Hume’s Fork
Ethical Naturalism
Emotivism
Intuitionism
Hurrah-Boo Theory
The Is-Ought Problem
The Open Question Argument
Prima Facie Duties
David Hume (1711CE – 1776CE)
A.J. Ayer (1910CE – 1989CE)
G.E. Moore (1873CE – 1958CE)
W.D. Ross (1877CE – 1971CE)
Principia Ethica by G.E. Moore
Language Truth & Logic by A.J. Ayer
OTHER
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong by J.L. Mackie
Recent ethical debate has moved away from normative ethics and in the 20th century has begun to focus on meta-ethics . Meta-ethics is a discipline in ethics that attempts to understand the nature of ethical statements, attitudes, properties and judgements.
Specifically, the key issue of what the terms “good” and “right” mean and whether ethical statements tell us objective facts or are just subjective opinions
Meta-ethics doesn't attempt to tell us what makes something right or wrong or how to act; that is the focus of normative ethics. Meta-ethics analyses the reasoning behind ethical language and moral terms such as 'good' and 'right'
There are two main views:
Cognitivism: moral truths exist independently of our mind and can be true or false; terms such as 'right' and wrong' correspond to facts in the world.
Non-cognitivism: there is no such thing as moral truth in the world; moral ‘facts’ are subjective emotional responses.
Main concerns of meta-ethics is to understand the relationship between facts and values.
Fact is a true or false statement. E.g. There are two people in the room.
Value is a belief, judgement or attitude. E.g. 'Killing is always wrong.
Issue is whether a value judgement, such as 'Abortion is wrong', can be considered a fact.
Most cognitivists are moral realists: they argue that, factually, certain actions are right or wrong.
Moral judgements can be objective moral facts - they are based on what the world is, independent of our minds.
Non-cognitivists are moral anti-realists: argue that moral facts don’t exist. A moral judgements express a value, which is subjective and mind-dependent.
In the 18th Century, Scottish philosopher David Hume put forward was has become known as Hume’s Fork.
Hume’s Fork states that objective factual statements about the universe can only be known empirically or analytically
But when we look at ethical statements they are neither empirical nor analytically known and so cannot be objective
There have been numerous attempts to solve Hume’s Fork such as Ethical Naturalism and Intuitionism.
Alternatively, Emotivism accepts Hume’s conclusion that ethical statements are not objective and attempts to explain how we use them instead
Hume argued that deriving what ought to be done from what is the case is an example of false deduction.
Non-cognitivists argue that we cannot reason from statements of fact to statements of value. The fact that a foetus feels pain doesn't dictate that women should or shouldn't have an abortion.
Values are not in the world; they are emotional responses to the world – the values we ascribe to them.
if moral judgements are not factual non-cognitivism cannot claim that something like rape or genocide is inherently wrong, and it cannot account for moral progress.
Cognitivists attempt to bridge the gap between 'is’ and 'ought’ and argue that morality is attached to certain facts and ideas that all people share and can be found through reason, experience or intuition.
Cognitivists account better for moral truth and moral progress because there is moral knowledge: it is possible to say that slavery, rape and genocide are wrong.
Cognitivists are not always successful in accounting for moral motivation: I might have the moral knowledge that stealing is wrong but do it anyway.
How good is defined: “There are objective moral facts and properties and these moral facts and properties are natural facts and properties.” This means that good is defined as something that is naturally occurring in the world, and is equated with pleasure. In this case, good refers to the feeling of pleasure, whereas bad refers to the feeling of pain.
Naturalism is the view that there are moral properties in the world.
It’s a cognitivist and realist argument and is empiricist in nature.
Moral judgements come from our experience of the world; a moral term, such as good', can be understood in natural terms, which means we can explain what the term good' means with reference to things that are not moral.
So for naturalists:
The Good is a natural property of the world. A natural property can be a physical or a psychological feature.
We can infer from those properties what the Good actually is.
Utilitarianism argues for psychological properties. For J. S. Mill, the utilitarian understanding of human nature and human motivation is the origin of morality.
Which scholars and theories are naturalistic:
Bentham’s Utilitarianism is naturalistic because of the Utility Principle, that morality is based on whether or not an action causes pain or pleasure. He is hedonistic, atheist and democratic in his understanding of what constitutes morality.
