualism, but a man will do well to remember that it can never be right to develop himself at the expense of others.
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.
We may well come to the conclusion that one of the great problems of the present situation is to adjust the delicate balance between freedom and law, and between the individual and society. And the only solution is that a man should discover what it means to love his neighbour as himself.
Taken from (1) Barclay W – Ethics in a Permissive Society, Chapter 4 Situation Ethics, pp. 69–91 (HarperCollins Distribution Services, 1972)
a) Outline and clarify the different ideas presented in this passage about situation ethics and freedom.