How naturalistic perspectives make moral decisions: As well as simply considering, from our own experience, what actions cause pleasure in comparison to those that cause pain, Bentham also offers the Hedonic Calculus to help people consider how much pleasure their action will bring about.
1.Intensity: stronger happiness is better than weaker.
2.Duration: longer lasting pleasure is better than brief.
3.Certainty: An act that will definitely produce pleasure is better than one which only possibly produces pleasure.
4.Propinquity/Remoteness: the more immediate in space or time the anticipated pleasure, the more relevant it should be to the decision.
5.Fecundity/Production: a pleasure that leads to more pleasure is of greater value than a pleasure that does not lead to more, similarly a pain that leads to more pain is worse than a pain with no painful after effects.
6.Purity: A pleasure with no pain mixed in, is the greatest pleasure.
7.Extent: the more people sharing the pleasure, the better.
Mill assumes that pleasure and happiness are the Good and is self-evident.
Mill refers to the Good, he is referring to morality as a whole. The Good is not something transcendent which we can only work out through reason; it is something derived from our very nature as animals.
Ethical Naturalism attempts to resolve Hume’s Fork but arguing that the term ‘good’ correlates to a natural property which can be empirically measured and verified
EXAMPLE: Probably the best known naturalist account of ethics is Bentham’s Utilitarianism which argues that ‘good’ correlates to ‘pleasure’. When someone says “charity is good” you can therefore empirically verify this by looking at how much pleasure is generated by charity o
EXAMPLE: Another example is from F.H. Bradley who argued that ‘good’ was to realise our position in society and carry out our duties. Like utilitarianism, we would be able to empirically verify the ‘goodness’ of actions by looking at whether they are in accordance with the moral traditions of society
Many people do appear to believe that ethical statements are objective
The majority of people do believe that ethics are objective and very few people believe that ethics are just opinions
Furthermore our legal systems are supported by the assumption that ethics are objective and ethical naturalism is in keeping with the majority view of ethics
People do attempt to measure goodness in terms of the quantity of some natural property
When people weigh up two good actions and attempt to measure them, they do typically measure the quantity of a natural quality such as pleasure
EXAMPLE: Giving £20 to charity is more ‘good’ than giving £10 because it creates more pleasure seems like a reasonable
David Hume: The Is-Ought Problem ▪ Hume argued that you cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’
In other words, just because something is the case (such as an action gives pleasure) doesn’t mean we ‘ought’ to do it
G.E. Moore: The Open Question Argument
G.E. Moore made a similar point to Hume and argued that the very fact we can ask questions about whether any natural property is ‘good’ shows that ‘good’ is a matter of subjective opinion
EXAMPLE: You can ask people “Is good to maximise pleasure” and the fact that people disagree about the answer shows that good is not just pleasure
Whether ethical language is meaningful or relates in any way to the real world.
Whether ethical language is objective.
Whether naturalism is a useful theory in ethical philosophy.
Can ethical language be understood in the same way as non-ethical language?
Can we test or check the meaning of ethical terms using empirical evidence?
Naturalism
“‘In my station my particular duties are prescribed to me, and I have them whether I wish to or not.’ - F.H. Bradley
‘For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained…’ - Hume
‘If I am asked, “What is good?” my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter.’ - G.E. Moore
One solution to Hume’s Fork is Intuitionism and is associated with G.E. Moore
E. Moore takes a cognitivist position but argues that the Good cannot be reduced to a natural property of the world.
Moore is critical of naturalism because it assumes:
- Good can be defined as a natural property (In Mill's case, happiness or pleasure).
- It’s possible to infer what is moral from such premises.
Moore criticises Mill's naturalism in two separate but connected arguments: the open question argument and the naturalistic fallacy.
Moore argued that the idea of ‘good’ was indefinable and therefore could also not be measured
However, Moore maintained that there were still objective moral truths which are self-evident or intuitive to a rational mind
ANALOGY: Moore used the analogy of the colour yellow to explain how we understand ‘goodness’. He argued that no one can define or explain what ‘yellow’ is but that people instantly recognise what ‘yellow’ is when they see it. Furthermore, we learn what ‘yellow’ is by looking at examples of yellow things
Moore argued that ‘good’ is like this in that we recognise what is ‘good’ even if we cannot define it and that we learn about what is ‘good’ by seeing examples of ‘good’ things
H. A. Pritchard said that working out right/wrong is our duty, which we use intuition to work out. In this respect, the concept of duty sounds a little more deontological than Moore's teleological perspective. said there were two kinds of thinking: reason brought together the facts about a situation, and intuition perceived the right thing to do.
WD Ross argued that moral principles can’t be absolute. He said that we have prima facie (at first appearance) duties: keeping promises, making up for harm done, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement and non-maleficence. Intuition identifies our prima facie duties, but our actions are down to our judgement.
Moore argues that if the Good was pleasure, then the question ‘is the Good pleasure?’ would be a closed question (would require a yes or no answer). But any attempt to define the Good is not that simple.
The fact that we have to think about it means it is an open question, and therefore the Good cannot be understood naturally as pleasure:
Naturalists like Mill argue that the Good is pleasure: Moore says that this is a circular argument.
Why does Moral Intuitionism reject Ethical Naturalism? The naturalistic fallacy is an argument from ethical non-naturalism. What Moore argued, is that a mistake that many ethicists have made is to describe or define ‘good’ in terms of things that exist (natural properties) that we already understand. For example, in Utilitarianism, goodness is associated with pleasure and in Natural Law, goodness is associated with things that do not go against nature. Moore argued that this is wrong.
Goodness, Moore argued is simple and indefinable like ‘yellow.’ If you were to try to define ‘yellow’ to a blind person, you would be unable. Moore argued the same thing about good: it is a mistake to define good in terms of something else, such as pleasure as you have failed to define good, you have simply given an example of it. In the same way, if you try to define yellow by referring to the sun or sand on a beach or a rubber duck, you haven’t defined yellow, you’ve simply described an object that possesses the quality ‘yellow.’
For Moore, good is not a natural property i.e. it cannot be experienced, whereas pleasure, pain, joy, misery all are, because we can experience them through our senses. To say that something pleasurable is good, or that something painful is bad is a mistake for Moore.
If Moore is right, you can see straight away that there is a problem with Utilitarianism, where ‘pleasure’ is at the heart of Bentham’s theory, which says that ‘pleasure is good’, so ‘we ought to seek pleasure’.
H.A. Prichard: Lots of people do feel that their moral intuitions are self-evident
Prichard argued that many people view the statement that “killing is wrong” as just selfevident in the same way that “2+2=4.
This suggests that moral statements might just be intuitively known
W.D. Ross: There appears to be some Prima Facie duties we have intuitively
W.D. Ross argued that we have a number of prima facie duties that are viewed as common sense intuition and this supports the idea that moral statements are intuitive o
EXAMPLE: Ross notes that justice and helping others appear to be duties that we just know we should aim to fulfil
Moore accuses Mill of producing a circular argument but commits the same fallacy in his own argument. If the Good is an intuition and intuitions are moral, he is saying the Good is moral (or the Good is good).
Moore argues that we just know what is good; we can't explain why, it is self-evident. What if intuitions conflict? E.g. A Nazi soldier may have felt that killing other human beings was wrong, but also felt an inherent sense of duty. Do some intuitions come first?
It doesn’t really solve Hume’s Fork as intuitions are not verifiable
One of the main problems of intuitionism is it doesn’t actually solve Hume’s Fork
Instead of showing that moral statements are empirical or analytical knowledge, it says that it is a third type of knowledge called intuition
Many people disagree that intuition is even a type of knowledge as it isn’t verifiable like other types of knowledge
It replaces natural properties with non-natural properties
Intuitionism attempts to avoid making the Naturalistic fallacy by not correlating moral statements with natural properties
However, the way it does this is by correlating moral statements with a non-natural property (intuition) which doesn’t appear to be a better solution
If morals are intuitive and objective then why do people disagree about what is right and wrong
Another problem of intuitionism is that if intuition was a real type of objective knowledge then everyone should agree through intuition what is right and wrong but this is not the case
Throughout history and cultures, there are many disagreements about what is right and wrong which shows that intuition cannot reliable provide us with objective moral statements
Whether ethical terms can just be known through intuition.
Whether ethical language is objective.
Whether intuitionism is a useful theory in ethical philosophy.
Do we just know what is morally good or what we ought to do without needing to reason?
Is there any way to choose between conflicting duties?
Intuitionism
‘Knowledge is knowledge and an attempt to state it in terms of something else must end in describing something which is not knowledge.’ – Daney
‘The sense that we ought to do certain things arises in our unreflective consciousness.’ – H.A. Pritchard
‘The suggestion that moral judgements are made … by just sitting down and having an ethical intuition is a travesty of actual moral thinking.’ – J.L. Mackie
A.J. Ayer didn’t disagree with Hume’s Fork and instead accepted that it showed that ethical statements were therefore not objective
He argued that when people make moral claims they are instead telling us about their subjective feelings (Emotivism can also be known as Hurrah-Boo Theory for this reason)
EXAMPLE: “Killing is wrong” is really just saying “I don’t like being killed”
Furthermore, as well as describing our feelings, Ayer argued that making moral claims also tried to provoke an emotional response in others to agree with us
Non-cognitive views are mostly inspired by Hume, who argues that we cannot derive moral judgements from what we perceive through our senses. Moral statements do not refer to moral properties in the world, either natural or non-natural (intuitions). Moral statements are neither true nor false.
There are no moral truths or facts in the world, so no possibility of moral knowledge.
Two main non-cognitive moral theories are emotivism and prescriptivism.
Hume believes moral judgements are emotional responses to the external world. Values cannot logically be derived from fact.
There could be objective morality as humans have similar preferences, and experiences of pleasure and pain. E.g. we feel pity for others and we don't like to witness suffering.
Hume's version of emotivism was adapted by A. J. Ayer.
Ayer was a logical positivist who was critical of intuitionism.
Ayer wrote as follows:
We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express – that is, if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false.
The verification principle’s focus is not whether a statement is true, but whether it is meaningful.
For Ayer, when we make a moral judgement, we’re expressing personal feelings and emotions. - They allow us to share emotions with others.
Moral values and judgements are not based on sense-experience and do not correspond to any physical properties in the world, therefore they are neither true nor false.
It is supported by Hume’s Fork
Hume’s Fork supports the view that there are no objective ethics
Furthermore, there seems something right in Hume’s Fork that you cannot prove what is right or wrong analytically or empirically
It might explain how two opposing views can both consider themselves as the morally good side
Throughout history, people often use moral claims to justify their actions
EXAMPLE: During WW2 both the allies and the axis thought they were in the right and the other side were wrong and so this supports the view that ethical claims are just expressions of subjective emotions
Most people feel that ethics are not just subjective opinions
Emotivism disagrees with the majority view that ethics are not subjective
Typically, people want to say that when they make an ethical claim they are not just expressing a feeling but are saying something stronger than that
If we accept Emotivism then we cannot really justify a legal system
The main problem with accepting emotivism is that it means that we cannot justify our legal system
How can we judge something as doing something wrong if the very idea of right and wrong is just a subjective opinion?
Brand Blanshard gives the example of a rabbit caught in a trap. If morality is essentially the expression of emotions felt when witnessing an event, this would mean that if no one is there to observe the rabbit and its pain, the pain is neither good nor bad.
Ayer's emotivism is called the 'boo-hurrah' theory as he reduces moral judgements and language to feelings of pleasure, displeasure or pain. But moral judgements involve more complex emotions, thoughts and feelings than just approval or disapproval.
Hare agrees with emotivists that there is no such thing as a moral fact, but disagrees on what moral values are and what they do.
Emotivists fails to take into account that moral judgements is to guide others, to tell them what they 'ought' to do.
For Hare:
- Moral judgements are action-guiding: they prescribe what to do.
- Moral terms are not descriptive but evaluative: they evaluate experiences and recommend or disapprove of them.
- Moral judgements are meaningful when they can apply to everyone in a similar situation.
Places more emphasis on reason than does emotivism. We use reason and logic to make moral judgements even if the reasoning relies on values being derived from facts.
Universalisability and 'overridingness'
Hare normative theory re-uses a term first used by Kant - 'universalisability’.
The verification principle’s focus is not whether a statement is true, but whether it is meaningful.
When we say 'ought', we are saying that the action is right for us and everyone in similar circumstances.
Hare takes into account that not everyone is in the same situation, but if the variables are broadly similar, then the line of action should be the same.
Moral judgements override non-moral judgements. E.g. If someone believes stealing is wrong, they wouldn't steal money even if needed. Moral principle overrides the non-moral consideration of monetary gain.
Hare analyses the word ‘good'. Saying something is good, means that I choose it and that I recommend its choice to others too.
Goodness is not a property we can find in an object: we cannot see, touch or smell the Good. We can use certain criteria that allow us to decide whether something is good, but this doesn't define goodness itself.
The Good itself is evaluative - it puts a value on the object: we commend it and we choose it, and this is the reason it’s good.
The commendation is intended to be action-guiding or imperative: it tells us what we ought to do. This fills the gap between value and fact.
Doesn't account for a clash of moral principles. E.g. Someone might believe abortion is wrong, but what if a pregnant woman's life is at risk because of the pregnancy?
Hare argues that one of the moral principles must be abandoned, or the two principles must somehow merge and adapt themselves to the situation. Universalisability is still possible, because we could create a principle that relates to any broadly similar situation.
Hare tries to make his principle of universalisability as specific as possible by allowing for broadly similar situations to be considered equivalent.
Circumstances are never completely the same and each situation is unique.
Hare doesn't account for rational but 'bad' decisions. E.g. Killing a fly because it annoys me, rather than helping it fly out of the window.
Hare argues that moral considerations override other types of consideration, but how can we make that decision if we cannot clearly differentiate between moral and non-moral uses of the term 'should'?
Ethical egoism
Useful Max Stirner quotes: “Why will you not take courage now to really make yourselves the central point and the main thing altogether?” “I decide whether it is the right thing in me; there is no right thing outside me.” “Away, then, with every concern that is not altogether my concern!” “I am unique. Hence my wants too are unique, and my deeds; in short, everything about me is unique.”
J. L. Mackie argues that moral values are relative rather than absolute - they 'are not part of the fabric of the world'.
Mackie makes the following points:
There’s a difference between kind and cruel actions, between acts of courage and acts of cowardice.
It’s possible to describe such acts and outline their differences, so acts of courage or cowardice are part of the fabric of the world'.
- However, the values we ascribe to such acts are not in the world: we can describe acts of cruelty but the value that they are wrong is not an objective fact.
He is critical of moral realism and that there are moral properties in the world (natural properties: Mill or intuitions: Moore.
Moral properties cannot be absolute because they are culturally relative. E.g. polygamy is moral in some cultures, but not in others.
Ayer agrees with Mackie that there is nothing factual about ethical language
Ayer argues that ethical language is symbolic, just like religious language. E.g. Christian cross is a symbol of Jesus's sacrifice, and the importance of redemption and atonement in Christianity. The cross represents the Christian faith and is understood by a community of believers: the cross is a religious symbol.
Ethical symbols represent how human beings interact with the world.
Moral rules are symbols as they establish conventions on how to live.
Society understands the ethical convention that killing is wrong- but for Ayer, this is an emotional response to the world.
Ayer argues that ethical assertions may be symbolic, in that they express moral judgements, but are not facts: they do not describe anything about the world and are thus meaningless.
Whether ethical statements are just expressions of our emotions.
Whether ethical language is factually meaningless.
Whether emotivism is a useful theory in ethical philosophy.
Is there any more to a moral statement than simply uttering a feeling?
What is the purpose of moral debate?
Ethical egoism
Useful Max Stirner quotes: “Why will you not take courage now to really make yourselves the central point and the main thing altogether?” “I decide whether it is the right thing in me; there is no right thing outside me.” “Away, then, with every concern that is not altogether my concern!” “I am unique. Hence my wants too are unique, and my deeds; in short, everything about me is unique.”
1 Explore how meta-ethics is different from normative ethics. (8)
1 Explore the ideas of the Cognitive and non-cognitive uses of ethical language (8)
1 Explore the difference between realism and anti-realism as approaches to ethical language. (8)
1 Explore the place and context of the debate about language as factual or symbolic. (8)
2. Assess the claim that ethical language is symbolic. (12)
2. Assess tthe claim that ethical language describes natural facts. (12)
2. Assess the claim that ethical statements merely express emotions. (12)
2. Assess the significance of non-naturalism within meta-ethics. (12)
3b) Analyse the implications of claim that the nature of ethical assertions is that they are not absolutist but relative. (20)
3b Analyse the relevance of the this claim ethical language is meaningless and therefore cannot be true with reference to the debates about verification and falsification. (20)
3b Analyse the implications of the naturalistic fallacy and the is–ought gap for ethical language. (20)
4 Evaluate the view that ethical language is inherently emotive. (30) Q 2022
4 Evaluate the status of the claim all ethical language is prescriptive. (30)
4 Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the claim that intuitionism is the only successful form of ethical language. (30)